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SUBJECTS AND EXTERNAL ARGUMENTS CLAUSES AND NON-CLAUSES

Within the theory of Government and Binding there are two relationships of particular interest to this paper. One is between [NP, S] and [VP, S]. [NP, S] is the GF subject of its clause (GF-S); [VP, S] is the syntactic predicate of its clause. In this paper I call the structural relationship between [NP, S] and [VP, S] the subject-VP relationship.

The other relationship is the semantic analogue to the structural relationship above: that between a subject argument and its semantic predicate.[1] Offering a definition of semantic predicate is beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that a predicate assigns theta roles to its arguments. The definition of subject argument has been much debated in the literature, with concerns being whether a subject argument need be external to the maximal projection of its predicate and whether a subject argument and (the maximal projection of) its predicate need form a constituent (which would be a clause or a small clause). With this paper I hope to shed light on the second part of that debate: I will conclude that a subject argument and its predicate need not form a constituent. I also argue against the externality requirement in Napoli (to appear). However, here I adopt the term "external argument" for subject argument, without prejudice as to whether the indicated argument need be configurationally external to (the maximal projection of) its predicate, in order to avoid any confusion with the structural term "subject" as defined in the paragraph immediately above. Now we can call the semantic relationship of interest here the external argument-predicate relationship.

This paper makes crucial use of the principle that every element in a given utterance must be licensed. NPs may be licensed in several ways. The most common is for the NP to appear in the lexical structure of some lexical head. By that I mean that the NP either receives a theta role from the lexical head (if it is in the argument structure of the lexical head) and/or it is an object of that lexical head (if it is subcategorized for by the lexical head). Notice that an NP can be the object of a lexical head and not bear a theta role (as with object NPs that are parts of unanalyzable idioms). And notice that an NP can receive a theta role from a lexical head without being subcategorized for (as happens with GF-Ss). But an NP can also be licensed in two other ways: (1) if it is a GF–S, it is

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licensed by virtue of the fact that English requires S to be expanded to NP VP, or (2) if it is itself a predicate, it is licensed by virtue of bearing a semantic relationship to its external subject, which must be independently licensed. (See also Chomsky 1986, p. 93 in particular.) The only exception is NPs in absolutives, which seem to be structurally licensed in much the same way GF-Ss are (see Napoli (to appear)).

Furthermore, every VP that is not or does not contain a semantic predicate (in a way made clear in Section 1.2 below) must be [VP, S]. Again, this follows from the principle of licensing. A [VP, S] is licensed simply by the fact that English requires S to be expanded to NP VP. Thus [VP, S] need not be or contain a semantic predicate, although it may. However, all other VPs must either be arguments of some predicate – in which case they are licensed by appearing in the argument structure of that predicate – or be predicates themselves and thus be licensed by bearing a semantic relationship to their external argument, which must be independently licensed.

We can now see that at least two differences between the subject-VP relationship and the external argument-predicate relationship have grammatical reflexes.

(A) A GF-S need not be thematic, but an external argument must.
(B) A [VP, S] need not constitute or contain a semantic predicate.

I show below how we can use these two differences to test whether a given syntactic phenomenon involves the subject-VP relationship or the external argument-predicate relationship. Only in the former instance is a clausal structure necessarily indicated.

I go a step further, however, and claim that whenever evidence for the subject-VP relationship is absent from a phenomenon, that phenomenon is not rendered by a clause. That is, the tests in Section 1 below for the distinctions in (A) and (B) are necessary and sufficient tests for the presence of a clause. There are two justifications for this claim.

First, the analysis of a phenomenon as clausal makes us expect certain syntactic possibilities. In particular, we expect that the GF-S can be nonthematic and the [VP, S] need not be or contain a semantic predicate. We expect this because these two positions are licensed independently of semantic considerations, as outlined above. If, instead, a given construction *Z* were a clause but never allowed nonthematic GF-Ss or nonpredicative VPs, we'd have to admit two types of clauses into our grammar: those that had the full range of syntactic possibilities we originally expected and this second, more restrictive, kind (of which *Z* is an example) that required thematic GF-Ss and predicative VPs. But

there is no independent evidence that language breaks down into two such different kinds of clauses. Thus a clausal analysis of a phenomenon like *Z* predicts syntactic possibilities that do not occur – with no explanation for their lack. I conclude that a construction such as *Z* is nonclausal.

I postpone the second justification for my position until Section 5, since it is extensive and more easily comprehended after the reader has been through the earlier sections.

The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 1 I offer tests for the distinctions in (A) and (B). In Section 2 I apply these tests to structures which have been argued to involve one or the other relationship, so that I can demonstrate the predictive validity of these tests. In Section 3 I apply these tests to *with* absolutives, showing there are two types: clausal and nonclausal. In Section 4 I suggest briefly other constructions whose analysis may be better understood by using the tests in Section 1. And in Section 5 I look at some of the predictions of the analyses given in this paper for theta theory and show that they hold, adding further support for these analyses and showing that the tests of Section 1 are, indeed, diagnostics for clausehood. The framework adopted here is GB as developed in Chomsky (1981, 1982, 1986) with certain modifications along the lines of Williams (1980–1984).

1. Tests

Both of the tests discussed here appear in bits and pieces and in varying forms elsewhere in the literature. The discussion here is included for the sake of clarity and completeness.

1.1. *Non Theta Bearing Items*

At least three kinds of NPs have been claimed in the linguistic literature to be athematic: *there* of so called *there*-insertion, various kinds of *it*, and NPs that are parts of idioms. While *there* does not seem to bear a theta role nor does raising *it*, what I call "ambient *it*" (following Bolinger, 1973) occurs in structures where it must be thematic, as does the *it* of extraposition. Also many NPs that are parts of idioms are thematic. I go through these complex issues below, concluding that there are NPs that do not bear theta roles, but that they are much less numerous that one might have previously thought.

There. *There* of so called *there*-insertion sentences is seen in (1).

(1) There's a problem I've got to talk to you about.

There covers the trace of Move NP. *There* is not lexically inserted into the base.[2] Therefore, by the Projection Principle, *there* cannot bear a theta role. Furthermore, we will find below in the discussion of ambient *it* empirically testable diagnostics for whether an item is thematic. By these diagnostics, as well, *there* is not thematic. (See also Note 14.)

The conclusion that *there* is athematic seems unavoidable and in most ways (as we will see below) *there* behaves as though it is athematic. However, for some speakers when *there* is accompanied by a non-psychological locative (something like *in the tree*, rather than *on my mind*) it can appear in positions that only thematic items appear in. It may be that a deictic locative phrase opens *there* up to a referential interpretation and thus allows *there* to bear a theta role. I point out examples of this sort below where relevant. (See also Note 13.)

Raising it. I call the *it* that fills the subject position of a verb with a finite complement which could also take an infinitival complement and concomitant raising into subject position but which does not allow a sentential subject "raising *it*" (R-*it*). We see R-*it* in (2a).

(2)a. It seems that Ralph already skimmed the milk.
b. No one seems to understand theta theory.
c. Carlie seems sweet.
d. *That Ralph already skimmed the milk seems.

(Notice that I am using the failure of (2d) as a crucial part of the identification of R-*it*. Thus *seem*, *appear*, *turn out* occur with R-*it*, but (*be*) *likely*, *seem true*, (*be*) *certain* do not. An *it* with this second type of predicate is extraposition *it* (discussed below) and not R-*it*.)

