opposed to phylogenetic liberalism's naturalization of racial hierarchy, black republicanism was also critical of antecase liberalism's construal of race as a category that could be easily divorced from considerations of group history and economic inequality. This insistence upon the importance of race, however, did not entail a rejection of the liberal goal of achieving individual equality; on the contrary, the two goals were believed to be intrinsically interrelated. The freedpeople did not make their claim to the land against the American nation, but as a fundamental part of it. Their special historical role as a group simply had to be recognized in order for their equality as individual citizens to be achieved.

CONCLUSION

Neither Greenstone's nor Smith's analytical framework is sufficiently robust to identify the critical dimensions of competing liberal constructions of the meaning of citizenship during Reconstruction. Greenstone's distinction between humanist and reform liberals is inadequate because it assumes an essentially singular conception of the individual subject, focusing on alternative valuations of what subjects do rather than who they are. Alternatively, Smith's "multiple-traditions" approach artificially separates discourses that were fundamentally intertwined, holding that "liberalism" and "ascriptive Americanisms" were clearly distinct and inherently incompatible species. As this case study demonstrates, alternative constructions of the civic subject provided the necessary basis for different conceptions of the fundamental rights of citizenship, with even the most explicit championship of the universal subject being imbued with a culturally distinct and practically consequential meaning. In short, the analysis of the substance and the subject of competing liberalisms must be joined in order to achieve a robust sense of their political significance.

FOR DAVID GREENSTONE, JANE ADDAMS WAS ONE OF THOSE FIGURES WHOSE POLITICAL VISION DID NOT FIT WITH HARYT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF A LOCKEAN, INDIVIDUALISTIC, STATE-FEARING POLITICAL CULTURE. ON THIS POINT, HE WAS CORRECT. HE PROCEEDED TO IDENTIFY ADDAMS AND MANY OTHER FIGURES WHO SEEMED TO EMBRACE A MORE POSITIVE, SOCIALLY ENGAGED STATE WITH YANKEE PROTESTANTISM, A COMPETING STRAIN WITHIN THE LIBERAL TRADITION. GREENSTONE TERMED ADDAMS'S POLITICS A "LIBERAL POLITICS OF STANDARDS," WHICH Sought TO SUPPLANT A POLITICS OF INTEREST AND PROVIDE ALL WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP THEIR INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND CULTURAL CAPACITIES. ROOTING HER VALUES IN THOSE OF NEW ENGLAND CALVINISM—A POLITICS OF CONSCIENCE THAT EVEN JUDGED CHARITY WANTING IF IT LED TO EGOTISM OR SELF-CONGRATULATION—HE ARGUED THAT THE GOAL WAS NOW THE CONVERSION OF SOCIETY INTO A COMMUNITY OF BROTHERLY LOVE DEVOTED TO DEVELOPING THE RATIONAL AND MORAL CAPACITIES, THAT IS, THE POTENTIAL SAFETYNESS OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL—PRECISELY THE GOALS OF A LIBERAL POLITICS OF STANDARDS.
While the politics of individual rights and interests stood in tension with the politics of humanitarian reform, both were, Greenstone argued, inside the boundary conditions of a distinctive, patterned, liberal discourse in the United States. The Harttian thesis remained vibrant if read metatheoretically. Our culturally conditioned wordings are Wittgensteinian “tools in a toolbox,” available for widely different uses. Ambiguities over the meaning of concepts can—and do—lead to major conflicts; liberal creeds are not consensus. Nonetheless, we encounter “grammatical limits on what we can meaningfully say, think, and perceive.” And if “words and deeds constitute each other,” the words/practices nexus is a sticky one that leads us to expect slow, infrequent shifts in basic concepts and established practices. American political culture, bipolar though it has been, shapes and limits American liberal development.3

It is surely the case that political discourse and political practices are patterned, that political narratives are culturally and historically specific, and that these narratives are vital to the ways Americans struggle over politics. It is more problematic, however, to contend that all variants of American political thought fall within the confines of something defined as liberalism. Addams is one of those figures for whom I find this classification problematic. Republican concerns play on in Progressive-era struggles over the meaning of citizenship and its relationship to virtue. And the politics of citizenship is centrally bound up with the politics of gender, race, ethnicity, and class.

A liberal tradition that stretches to encompass all of this, I contend, ceases to have much explanatory power. I agree with Rogers Smith’s contention that it is not clear what good is accomplished by using the term liberal as expansively as many scholars now do.4 If we are to understand the ways in which the politics of the limited American social welfare state were patterned, if we wish to think about political contingencies and possibilities, I do not think that variants on the American exceptionalism thesis will help us get there. I fear that Greenstone’s bipolar categorizing approach diminishes our capacity to recognize potentially transformative worldviews. This posture places me at odds with quite a few contributors to this volume.

I offer support for my position in the form of a study of an important period in which the meaning of American citizenship was contested and reformulated. In examining the contested nature of citizenship and struggles over political identity during the Progressive era of American history, I share research interests with several other authors in this volume, especially Carol Horton and Rogers Smith, both of whom argue that the American political tradition is richer than Greenstone’s bipolarism allows. I find, in support of Smith, that proponents of the cult of true womanhood blended, in different measures, liberal, republican, and ascriptive claims about civic identity, but I also argue that in the blend, new and potentially transformative visions were sometimes presented. These altered visions may even capture center stage in our political imagination. And while Smith especially stresses the ways in which political leaders and aspirants present “civic ideologies, or myths of civic identity that foster the requisite sense of peoplehood” in order to achieve political popularity, he thinks that the views of those who were ineligible to hold political office failed to shape American citizenship laws.5 I treat as more central to the struggle over what it means to be a full member of the polity the views of those who contested their exclusion and who sometimes presented different visions of what citizenship might mean.

REVISIONING PUBLIC SPACES AND PUBLIC PURPOSES

The meaning of citizenship is historically contingent. The discussion is framed and the salience of citizenship is forged in a specific historical context in which identifiable portions of a population are either excluded from citizenship or are lesser citizens. One’s own status and standing as a full member of the republic gains meaning by reference to the available alternatives; identity and self-definition as a citizen are forged in a conversation about otherwise. Richard Slotkin calls this “definition by repudiation.” Whatever their differences, a certain unity and identity of citizens is achieved by reference to what they have in common; for example, that they are not the children of Satan. In a different formulation, political life “sims at the construction of a ‘we’ in a context of diversity and conflict. But to construct a ‘we’ it must be distinguished from a ‘them’ and that means establishing a frontier.”6

Entailed are unstated assumptions and arguments about what renders groups or individuals unfit for citizenship. Judith Shklar saw that slavery and servitude have been central to the way in which we think about citizenship. To be less than a full citizen is to approach the condition of slave; slavery always loomed in successive American political arguments for inclusion. Toni Morrison points out the central role Africans in America played in how white men defined their individualism, heroism, and virility. A “bound and unfree, rebellious but serviceable, black population” is the convenient group against which “all white men are enabled to measure these privileging and privileged differences.”7

The public realm of modern citizenship had also been constructed upon the negation of female participation. Women were, Carole Pateman argues, subjects of the social contract. The ballot was a certificate of full membership in society, and paid labor separated the free man from the slave. Voting and earning, central attributes of the American citizen, were also marks of honor and civic dignity. Those who could not vote and who did not earn were mere subjects in a constitutional democracy. Voting was not simply about pro-
testing one's rights and advancing one's interests; it was a mark of political agency and maturation. Citizenship and enfranchisement were signs of imputed virtue.

Qualities associated with adult manhood were linked to qualities expected of a full participant in the life of the political community. As Paterman writes,

[Theoretically and historically, the central criterion for citizenship has been “independence,” and the elements encompassed under the heading of independence have been based on masculine attributes and abilities.]

A man was an adult and an agent; he had the capacity for independence and self-sufficiency. Independence required autonomy, lest the agent be unduly influenced by and compromised by another. (Not all men were clearly “men.”) Citizens were capable of boundary maintenance, self-discipline, and objectivity; they were responsible for their character.

In the United States, non-citizens have been understood to be non-white, non-male, non-adult, non-agents. They stand in a different relationship to the state than do citizens. It has been commonplace to presume that not-men required guidance, restraint, and sometimes protection. Not-men were more likely to become identifiable objects of policy making and policy discussion. Failing to measure up to the requisites of citizenship, one runs a high risk of entrapment in one of the categories of otherness derived from it...categories of abnormality license bureaucratic correction, discipline, regulation, exclusion, conquest, help, conversion, incentives, or punishment.