Verbs like *seem* allow raising into GF-S position, as in (2b), thus we know from the Theta Criterion and the Projection Principle that the lexical structure of these verbs does not include an external argument when the internal argument is an infinitival clause. Therefore, the GF-S of *seem* in (2b) is not thematic. However, it is theoretically possible that the argument structure for *seem* could be different when *seem* takes an internal argument that is not an infinitival clause. For example, in (2c) we do not have an infinitival clause. One might argue (although I know of no such arguments and I doubt they would be tenable) that the argument structure of *seem* allows an external argument precisely when the internal argument is a nonclausal predicate.

What I conclude from the above discussion is that we cannot determine on a priori grounds that the GF-S of *seem* in (2a), which is R-*it*, is athematic simply because of the existence of structures like that in (2b), unless we adopt the position that lexical structure is invariant regardless of subcategorization frame (where the difference between a finite complement and an infinitival complement would appear in the subcategorization frame). I am unwilling to adopt this position without argumentation (and I think it is wrong; see Napoli forthcoming). However, we can determine on empirical grounds that R-*it* is athematic since R-*it* fails all the diagnostics offered immediately below in the discussion of ambient *it*.[3]

Ambient it. If an NP can control PRO, it must have a theta role. Ambient *it* can control PRO. (Many of the following examples are either taken or adapted from Bolinger, 1973.)[4]

(3)a. It's cold enough [PRO to freeze the balls on a brass monkey].
b. It's late enough [PRO to make me yawn].
c. It's nice enough in California [PRO to make me want to move].

In (3a) we see that weather *it* is thematic; in (3b), that time *it* is thematic; in (3c), that other senses of ambient *it* are thematic.

Ruwet (1986) criticizes the above argument, asking whether *it* in sentences like (3a–c) is the controller of PRO or whether the state or event itself (that is, the event described by the matrix clause minus the infinitival clause) could be the controller of PRO. Indeed, Ruwet's analysis seems semantically plausible. However, the examples in (4) present problems for Ruwet's analysis.

(4) It got cold enough [PRO to snow].
It got humid enough [PRO to finally rain].

Here is it not semantically plausible to think of an event as controlling PRO: the event of getting cold, for example, does not snow. Nor can we claim that some unmentioned entity other than ambient *it* controls the PRO in (4), since no other NP is allowed:

(5) *The weather/temperature got cold enough to snow.
*The sky/air got humid enough to finally rain.

I conclude that ambient *it* can control PRO and therefore bears a theta role.

Also, if an NP can be the sister of a V or a P that normally assigns a theta role to a sister NP (actually, here the theta role is assigned not by the P itself, but compositionally by the V – see Chomsky (1986b) and

Napoli (to appear, chapter one)), then that NP should be taken to have a theta role in that structure.[5] Likewise, if an NP can serve as the GF-S of conjoined VPs where one of them normally assigns a theta role to a GF-S, then that NP should be taken as having a theta role in that structure.[6] (For more examples, see Darden, (1973) and Postal and Pullum (1987).)

(6) Don't do it!/I like it in California./Hold it!
Come off it!/Look what a hard time they're having of it.

(7) It rained and ruined the picnic.
It snowed but didn't stick.
It thundered and scared the hell outta me.

The conjunctions in (7) are asymmetric. That is at least partially due to the connection of linguistic linearity to temporal consequence or cause-and-effect (see Schmerling 1975). It may also be because we typically recognize ambient *it* in GF-S position by the choice of accompanying predicate (weather and time expressions). Thus we must first establish that an *it* is ambient *it* (by selecting an appropriate typical predicate) and then we can conjoin on a second, less typical, predicate.[7]

Thus ambient *it* can bear a theta role.

The point of the above is well made by Bolinger, who warns us not to confuse "generality of meaning" with "lack of meaning". Still, when ambient *it* does not control PRO and is not a sister to a V or a P (that is, when there is no evidence present in the structure to force us into recognizing that *it* is thematic), some speakers have unsure judgments about whether ambient *it* can occur in external argument position other than [NP, S]. They waffle on their acceptability judgments of the relevant sentences. This distinction brings to mind the claims in the literature that ambient *it* is a quasi argument (see Chomsky, 1981; and Rizzi, 1986, among others). Examples with ambient *it* in this paper were acceptable to all the speakers I asked.

It of Extraposition. The *it* of Extraposition (EXT-*it*) appears to be able to control PRO:

(8) It's likely enough that John did it [PRO to convince me we ought to question him].

As with the ambient *it* examples, however, one might claim that PRO in (8) might be controlled by something other than EXT-*it* – perhaps the event, perhaps the *that* clause itself. However, if the event or the *that* clause were the controller of PRO, we'd have no explanation for the contrast of grammaticality between (8), with EXT-*it*, and (9), with R-*it*:

(9) *It seems enough that John died to upset me.

Instead, if we analyze the *it* in both (8) and (9) as the controller of PRO, then we can account for the difference in grammaticality by claiming that EXT-*it* is thematic and, thus, a valid controller, whereas R-*it* is non-thematic and, thus, cannot control PRO.[8] I, therefore, take (8) as an instance of control by EXT-*it* and evidence that EXT-*it* is thematic.

There is other evidence that suggests EXT-*it* is thematic. In (10) we see that EXT-*it* can occur in sister position of a V or P (with the object of the P again receiving a theta role via Compositional Theta Assignment) that normally assigns a theta role to its NP sisters. Thus (10) is parallel to (6) above.

(10) You'll have to see to it that he's well fed.

While it is possible the *it* in (10) is not EXT-*it*, I know of no arguments to that effect. And this *it* is taken in the linguistic literature to be EXT-*it* (as Postal and Pullum (1987) document).

Although we have no unassailable arguments that EXT-*it* is thematic, the evidence we do have is suggestive. Therefore, I conclude that EXT-*it* is thematic (and see Bennis (1986) for the same conclusion for Dutch; Chomsky (1981) for the claim that EXT-*it* is a quasi argument; and Culicover and Rochemont (1986) for a base-generated analysis of NP extraposition that assigns argument status to the NP and which could be extended to EXT-*it*). We will see in later sections that EXT-*it* does, in fact, behave as though it were thematic in the structures studied in this paper.[9]

NPs in Idioms. Much has been written about idioms and I will not here enter into a comprehensive discussion. For my purposes all that is necessary is to make a distinction between two extremes in types of idioms. One is the idiom which is readily analyzable into lexical subparts. The other is the idiom which is (almost) unanalyzable into lexical subparts. (See Sag (1982) and Reagan (in press).) Most idioms fall somewhere between the two extremes. As an example of an analyzable idiom, let me use (11). As an example of an unanalyzable idiom, let me use (12).

(11) The cat got out of the bag. (The secret was discovered.)

(12) They put on the dog. (They went to an extra effort to do something that looks good.)

Analyzable idioms allow us to play with the NPs involved and extend the idioms in creative ways in a wide variety of contexts and sometimes even

out of context. Unanalyzable idioms strongly resist this extension.

(13)a. The cat got out of the bag and wrecked havoc.
b. They put on the dog and combed its tail.

As a start to a conversation (13a) has an idiomatic as well as a literal reading. But (13b) strongly favors a literal (and perverse) reading. The fact that *the cat* in (13a) receives a theta role from the VP *wrecked havoc* shows that the subject of the idiom *The cat is/got out of the bag* can bear a theta role. I conclude that NPs in analyzable idioms in general bear theta roles, while those in unanalyzable idioms do not.

The extension test seen in (13) will be my test for whether an idiom is analyzable with respect to the NP whose thematicity is at issue. If we can extend the idiom with respect to the given NP, that NP is being analyzed as a subpart of the idiom. Extendability can call for building up a story around the idiom which is plausible at the metaphorical level. More transparently metaphorical idioms will more easily pass the test. The judgment of degree of transparency of an idiom as a metaphor is the sort of judgment we expect to vary among speakers. Some see almost every idiom as metaphorical while others are more restrictive.

We may test the theta role status of any NP in the idiom, regardless of its GF. Thus, while in (13a) *the cat* is a thematic GF-S, in (14) *our goose* is a thematic D.O. And while in (13b) *the dog* is an athematic D.O. under the idiomatic reading (explaining the failure of an idiomatic reading for (13b)), in (15) *little pitchers* is an athematic GF-S (explaining the failure of an idiomatic reading for (15b)). (See also Bresnan (1982).)

(14)a. The Dean cooked our goose. (The Dean got us in trouble.)
b. The Dean cooked our goose and ate it.
(15)a. Little pitchers have big ears. (The children are listening.)
b. Little pitchers have big ears and fill up fast.

(14b) allows an idiomatic reading, but (15b) allows no reading at all for the speakers I asked (although one of the referees for this article accepts it, and with the idiomatic reading). Some speakers objected to (15b) as a test of extendability since they felt *pitchers* in the idiom might not be the *pitchers* that means "jugs" but some word not found anywhere else in the language except in the idiom. For those speakers (15a) has no non-idiomatic reading at all and is clearly unanalyzable.

Since the purpose of this section is to establish tests for distinguishing NPs in GF-S position from NPs in external argument position which are not GF-S, the relevant idioms to look at are ones with NPs in GF-S position. Most idioms that involve NPs in GF-S position are analyzable to

a greater or lesser extent, with variability from speaker to speaker, as we expect. My claim is not that every speaker will agree on which idioms are analyzable. Rather, for any given speaker those idioms which are analyzable will involve NPs that behave grammatically in their speech as though they bear theta roles whereas those idioms which are unanalyzable will involve NPs that behave grammatically as though they do not bear theta roles. Speakers I asked agreed that the idioms in (16) are analyzable:

(16)a. The shit hit the fan. (The problems were discovered.)
The shit hit the fan and fouled our day.
b. A little birdie told me. (I found out in some secret way.)
A little birdie told me and flew away.

Speakers varied on whether the idioms in (17) are analyzable:

(17) The axe fell./The proof is in the pudding.
The cat has his tongue./His marbles are loose.
The roof caved in one John's dreams./The sky fell.
His ship came in./The ice is broken.
Your star will rise./The die is cast.
The earth moved. / All hell broke loose.
Hell's a poppin'./The penny dropped.

Speakers agreed that the idioms in (18) are unanalyzable.

(18)a. Mum's the word. (No one should talk about this.)
*Mum's the word and makes me feel confident.
b. The jig is up. (We can't go on with the ruse.)
The jig is up and won't start again.

For the second sentence in (18a) speakers got no reading. *Mum* seems not to occur outside this idiom at all (just as *pitchers* in (15a) does not for some speakers), except in the related idiom *keep mum*. The second sentence of (18b) was judged to have only the literal reading. Again, some speakers objected to the second sentence of (18b) as a test for extendability since they felt *jig* here was not the *jig* that means "dance", but some word not found elsewhere in the grammar. In both (18a) and (18b), then, the first sentence has no nonidiomatic reading, thus it cannot be taken as metaphorical and therefore is unanalyzable. In Sections 2 and 3 I will use only idioms that speakers I asked agreed were either analyzable (as in (16)) or unanalyzable (as in (18)). Readers can test for themselves whether extendability correlates with theta role in their own speech for idioms like those in (17).

Analyzable idioms can be extended to allow the relevant NP to control PRO, but control is impossible in unanalyzable idioms.

(19)a. A little birdie told me in time [PRO to save my life].
b. *Mum is the word often enough to be remembered.

We can see, then, that many NPs in idioms do bear theta roles.

Conclusion. *There*, R-*it*, and the subjects of unanalyzable idioms are athematic NPs, and thus cannot be external arguments.

1.2. *VPs That Do Not Constitute or Contain a Semantic Predicate*

It is difficult to find a VP that can not be interpreted as constituting or containing a semantic predicate given the proper context. There are claims in the literature to the effect that VPs consisting of a copula and a definite NP are not predicative in the normal case (see Williams (1980), and Woisetschlaeger (1983)). Yet even these VPs can be argued to be predicative with appropriate contexts. Nevertheless, there is a discernible scale of likelihood of interpretation as a predicate for VPs with the structure [copula-NP], where certain indefinite NPs are (almost) invariably going to make the VP predicative (*be a jerk*), other indefinites probably will (*be a teacher*), certain definites probably will (*be the best idea*), other definites may or may not (*be the doctor*), and finally other definites probably won't (*be the boy in question*). At the extreme negative end of the scale are VPs made up of a copula plus a referential NP used as a simple alternative identification of the referent of the GF-S without adding information beyond naming, as in (20).

(20) My aunt is Miss Prothero.

Yet even such sentences as (20) are not equational in the logical sense, since in context they are not symmetric. And one can come up with contexts in which they do more than simply name.

(21) We all know that a woman named Miss Prothero asked the firemen if they wanted anything to read. But what you haven't figured out yet is that my own aunt, our dear friend, is Miss Prothero.

Even with the lack of a clear test for predicativeness, I will go forward and use VPs consisting of a copula plus a referential NP as examples of nonpredicative VPs. In the examples below I consistently choose referential NP that strongly resist being interpreted as predicative out of specialized contexts.

1.3. *Conclusion to Section 1.*

From Section 1.1 I conclude that *there*, R-*it*, and the subjects of unanalyzable idioms (all athematic items) occur as GF-Ss and not external arguments. Their presence signals a clause structure.

If *there*, R-*it*, and the subjects of unanalyzable idioms are excluded from a given construction, in the absence of apparent alternative explanations, I will conclude that they are excluded because they are not in GF-S position. Thus their exclusion will indicate the absence of a clause.

From Section 1.2 I conclude that whenever we have a VP consisting of a copula plus a referential NP, we do not have a semantic predicate. Such a VP cannot, therefore, take an external argument. If such a VP forms a syntactic constituent with an NP, that NP is its GF-S and the constituent they form is a clause.

If VPs consisting of a copula plus a referential NP are excluded from a given construction, in the absence of apparent alternative reasons for this exclusion, I will conclude they are excluded because the construction at issue is not a clause.

It is, of course, logically possible that the exclusion of athematic NPs and nonpredicative VPs from a given phenomenon indicates that the phenomenon is a special type of clause rather than a nonclause. I have already argued against this claim above and I add another argument against it in Section 5. Thus the tests developed here are necessary indicators of clausehood.

We now have two diagnostics for the presence of a clause.