By the late nineteenth century, amid large-scale immigration, labor struggles, the rise of Jim Crow legislation, and demands for female suffrage, an especially animated “conversation” about citizenship emerged. Visions of manliness, independence, and potency formulated by cultural elites not only were lampooned by Thorstein Veblen but were increasingly contested. New understandings of what constituted membership in the republic were in the making. Gender definition, independence, agency, and citizenship were drawn together in changing, contested narratives about American identity.

The strongest challenge to the moral authority of the man/independence/autonomy vision of citizenship was articulated in the Progressive era. During this period of rich, interlinked conflicts, the voices of those cast as less than full citizens revealed unstated rules and values in the polity. They sometimes revealed much more. As outsiders challenged their exclusion from full, mature, adult citizenship and the exclusion of their concerns from mainstream politics, they often challenged the frameworks linking autonomy, agency, independence, manliness, and citizenship. Talking back, they offered alternative narratives of citizenship.

As women challenged their exclusion from various aspects of public life during the Progressive era, the condition of the would-be new entrants became—in their eyes and potentially in the eyes of the broader society—an important or vital contribution to citizenship. Characteristics and experiences of the group were held to bring something essential or invaluable to the political life of the community. In emerging alternatives to male understandings of citizenship and agency, different qualities were valued, and the state itself was challenged to assume a new character.

Many feminists of this era sought something other—and sometimes more—than liberal theory, even in Greenstone’s expanded liberal tent, tended to provide. Their vision extended beyond overturning restrictions on women as individuals and often beyond the individual as the unit of analysis. Maternal feminists such as Addams emphasized the corruption of the public realm as well as the dehumanizing features of a liberal capitalist state and the political culture underpinning it.

Maternalists remind us of the inadequacy and limitations of a rights-based conception of the individual and a view of social justice as equal access. They...would have us recognize how, as interrelated “selves,” we can strive for a more humane relational and shared community than our current political circumstances allow.

It is hard to find in liberal theory the language and concepts to “understand the various kinds of human interdependence which are part of the life of both families and polities.”

In fact, the Progressive-era wave of women’s activism could be seen as part of a veritable “democratic revolution,” “a series of successive displacements of the line of demarcation between public and private.” In this regard, turn-of-the-century feminists were part of the trajectory of workers’ struggles of the late nineteenth century. The boundaries between public and private shifted by a “proliferation of new political spaces” rather than by the incursion of public authority into a pre-existing private realm.

Women activists and women’s organizations, so important in the expansion of notions of public responsibility, were not formally incorporated in deliberative bodies, yet they generated a narrative space for a new American public discourse of citizenship. Women were creating new languages about public space and new visions of the state. Women of different classes, races, and ethnicities were active in this struggle in different ways.

According to Mark Kann, classic accounts of an American liberal tradition are flawed because “individualism does not describe the historical norms or cultural practices of women...” from whom self-sacrifice is
expected and for whom something more akin to civic virtue is the norm. Adult white males are able to subscribe to individualism only because other members of the polity uphold other values. During the Progressive era, female activists insisted that these other values become public and universal values; individualism and prior notions of the individual subject came under heavy challenge. These white-activist claims, colored by race and class, nonetheless transgressed liberal boundaries.

This essay places Addams's world at center stage, for she was a central player in forging a gendered narrative of citizenship and an alternative vision of who we are. Addams's perspectives and critiques in the name of social responsiveness touched every social and political institution—the family, the church, charitable institutions, business corporations, labor unions, political parties, and the institutions of racial coercion. To the female reformers and suffrage leaders of Addams's era, "it seemed perfectly clear that women were the only people in America capable of bringing about a new order in which democracy would find social as well as political expression."16

FROM AUTONOMY TO INTERDEPENDENCE

Much of our ethical maladjustment in social affairs arises from the fact that we are acting upon a code of ethics adapted to individual relationships, but not to the larger social relationships to which it is haphazardly applied.17

Progressive-era women's highly articulated vision of citizenship stressed human interdependence. The good citizen was not the independent man. The city offered bountiful evidence of human dependence and interdependence: even infrastructure made the point. Addams's contemporary, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, noted that homes are now webbed together "by a network of pipes and wires."

Our houses are threaded like beads on a string, tied, knotted, woven together, and in the cities even built together; one solid house from block-end to block-end; their boasted individuality maintained by a thin partition wall. The tenement, flat, and apartment house still further group and connect us; and our claim of domestic isolation becomes merely another domestic myth.18

The modern city, bringing masses of people together, negated the self-sufficient household. More and more services were provided to the home by outside agents, public and private; water, light, and increasingly food supply were being socialized. There is now "a common dependency from which there is no escape." Building roads, providing drinking water, draining sewage, disposing of garbage, safeguarding food, and protecting children and homes could no longer be done by individuals themselves; they "can only be effectively done collectively." Addams emphasized "the futility of the individual conscience when woman insists upon isolating her family from the rest of the community and its interests."19

Woman in the metropolis "is utterly dependent upon the city administration for the conditions which render decent living possible." Anna Nicholas, the civil service commissioner of Cook County, Illinois, underscored the extent to which the functions of the home are connected with and controlled by the various departments of the central government. She noted how the politics of city hall permeate the home.20 In Chicago machine politics, Addams further noted the pronounced dependence on the alderman, especially for poor and working people: "The long year round the fortunes of the entire family, down to the opportunity to earn food and shelter, depend upon the 'boss.'"21

A few miles south, at the University of Chicago, the theme of interdependence was also sounded. In The Woman Movement from the Point of View of Social Consciousness (1916), Jessie Taft, a student of George Herbert Mead, argued that "individuals are so interrelated and dependent that each one depends on the rest for obtaining his own ends." Health is a case in point, for "unless health is a common object of desire in a community and is sought for by each person with regard to all others, no one individual is safe from infection."22

Taft extended this argument to rights themselves, which were more properly viewed as dependent upon society for their existence than as absolute entities inhering in a self.23 This alternative conception of rights generated a potent, if often underexplored, connection with African-American visions. It was shared by the aged ally of the woman's movement, Frederick Douglass, who saw only too well, with the rise of racial violence and Jim Crow, how inherently dependent upon others African Americans were for their rights. Douglass realized that citizenship was hollow unless government protected persons and rights. He considered independence synonymous with powerlessness and abandonment. "The first duty that the National Government owes to its citizens is protection," Douglass wrote.24 Citizens depended on government for the enforcement of the claims of citizenship. Rights-bearers were dependent upon state and society. This was quite different from the perspective identifying citizenship with independence.

In Addams's view, men gravitate to ideals of individuality and independence, while women thirst for social action.25 Social action serves as a bridge from a self perceived as individual to a self perceived as interdependent. Working in urban slums, women in the settlement movement linked their sensitivity to social problems with their special qualities of feminine insight.

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Female public campaigners such as Addams and Lillian Wald based their claims to the title of reformer in “specialized feminine perceptions of social justice,” which included “women’s ability to empathize with the weak and dependent.” They believed “feminine intuition could both diagnose and direct social change.”

Women who based their claim to participation in the public realm upon the special characteristics of women asserted that women’s nature would ennoble, uplift, and change the character of public life and discourse. “Those who sought to expand women’s role did so while defending the traditional conception of her nature,” and women claimed to be especially equipped to recognize exploitation and see the true vision of a democratic society.

Addams envisioned bringing women’s brooms, caretaking skills, and the empathy and wisdom born of direct contact with immigrants and the urban poor into the definition of nature, ethical democratic citizenship. If female reformers would clean up urban machines and city administrations, care for the poor, and improve sanitation, suffragists would also pursue more caring policies and refrain from making war. Feminine intuition and nature would tackle the problems of the industrial city, the nation, and the world. The house-cleaner government was a pervasive image, echoed in a late suffrage cartoon:

Housekeeping is woman’s work—no man denies that. Government is public housekeeping—practically everybody agrees to that. Isn’t it foolish then to keep out of government the very people who have had most training for a large part of its function?

The agents of economic and social injustice became gendered; females were not the designers and implementers of the rules of the business order. The diseases of the industrial order were deemed male diseases. Women, proclaiming their noncomplicity, would counter the forces of materialism.

Men were cast as notoriously bad housekeepers with a complete indifference to dirt, and “dirt means dead children.” “Each little tombstone is a mute argument for giving the ballot to women, the natural enemies of dirt.”

Male-administration of government is mal-administration of government as proved by the perennial exposures of corruption in federal, state and municipal government. Experience has proved that woman suffrage is a preventive of this malady.

Addams often employed the metaphor of government as housekeeping, linking men with a predatory temperament and careless indifference to civic housekeeping. “Affairs, for the most part, are going badly in these great new centers”; males have been unable to solve the litany of urban ills:

Unsanitary housing, poisonous sewage, contaminated water, infant mortality, the spread of contagion, adulterated food, impure milk, smoke-laden air, ill-ventilated factories, dangerous occupations, juvenile crime, unwholesome crowding, prostitution and drunkenness, are the enemies which the modern cities must face and overcome, would they survive.