2. Applying the tests of section 1.

I will now take three structures which are generally assumed or have been convincingly (to my mind) argued to be clausal and three structures which have been claimed or argued to be nonclausal in the literature and demonstrate the tests developed in Section 1. The tests are shown to validate the assumed or argued structures, and in doing so receive validation themselves.

I take the three clausal structures: tensed S, infinitivals, and the accusative-*ing* construction (whose clausal status is argued for in Reuland (1983)).

The three nonclausal structures here are much more controversial with respect to their analysis. The first is small clauses of the type seen in complements of verbs like *expect*, *consider*, *believe*. Williams (1980)

argues for their nonclausal status (see also Rothstein (1985), Emonds (1985), and others). In this matter, Williams is going against a great amount of literature (Chomsky (1981), Stowell (1981), Pesetsky (1982), Safir (1983), among others). The material of this section, however, clearly favors Williams' analysis. The term "small clause" (SC) is therefore a misnomer. Still, in an effort to avoid proliferation of terms for a single phenomenon, I will continue to call the construction of interest SCs.

A special word must be said about SCs. An SC is verbless, hence the relevant syntactic relationship to test as a diagnostic for the presence of a clause is not subject-VP but subject-XP, where subject is now defined as [NP, SC] with SC standing for small clause. There is considerable controversy over whether XP is a maximal projection or whether the whole SC is the maximal projection of the relevant X. Thus, when I write SC, I am not suggesting that there is a fixed category label for all small clauses. Rather, the notation SC is an expository device. Since the evidence in this paper suggests that SCs are not really clauses after all, and, hence, need not form a constituent, no node SC exists and these issues are irrelevant to us.

The second nonclausal structure considered here is merely claimed to be nonclausal in Williams (1984a), and the third is both claimed to be nonclausal in Williams (1984a) and argued at length to be nonclausal in Akmajian (1977). They are the perception verb stem complement (PVSC) and the perception verb participle complement (PVPC). The material of this section supports Williams and Akmajian.

The predictions are that athematic NPs will be allowed in GF-S position of clausal structures but will be barred from the external argument position of nonclausal structures. Furthermore, a nonpredicative VP (consisting of the copula plus a referential NP) can be the main VP of a clausal structure but a referential NP (with or without the copula, as the structure allows) cannot be the predicate of a nonclausal structure.

Before I begin there are several caveats to keep in mind. I list them at the outset so I can refer to them later by number and not have to interrupt my exposition with long comments.

Caveats About the Tests

1. The SC considered here contrasts minimally with infinitivals that involve the copula. Thus with regard to *there* sentences, only those which involve the copula can be used to make an interesting contrast. However, Williams (1984a) argues that *there* occurs only with AUX and

that AUX does not occur in nonclausal structures. If Williams is right, the SCs with *there* will be out, but for reasons extraneous to the fact that *there* is athematic. They will be out because of the absence of AUX (or, in traditional terms, because there is no verb which sanctions them). However, *there* sentences which occur with verbs other than the copula cannot be argued to require an AUX. (There are many such verbs, several of which are listed in McCawley (undated), the source of some of the examples I use in this paper.) In testing the PVSCs and the PVPCs I confine myself to examples with *there* and some verb other than the copula. Since, as will be seen below, these structures reject *there*, I conclude that it is because *there* is athematic while the structures involved require an external argument in the position occupied by *there*. Thus, even for the SC examples I will use the *there* test.

2. Again since the SCs I am using contrast minimally with infinitivals that involve the copula, with regard to the idiom test only idioms which involve the copula can be used to make an interesting contrast. This puts a severe limitation on the idioms which can be used in testing these structures and accounts for my regrettable repetitiveness of example types.

3. Again since the SCs I am using contrast minimally with infinitivals that involve the copula, with regard to the R-*it* test only R-*it* with a progressive marker on the verb can be used to make an interesting contrast. However, *seem* and *appear* do not occur in the progressive with R-*it*. Thus the relevant examples will be ungrammatical for reasons extraneous to the question of whether SCs are nonclausal. For this reason there will be a gap in my list of examples where SCs with R-*it* should occur.

4. The SCs I am using all involve a matrix verb that can take an NP object with or without a following predicate. Many strings are suspectible to either analysis, as in:

(22) Offense taken at sexist remarks
  a. $[_{NP}\,[_{N}$ offense$]\,[_{AP}$ taken at sexist remarks$]]$
  b. $[_{NP}\,[_{N}$ offense$]]\,[_{AP}$ taken at sexist remarks$]]$

It is important, therefore, in investigating the structure of SCs to make sure that the string following the matrix verb is open only to an analysis of NP plus following predicate (as in (22b)) and not simply NP containing a modifier of the head N. This is the case with all the examples I offer.

5. For some speakers greater length and/or complexity improves the acceptability of some of the sentence types discussed below. For example, although all speakers I have asked find both (23a) and (23b) bad,

some find (23d) much better than (23c).

(23)a. *We want there a party by 5 o'clock.
(cf. I want Jim here by 5 o'clock.)
b. *We absolutely want there a party by at least 5.
c. *We consider there likely to be Martians.
d. ?We all consider there likely to be too many Martians on Mars, so let's colonize elsewhere.

I don't know what to make of this fact. Greater length and/or complexity tends to ameliorate ungrammatical sentences of a variety of types, not just some of those types examined in this paper. Perhaps when a sentence is hard enough (with respect to complexity/length), speakers tend to lose touch with their acceptability judgments. In this paper I restrict my examples to simple, short ones, where the judgments are reliable. With such sentences the tests of Section 1 give remarkably clear results.

Clauses

Athematic NPs can appear as the GF-S of finite Ss (in (24)), infinitivals (in (25)), and the acc-*ing* construction (in (26)). In examples (24–26) below the (a) sentences have *there*; the (b) have R-*it*; and the (c) have an unanalyzable idiom.

(24)a. There followed a period of relative prosperity.
b. It seems he's right.
c. The jig is up.
(25)a. I didn't expect there to prevail such an ugly attitude.
b. I didn't expect it to seem he was so right.
c. I didn't expect the jig to be up so soon.
(26)a. I counted on there awakening in him a more than casual desire.
b. I counted on it at least appearing he was right.
c. I didn't count on the jig being up so soon.

Likewise, VPs consisting of the copula and a referential NP can occur as the main VP of these three structures.

(27) My aunt's Miss Prothero.
I never expected your aunt to be Miss Prothero.
I counted on John being our neighbor on the right.

The two tests lead to the conclusion that finite Ss, infinitivals, and the acc-*ing* structure are clausal. The wide acceptance of this conclusion supports the validity of the tests.

Nonclauses

Athematic NPs cannot occur in SCs (in (28)), PVSCs (in (29)), or PVPCs (in (30)). In examples (28–30), the (a) sentences have *there*; the (b), R-*it*; and the (c), an unanalyzable idiom.[10]

(28)a. *I didn't consider there a problem.
c. *I didn't expect the jig up so soon.
*I want mum the word. (cf. I want Mary quiet.)

(For discussion of the lack of an example with R-*it* see Caveat 3. For discussion of an alternative account of (28a), see Caveat 1.)

(29)a. *I could see there glow two eyes in the shadows.[11,12]
b. *I could actually see it appear that he was sad.
c. *I could just see the jig be up before we had a chance to extricate ourselves.
(30)a. *I couldn't see there looming in him the possibility of financial disaster.
b. *I couldn't see it appearing that he was sad.
c. ??I couldn't see the jig being up before we had a chance to extricate ourselves.

As I remarked at the outset in the initial discussion of *there*, the presence of a deictic locative may improve the acceptability of *there* in these types of sentences for some speakers. Thus some speakers find (29e) better than (29d) and (30e) better than (30d).[13]

(29)d. *I could see there begin to be a flicker of doubt.
e. I could see there begin to be a flicker of doubt in his eyes.
(30)d. *I could see there looming the prospect of financial disaster.
e. I could see there looming before my very eyes the prospect of financial disaster.

(Notice that the complexity/length factor discussed in Caveat 5 enters here.) Still, few speakers are comfortable with *there* in the relevant positions in these sentences.

In contrast to (28–30), we find that thematic NPs freely occur in SCs (in (31)), PVSCs (in (32)), and PVPCs (in (33)). The reader can easily find examples involving NPs that are generally agreed to be thematic. In (31–33) the (a) sentences have ambient *it*; the (b), EXT-*it*; and the (c), NPs in analyzable idioms.[14]

(31)a. I consider it nice around here.
b. I consider it likely that he won't show up.

c. I never expected the cat out of the bag so soon.

(32)a. I could hear it rain.
b. We all watched it become clear that he wasn't going to show up at the church.
c. I wish I hadn't seen the shit hit the fan.

(33)a. I watched it raining.
b. I watched it becoming ever more clear that he wasn't going to show up.
c. I just can't see the shit hitting the fan, no matter how much Daddy discovers.

It is important that the reader keep clear the distinction I am drawing between R-*it* (in (29b) and (30b)) and EXT-*it* (in (31b), (32b), and (33b)). A test to distinguish one from the other is: if a predicate can take a sentential GF-S, the *it* that occurs with it is EXT-*it*. Even with the complexity/length factor noted in Caveat 5, speakers judge the relevant sentences with R-*it* to be worse than close counterparts with EXT-*it*. Thus (34b), with EXT-*it*, is fine, while (34a), with R-*it*, is at best marginal.

(34)a. ??I can't really see it appearing to any jury that he was the innocent victim of a police frame-up.
b. I can't really see it appearing likely to any jury that he was the innocent victim of a police frame-up.

Notice that in 35 we have EXT-*it*, not R-*it*:

(35) We believe it sure to be true that Reagan personally sold hand grenades to Iran.

While *sure* can occur with R-*it*, as in,

(36) It's sure that Reagan sold hand grenades.
(cf. *That Reagan sold hand grenades is sure.)

sure can also appear with any other NP so long as movement has applied. In (35) EXT-*it* has been moved from the GF-S position of the infinitival into the D.O. position of *believe*. The trace left behind makes the AP *sure t to be true that* . . . an open function. Thus it can be a predicate, and the *it* is its external argument in (35). Here *believe*, like *consider* s-selects its sister AP (which is a predicate) but not its D.O. (see also Note 5 above, the discussion of (55) below, Williams (1980) and elsewhere, and Napoli (to appear)). With this analysis *it* in (35) is thematic and the AP headed by *sure* is a predicate. In fact, *it* in (35) is the external argument of two

predicates: the AP and the infinitival VP. Of course I am adopting throughout this paper a theta criterion like that in Chomsky (1986) (and in the work of many others), which allows an element to receive a theta role from every argument structure it belongs to. Such a theta criterion is necessary for any theory that allows secondary predicates (i.e., predicates that are not the first XP right sister of INFL – see also Chomsky (1986) and Rothstein (1985)).

Turning now to the test of whether a phenomenon requires a predicate or allows a nonpredicate, we find that a referential NP (with or without the copula, as the structure allows) cannot appear in predicate position in SCs, PVSCs, and PVPCs.

(37) *I found your aunt Miss Prothero.
*I can't see John become the neighbor on the right.
*I couldn't see John becoming the neighbor on the right.

In contrast, NPs which are not referential can appear with a predicative function in all three structures.

(38)a. I consider John the finest doctor.
b. I saw John become the best doctor around.
c. I could just see John being the trustworthy priest.

A nice example to make to make clear the contrast between (37) and (38) is seen in (39a), where on one reading *the professor* is an alternative referential identification of John and on the other reading *the professor* is a set of characteristics that John assumes (those of the proverbial professor). On the second reading *the professor* is a predicate. Only the predicative reading emerges in (39b–d).

(39)a. John is the professor.
b. I consider John the professor.
c. I could see John become the professor.
d. I could just see John being the professor.

(28–39) are explained if SCs, PVSCs, and PVPCs are nonclausal. If these are nonclausal, the relationship between the NP and the following material cannot be the structural one of subject-VP (or subject-XP, in the case of SCs), thus it must be the semantic one of external argument-predicate. Therefore only thematic NPs can occur in these structures and only semantic predicates and not simply referential NPs (with or without the copula) can appear.

Our two tests, then, lead to a nonclausal analysis of three structures which have been argued elsewhere to be nonclausal. Again the fact that

our tests lead to analyses that can be supported on independent grounds validates the tests.

3. Absolutive with.

In this section I apply the tests developed in Section 1 to the analysis of absolutive (ABS) *with* structures.

With-ABSs have been argued to be clausal by some (McCawley (1983), Beukema and Hoekstra (1983)) and to be nonclausal by others (Williams (1980), Riemsdijk (1978), and for French Ruwet (1982)). Here I argue that there are two types of *with*-ABSs: clausal ones which have the acc-*ing* construction (as in Reuland (1983)) following *with*, and nonclausal ones which have two constituents following *with* within the PP, an NP and a predicate which takes that NP as its external argument. That is, I analyze (40a) as in (41a), and (40b) as in (41b). With the ABS reading, I analyze neither of them as in (41c).

(40)a. With your brother having lost everything in the stock market crash, I'm surprised he's so happy.
b. With the bus drivers on strike, let's walk.

((40a–b) are variations on examples in McCawley (1983), as are several other of the acceptable examples in this section.)

(41)a.



b.



c.



Certainly a string like *the bus drivers on strike* is open to two analyses (as in Caveat 4):

(42)a. [NP the bus drivers [PP on strike]]
b. [NP the bus drivers] [PP on strike]

In the first analysis the PP would modify; in the second analysis it would predicate. Thus (40b) could be open to an analysis like that in (41c) above rather than (41b), with the reading being close to "Let's walk along with the bus drivers who are on strike". However, the justification for (41b) for the *with*-ABS reading of (40b) is not based solely on semantic interpretation. To see this, consider a string which cannot be analyzed as a single NP, such as *Jack fond of Mary*.

(43)a. *Jack fond of Mary came in.

Such a string can occur wherever we can have an NP followed by a predicate, as in SCs:

(43)b. I consider Jack fond of Mary.

This string can also occur in *with*-ABSs:

(43)c. With Jack fond of Mary, we shouldn't expect a divorce.

I conclude that *with*-ABSs that do not contain the acc-*ing* construction have two sisters of the *with*. Hence the ABS reading of (40b) corresponds to the analysis in (41b) and not to that in (41c). (See Riemsdijk (1978) and Ruwet (1982), particularly p. 95 and 109.)

With, then, can take an S sister or an NP sister with or without an adjunct phrasal major category that can predicate of the NP. In this way *with* is like many verbs that can take an object with or without an adjunct that predicates of that object (i.e., the SC situation).