Urban males, Addams thought, preferred to assess candidates on the basis of the national tariff or military policy, issues having to do “only with enemies and outsiders,” thus ignoring the types of duties that had to be performed in the modern city.

Despite the city’s need for women’s wisdom, Addams believed modern women were actually losing their capacity to participate in civic life. Traditional areas of women’s concern were being increasingly absorbed into public business. The health department, bureau of street cleaning, and bureau of tenement house inspection had taken over functions that were once performed by the women of the community. Women were left “in a household of constantly narrowing interests.”

Most of the departments in a modern city can be traced to woman’s traditional activity; but, in spite of this, so soon as these old affairs were turned over to the city they slipped from woman’s hands, apparently because they then became matters for collective action and implied the use of the franchise.

As philanthropic activities passed from the private to the public sphere, women were often “forced to stand by and see the things they have started being done very badly because they can no longer help.”

Sounding a rearguard, defense-of-our-traditional-rights-and-predogative cry, Addams urged women to politics so as not to lose what they had claimed as their rightful sphere of expertise:

[If women are to go on doing those things which they have always done they will have to have some share in the government which is now doing them. If not, these activities will be turned over altogether to the men.]

The image of the larger home—the social aspect of housekeeping—was part of a shared discourse:

Woman’s place is Home…. But Home is not contained within the four walls of an individual house. Home is the community. The city full of people is the Family. The public school is the real Nursery. And badly do the Home and Family need their mother.
American women lived lives that knew no such artificial divisions. They offered an interpretation of political life that emphasized the role of women as saviors of the race, justifying their activity because they were mothers.  

Adella Hunt Logan, active in Alabama politics and lifelong member of the National American Women Suffrage Association (NAWSA), argued that African-American women could no longer refrain from meddling in politics, for they have learned “that politics meddle constantly with her and hers.”

Colored women feel keenly that they may help in civic betterment, and that their broadened interests in matters of good government may arouse the colored brother, who for various reasons has become too indifferent to his duties of citizenship....

Good women try always to do good housekeeping. Building inspectors, sanitary inspectors and food inspectors owe their positions to politics. Who then is so well informed as to how these inspectors perform their duties as the women who live in inspected districts and in inspected houses, and who buy food from inspected markets?

She enumerated many arenas in which good housekeeping gives women an interest in politics. Like her white middle-class counterparts, Logan frequently argued that women’s greatest involvement in politics furthered substantive policy goals. Even when women exercised only a partial franchise, she claimed, there have been policy benefits.

But, Logan notes, “having no vote they [African-American women] need not be feared or bersed.” African-American women and the families they sought to protect confronted an actively hostile state far more than did their white counterparts. Their power to shape public discourse and bend the state to their will was considerably weaker. “White women differed from African-American women in their ability to use the state to remedy social problems, but otherwise the dynamic was similar: women took the lead in remedying social problems.”

Despite the overlapping discourse of social housekeeping, white feminists were not highly attentive to and did not tend to incorporate the insights of their African-American counterparts. As we will see, the nature of the claims they were building for citizenship confounded this issue.

There was not always agreement on the basis for woman’s special claims upon public space. Quite often Addams and her contemporaries considered women’s unique position to be primitive and instinctual. Women’s interests were primordial and trustworthy; old maternal anxieties would, if shared by politicians, guide the city toward greater stability. Sometimes long home-based experience was held to yield a similar kind of expertise. And sometimes women’s authority was traced to custom and involvement with urban immi-
grants and the poor. The question of “what home has to do with it” appeared to lead Addams and Gilman in one direction and politicians in another.

The science of the period offered a system of ideas readily adaptable to those seeking arguments: for women’s innate uniqueness. Darwinism retained its hold on popular feminism during the early decades of the twentieth century, despite the fact it could be and was, in other hands, used to justify existing social institutions and roles. Feminists who based their authority in women’s special nature derived considerable support from reigning beliefs about the relationship between biological differentiation and social evolution.18

Antoinette Brown Blackwell, the first ordained American female minister, paved the way in analyzing the implications of Darwinism for feminists in her 1875 work, The Sexes Throughout Nature. Blackwell accepted the argument of Darwin and Spencer that evolutionary divergence of males and females resulted from the different ways energy was used in the process of reproduction. Men developed powers of abstract reasoning; women developed the power of intuition. Her unique gloss lay in the argument that “intuition was not inferior to reason but rather an equivalent mental power and equally necessary to the proper functioning of society.”