I use the tests of Section 1 to distinguish between the two types of *with*-ABSs exemplified in (40a–b) and analyzed in (41a–b). The predictions are that clausal *with* constructions can allow an athematic GF-S as well as a nonpredicative VP, while nonclausal *with* constructions should preclude an NP follows by an adjunct where the NP is athematic or where the adjunct consists of a clearly referential NP (and, thus, is not a semantic predicate).

Clausal With-ABSs

Athematic NPs can occur in *with*-ABSs with *ing*. (44a) uses *there*; (44b) uses R-*it*; (44c) uses an unanalyzable idiom.

(44)a. With there being no possibility of advancement in her present job, Linda is determined to leave.
b. With it at least appearing that John knows economics well, we should nominate him.
c. With mum being the word, we don't have to worry.

Likewise, VPs consisting of the copula and a referential NP can occur in these *with*-ABSs:

(45) With your aunt being Miss Prothero, let's light a fire.

(44–45) are explained if *with*-ABSs with *ing* are clausal.

Nonclausal With-ABSs

Athematic NPs cannot occur in *with*-ABSs without *ing*. The three types of NPs to discuss here are *there*, R-*it*, and NPs in unanalyzable idioms. Since some complications arise, I will take them each separately.

First, most speakers reject *there* in these sentences:

(46) *With there another problem, their divorce is assured.

(For discussion of an alternative explanation for (46), see Caveat 1.) However, just as we've noted above, the presence of a deictic locative can improve or save entirely such sentences.[15] Josh Ard (personal communication) offered me (47):

(47) Life on our street used to be very dangerous for the kids, but now, with there a stop sign at the corner, life is much safer.

As before, I suggest that *there* may be referential here, its referent being the place indicated by the locative. In support, let me add that no speakers I have asked allow *there* in the absence of a deictic locative in *with*-ABSs without *ing*.

(48) *With there a flaw in his argument, he'll never win.

Turning now to R-*it*, we find a new complication. The *with*-ABSs being tested here contrast minimally with clausal *with*-ABSs that involve the copula. But, as was pointed out in Caveat 3, R-*it* does not occur with verbs in the progressive. Thus we cannot find examples of R-*it* with a progressive participle in our *with*-ABSs. Instead, every time we find R-*it* in a *with*-ABS, we are dealing with the acc-*ing* construction, that is, with clausal *with*-ABSs (as in (44b)). Therefore, we have a gap in our tests (parallel to the gap in the example sentences of (28) above).

NPs in unanalyzable idioms do not occur in *with*-ABSs without *ing*.

(49) *With the jig up, John left town.
(50) *With mum the word, we can count on silence.

In contrast to (46–50), thematic NPs freely occur in *with*-ABSs without *ing*. The reader can easily find examples involving NPs generally agreed to be thematic. Below (51a) has ambient *it*; (51b), EXT-*it*; and (51c), an NP in an analyzable idiom.

(51)a. With it cold enough to freeze the balls on a brass monkey, you better bring a warmer coat.
b. With it clear that tomorrow will be no better, let's just ignore the weather and go to the movies anyway.
c. With the cat out of the bag, why whisper anymore?

Likewise, a referential NP cannot appear in post NP position in a *with*-ABS without *ing*.

(52) *With Jocasta Oedipus' mom, the poor guy was doomed.

In contrast, predicative NPs can appear after the initial NP in *with*-ABSs without *ing*.

(53) With John the finest doctor in town, let's see him.

(46–53) are explained if *with*-ABSs without *ing* are nonclausal. If these are nonclausal, the relationship between the NP and the following material cannot be the structural one of subject-VP (or, rather, subject-XP, since these structures, like SCs, don't involve V). Thus it must be the semantic one of external argument-predicate. Therefore only thematic NPs can occur immediately following *with* and only predicative NPs can appear as an adjunct to the NP following *with*.

Before leaving these arguments, let us consider examples involving passive participles that might at first appear to contradict the analysis presented here.

(54) With John arrested again, we've got troubles galore.
(55) With the only bed slept in by lepers, let's stay awake.

While it might be possible to argue that (54) involves a lexical passive, (55) is transformational (see Wasow (1977), Chomsky (1981), among others). Typically we think of Move NP as resulting in movement into GF-S position only, whereas in (54) and (55) I'm claiming that movement is into the object of a P position. But this movement is not, after all, any more problematic than NP Movement into D.O. position with verbs that

do not s-select their D.O. in SCs like that we saw above in (35). That is, so long as *with* does not assign a theta role to its object, the object position can be lexically unfilled at D.S. Thus Move NP can fill the object of the P position. In Napoli (to appear, chapter one) I argue that most Ps do not assign theta roles to their sisters and, in particular, that *with* does not. Hence the application of Move NP in (54–55) in no way requires a clausal analysis of the material following *with*.

I conclude that *with*-ABSs without *-ing* are nonclausal.

Response to the Literature

Much of the literature on *with*-ABSs has used only one kind of *with*-ABS in making crucial points for a given analysis. Thus Williams (1980) uses no example of *with* plus the acc-*ing* construction in arguing against clausehood. And McCawley (1983) uses almost exclusively *with* plus the acc-*ing* construction in his crucial examples for arguing for clausehood.

Here I address an argument pertinent to both kinds of *with*-ABSs. Beukema and Hoekstra (1984) build an argument for the clausal status of all *with*-ABSs based on the data below.

(56)a. Who did you stay home with?
b. *Who did you stay home with on television?
(cf. You stayed home with Dick Cavett on television.)

They claim that (56b) is out because the empty NP following *with* is in a SC with the predicate that follows it, thus it is not open to government by the preposition *with* and is hence not properly governed. (56b), then, violates the ECP. Their argument is interesting, however, in that the usual clausal analysis for SCs takes them to be S not S'. That is, clausal analyses of SCs take them not to be maximal projections. Thus the NP should, after all, be open to lexical government by the P. Beukema and Hoekstra meet this implicit objection by assuming that categories other than V may properly govern only those categories that they theta mark. Since the NP after *with* (the empty NP) in (56b) is theta marked by the predicate that follows it and not by the P that precedes it, the empty NP is not properly governed.

But now their explanation for (56b) holds just as well if the *with*-ABS here is nonclausal (as I have argued above), for even in the nonclausal analysis the empty NP is theta marked by the following predicate and not by the preceding P. Thus (56b) is a violation of the ECP even with a nonclausal analysis.

Conclusion to Section 3

There are two kinds of *with*-ABSs: clausal and nonclausal.[16]

4. Other constructions.

With the tests developed in Section 1 the clausal status of a number of other constructions which have not received wide attention in the recent literature (Stump (1981) being a notable exception) but which have come up in the more classical literature can be considered. Below I list some of these, often taking examples from the literature (including Jespersen (1927), Curme (1931), Kruisinga (1932), Quirk et al. (1972), and Visser (1972)). These constructions are syntactically minimal and defy analysis with the usual sorts of arguments. Thus the tests of Section 2 may be among the only ways these constructions can be tested for their clausal status. Still, often only my second test (the nonpredicative VP or XP – in the case of SCs – test) is applicable. While the evidence is slight, all of these constructions appear to be nonclausal and to involve the external argument-predicate relationship. I will give only one test for each construction and leave the reader to fill out the others.

I. *S and X*:

(57) How could you talk that way, and your mother listening?

I contend that the X here consists of an NP plus a following predicate where the X is not a clause. Thus athematic NPs cannot initiate this string:

(58) *He just blabs everything and mum the word.

However, even NPs which were argued in Section 1 to have theta roles are excluded.

(59) *He keeps on sending notes and it clear no one answers.

Yet R-expressions which are not parts of idioms and pronouns other than the instances of *it* discussed in this paper easily appear in this construction. I suggest that the "aboutness" relation (mentioned in passing in Chomsky (1982)) is relevant here. Perhaps the predicate must be about the external argument in order for the X to be well-formed.

Within the X if the constituent following the initial NP is another NP, it must be predicative:

(60) Bill acts like he knows it all, and him a/*the student.

II. *XP and/yet/but XP*:

(61) Only sixteen and already getting married!

I contend that these structures are not sentences, but, rather, a conjunction of predicates where the second XP predicates of the first XP and the first XP predicates of some discourse referent. Thus if either conjunct is an NP, it must be predicative:

(62) *A sailor* and afraid of the water!
**The neighbor* on my right and a slob!
(63) Just into junior high and *already a coquette*!
*A minister and *the liar*!

All NPs in idioms (whether the idiom is analyzable or not) plus ambient *it*, EXT-*it*, and inert NPs (*there* and R-*it*) are barred from either conjunct, since they cannot be predicative.

(64) **Mum* and the word!
(65) *A bird in the bush and *there*!

III. *NP XP*:

(66) Him an enemy of our beloved church!

I contend that the XP predicates of the NP and the whole structure is not a clause. Thus the NP here can be any R-expression other than an NP in an idiom and it can be a pronoun other than the uses of *it* found repeatedly in this paper. I will not give the relevant examples, since the reader can easily come up with them. That even the theta bearing *its* discussed in this paper cannot occur in NP position here is expected in light of the fact that this construction carries with it a sense of surprise: that the XP is predicated of this choice of NP is taken to be remarkable (and in this way it functions similarly to II above). But ambient *it* and EXT-*it* typically occur with a restricted set of predicates. Thus they cannot be the surprise arguments of predicates.

As expected, if the XP here is an NP, it must be predicative:

(67) Him a/*the person to be trusted!

IV. *Absolutives*

For many speakers initial absolutives are odd constructions. But for others they are somewhat acceptable or just fine, as in:

(68) The tub empty now, Sue got the shivers.
(cf. acc-*ing*: The tub being empty now, Sue . . .)

I contend that these absolutives consist of an external argument and its predicate. Exactly the same restrictions hold on the NP here as hold on the NP of I and III above. And exactly the same restrictions hold on the constituent that follows the NP if that constituent is also an NP:

(69) Your brother a/*the doctor now, your mom must be proud.

Inverted absolutives following a clause are also found.

(70) I couldn't laugh, so earnest his expression!

The same restrictions hold within these absolutives as within (69):

(71) I wanted to laugh, such a/*the fool that boy!

For some reason I do not understand, pronouns are excluded from both initial and inverted absolutives:

(72) *Him cold, I grabbed the towel.
(cf. acc-*ing*: Him being cold, I grabbed the towel.)
*I had to cry, so stupid him!

5. Conclusion.

Two tests are offered and defended above for distinguishing between the subject-VP relationship and the external argument-predicate relationship. In the process, NPs which have often been claimed in the literature to be athematic are closely examined. The surprising result is that many such NPs bear theta roles. However, there is a small group of NPs which never bear theta roles and these NPs never occur as external arguments.

With these two tests we were able to see that there are both clausal and nonclausal *with*-ABSs. These tests were also used to suggest that four other constructions in English are nonclausal. These tests should be valid for all configurational languages.

Throughout this paper the tests were taken to be necessary as well as sufficient diagnostics for clausehood. I gave one argument for this position in Section 1 and I have postponed a second argument until now. Let us consider the repercussions of this claim with respect to the analysis of SCs. In (74) *believe* would take two sisters, an NP and an AP.

(74)



This analysis leads to certain predictions about the theta roles of NPs in sentences like (74). We see that *believe* can take a clause sister (in (75)), a simple NP sister (in (76)), and an NP sister plus an adjunct XP that functions as a predicate to that NP sister (in (74) above).

(75) I believe that John is foolish.
(76) I believe John.

Given that a verb assigns a theta role to its argument sisters, *believe* can assign a theta role to a propositional sister (in (75)) or to a referential sister (in (76)). When we turn to a structure like that in (74), we might expect *believe* to assign a theta role either to its sister predicate (and thus, to the proposition which corresponds to the external argument plus its predicate, since every predicate must find an external argument) or to its sister NP. With the first theta role assignment, we'd understand *believe* to have a propositional theme. With the second theta role assignment, we'd understand *believe* to have an NP that is the theme **in its capacity of being predicated of by the following XP.** This is exactly what we find. (77) is from Safir (1983).

(77) I believed John sober.
  a. I believed John to be sober.
  b. I believed John while he was sober.

The (a) reading is propositional. The (b) reading is what I call a mediated one, following Miller (forthcoming). In the (a) reading *believe* assigns a theta role to the predicate; and in the (b) reading, to its D.O. In the (a) reading *John* receives a theta role only from *sober*, but in the (b) reading *John* receives a theta role from *believe* and *sober*.

We predict the same sort of dual readings for all nonclausal structures involving predication which occur as sisters to Vs that may take either propositional or referential arguments. That is, all such Vs should be allowed to give a theta role either to a sister predicate or to a simple NP object. Another example parallel to (77) is the SC in (78):

(78) I prefer Marcello at home.
  a. I prefer that Marcello be at home (by 5 o'clock).
  b. I prefer Marcello when he's at home.

The (a) reading is propositional; the (b) reading is mediated. In the (a) reading *Marcello* receives a theta role only from the predicate that follows it (the PP *at home*); but in the (b) reading *Marcello* also receives a theta role from *prefer*.

On the other hand, a V like *elect* can take an NP and an adjunct XP predicate of that NP, but in its argument structure we have only referential arguments (that is, we elect people, not events). A sentence with *elect* that has an NP object and an adjunct XP predicate, then, should not be ambiguous, lacking a propositional reading. This is true.

(79) We elected Reagan president.

Reagan receives a theta role from both *elected* and *president*.

Consider now *see*, with an NP or a clausal sister.

(80) I can see so many problems with this analysis.
(81) I can see that he studies hard.

The kind of dual readings in (77–78) should arise for PVSCs and PVPCs, also. And they do:

(82) I can't see John wearing a skirt.
  a. I don't believe that John will wear a skirt.
  b. I can't picture John in a skirt.

((82) also has a vision-reading. This third reading is irrelevant here.) The (a) reading is propositional; the (b), mediated.

While the above examples involve the nonvision-reading of *see*, we'd expect the same kind of dual readings for the vision-*see*. However, this prediction is hard to test since I cannot imagine real life conditions under which we could see an action and not see the actor, or vice-versa. Thus I leave the testing of this prediction to more imaginative linguists.

No analysis I know of SCs, PVSCs, or PVPCs that treats them all as clauses can account for the indicated ambiguity in (77–78) and (82) and the lack of ambiguity in (79). The analysis in this paper, however, predicts the ambiguity and precisely when it actually occurs. In particular, the fact that (77–78) and (82) have mediated readings (where the theme of the matrix V is an NP in the capacity of being predicated of by something other than the matrix V) gives strong support to the nonclausal analysis.

I conclude that the nonclausal analysis of these constructions is correct and that the tests in Section 1 are diagnostics for clausehood.

If these two tests are valid, semantic propositions in a variety of syntactic constructions are not rendered by syntactic clauses and the relationship of external argument-predicate is independent of the relationship of subject-VP. That is, there cannot be a one-to-one correspondence between syntax and semantics. Furthermore, the projection principle of GB under a strict interpretation of that principle needs to be modified, since the propositional nature of certain constructions cannot

be discerned prior to predication coindexing and predication coindexing does not apply until LF.

NOTES

* I thank Josh Ard, Pete Becker, Greg Carlson, Janie Chisholm, Gary Ebbs, Jacqueline Guéron, Dick Hudson, Rod Johnson, Barry Miller, Andrew Radford, and the anonymous referees of this work.

[1] Napoli (to appear, chapter one) argues that predicates take role players in contrast to lexical heads, which take arguments. Furthermore, predicates assign semantic relations to their role players which are more refined and varied than theta roles. Here, however, I use traditional terminology for familiarity's sake.

[2] Even in analyses where *there* is base generated (as in Williams (1984a) and Guéron (1984)) it is without a theta role.

[3] R-*it* never controls PRO, never appears in nonGF-S position, and never is the GF-S of conjoined VPs unless all the Vs are raising Vs. See also (9) in the text and Chomsky (1981, p. 325).

[4] In these and other examples of controlled PRO I use complements of *enough*. For a variety of reasons many environments for PRO are not available to test here. And forms with *-ing* which could well involve PRO, as in (i) (from Chomsky 1981, p. 324),

(i) It sometimes rains after [PRO snowing].

are among those whose clausal nature I would like to offer tests for in this paper. Thus I will not use them here.

Complements of *enough* can involve arbitrary PRO, as well:

(ii) It's cold enough [PRO to dress warmly].

See also Rouveret (1978), Guéron and May (1984), and Manzini (1983).

Also, in all the examples of control in the text below with ambient *it*, we have nonobligatory control (NC). Often NC is open to an interpretation of event control. If we could find an example of obligatory control (OC) with ambient *it*, we'd have a strong argument for ambient *it*'s argumenthood. I have been unable to find any incontrovertible instances of OC. However, there may be some. Thus, for some speakers both (iii) and (iv) are good, suggesting that these involve raising. But for others (iii) is good but not (iv), suggesting that (iii) involves OC (cf. (v)).

(iii) It ceased raining.
(iv) (*)There ceased being parties.
(v) John ceased studying. (cf. *John ceased Mary's studying.)

[5] Chomsky (1986, p. 93) says, "Every complement of a head must be s-selected by it." Napoli (to appear, chapter two) shows that sisters of a lexical head need not be s-selected by the head. Adjunct predicates can be sisters to a lexical head if they predicate of some other element s-selected by that head. Or a verb can have a D.O. it does not s-select so long as it also has a sister predicate that it does s-select and that predicates of its D.O. This is the situation with a verb like *consider* in:

(i) I consider John nice.

More discussion of this point is found in Sections 2 (see the discussion of (35–36)) and 5 below. Napoli also argues that most Ps do not give theta roles to their objects.

[6] It is not possible to argue that *it* in the examples in (6) is part of the predicate and not an argument without arriving at unwelcome results. For instance, if *hold it* were a predicate

(like "stop"), we'd have to say that the first sentence in (i) involves a different predicate from the following two sentences.

(i) Hold it!/Hold that!/Hold everything!

[7] Ruwet (1986) questions the validity of this conjunction test. His objections to the proposal that ambient *it* is thematic are better taken for its French counterpart *il*.

[8] EXT-*it* typically cannot control the GF-S of an infinitival with extraposition, as pointed out to me by Jacqueline Guéron:

(i) *It's clear enough that John shot the storekeeper to be likely that the judge'll throw the book at him.

This might be taken as evidence for a number of hypotheses, including that EXT-*it* cannot control PRO, but instead the extraposed clause in (8) is controlling PRO. (9) in the text militates against this position, however, as does the fact that an unextraposed subject clause also cannot control the subject of an infinitival with extraposition.

(ii) *That John shot the storekeeper is clear enough to be likely that the judge'll throw the book at him.

Thus I do not take (i) as evidence against the possibility that EXT-*it* controls PRO.

Oddly, (iii) is marginal and definitely superior to (i):

(iii) ?In order to be likely that the judge'll set a low bail, it must be perfectly clear that John's reliable.

[9] Rizzi (1986) says an item can be nonreferential but thematic. Then neither ambient *it* nor EXT-*it* need be referential.

[10] Guéron (1984) argues that *there* has inherent Case and cannot appear where it will be assigned structural Case. Then (28–30)a would be ungrammatical even if we had an embedded clause, so long as that clause were transparent to assignment of Case from the adjacent V. Examples like (29e) and (30e) (grouped below in the text), however, militate against this solution.

[11] 29b is not out for any pragmatic reason having to do with the difficulty of seeing mental states, since (i) is fine:

(i) I actually saw the chairman appear to be confused.

[12] Causative complements do not have the same structure as PVSCs in English (in contrast to Romance). See also Gee (1977).

(i) I made there be a formal apology.

[13] Some PVSCs and PVPCs with *there* sound much better than (29a) and (30a) even in the absence of a deictic locative. (i) is from Gee (1977). (ii) was offered to me by Jacqueline Guéron:

(i) I've never seen there be so many complaints from students before.
(ii) I can't see there arising any problems from this.

It seems that with the vision-reading of *see*, *there* cannot occur in these complements without a deictic locative (see (29d) vs (29e) and (30d) vs. (30e)), but with the nonvision-reading of *see*, *there* can occur. Likewise, with the nonvision-reading of *see* unanalyzable idioms are not as terrible in the complement as we might have expected them to be (see the marginality of (30c)). However, even with the nonvision-reading, R-*it* is not accepted (see (29b) and (30b)), although in the complement of the verbs *imagine* and *understand*, it is:

(iii) I can't imagine/understand it appearing that the chairman was confused.

Given the contrast between (iii) and (29b)/(30b) and the data in (34) below in the text, I

conclude that the fact that *there* is acceptable in (i)–(ii) is not due to a structural difference between the complements of vision-reading and nonvision-reading *see*, but to some property of *there* which is yet to be understood. Still, I raise the suggestion that *see* may be in the process of being lexically reanalyzed into vision-*see* and nonvision-*see*, where the latter but not the former takes a clausal complement. See also Gee (1977).

[14] Chomsky (1981, p. 109) remarks on the success of EXT-*it* in SCs but the failure of *there* in SCs.

[15] Questions arise as to whether (47) can be analyzed as in (41b) or as in (i) (which is, I believe, the correct structure):

(i)



With (i) we'd have to allow *with* an object plus two adjuncts.

[16] One might take the fact that we can have a *with*-ABS without the acc-*ing* construction conjoined to a *with*-ABS with the acc-*ing* construction as evidence against the conclusion here.

(i) With the bus drivers on strike and Jack always having car trouble, we won't see him at work this week.

However, unlike categories may be conjoined (see Schachter (1977), Peterson (1981), and Napoli and Nespor (1986), among others).

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