According to the American followers of Spencer, sexual differentiation and sex role differentiation were markers of a particularly advanced state of civilization and characteristic of advanced races. Differentiation of civilized white male roles from civilized white female roles was an indication of an advanced status and a necessary stage in evolutionary progress. White women who espoused their advanced civilization as highly specialized biological creatures embraced their differences from men as a signifier of the authority of white males and females to lead. Evolutionary theory of the late nineteenth century gave fuel to a sense of humiliation when white women were denied suffrage while black males and immigrant males (except Chinese and Japanese) could lay claim to it. Suffragists often voiced outrage at being classed below these men. Cartoons such as “The Political Companions of Women” depicted Frances Willard, president of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, alongside other disenfranchised denizens of the United States: Indians, the insane, criminals, and idlers.20

Addams read Spencer’s 1873 Study of Sociology and accepted his position that “the female psyche and mind were of special significance in the evolutionary process because of the innate feminine capacity to empathize with the weak.” She also appreciated Lester Ward’s assertion that “the female was the prototype of the human being and the most highly evolved of the sexes,” a view at odds with some versions of evolutionary biology that accorded women a lesser role because of biological structure, cranial size, and the development of rational powers.21 Although Ward cautioned that “like all instincts, [the maternal instinct’s] acuteness and subtility are propor-
tioned to the narrowness of its purpose,” he granted that woman’s power instantaneously and accurately to judge what to do when her safety and that of her offspring were in jeopardy had become increasingly developed and complex with the progress of civilization.22 Feminists also employed sociologist William I. Thomas’s claim that life evolves from an anabolic (energystoring) stage to a katabolic (energy-consuming) stage. He admitted that “[b]oth social feeling and social organization are thus primarily feminine in origin—functions of the anabolism of woman.”

Addams had met Scottish biologist and sociologist Patrick Geddes, coauthor with J. Arthur Thomson of The Evolution of Sex (1889), who argued that women’s cell metabolism made them passive and nurturant, while males were warlike and aggressive. Geddes and Thomson posited an absolute difference between male and female cellular biology relating to the two laws of thermodynamics: that of conservation and that of irreversible degradation of energy in any system. “Male cells are ‘katabolic,’ which is, characterized by expenditure and breakdown, whereas female cells are ‘anabolic,’ conservative and constructive.”23 According to Geddes and Thomson, women were natural pacifists.

Suffrage cartoons frequently depicted woman’s instinctual pacifism and what would be prevented if women were armed with the vote. “To bring peace, drive graft out of politics and close up forever Oriental harems and Occidental brothels requires woman suffrage, the most priceless possession of good civil government,” one proclaimed. In another, a mother supports the weight of the world on her shoulders, Atlas-like, as three brigands battle on top and two children cling to the mother’s skirts: “[T]he woman supports the world and protects her children, while the men waste property and kill each other. Woman suffrage will end such criminal foolishness. Only world suffrage means world peace.”24 Hoping to use their efforts to bring World War I to a speedy end, Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt issued a call for a convention in Washington in 1915, which led to the formation of the Woman’s Peace Party.25

Addams, Catt, and many other feminists believed that “female and male natures had diverged in the course of evolutionary development and that society at large reflected this polarization.” Catt held that “women have been given in greater perfection the gentler traits of tenderness and mercy, the mother heart, which goes out to the wronged and afflicted everywhere, with the longing to bring them comfort and sympathy and help.” For the natural evolution of society, they believed, women must not be confined to the home.

If males organized society and polity, then these organizations could be, and sometimes were, seen as reflecting physiological structures. Women would enter the public sphere bringing biologically based values, skills, and temperaments to bear on its institutions. This would produce a more egal-
narrow relations.” Contact with the moral experiences of the poor reveals that moral standards cannot be simply mechanical; the poor have much to teach the social worker. “We arrive at moral knowledge only by tentative and observant practice. We learn how to apply the new insight by having attempted to apply the old and having found it to fail.”

The charity worker learns from her encounter with others. Contact “not only increases her sense of social obligation but at the same time recasts her social ideals.”

She is chagrined to discover that in the actual task of reducing her social scruples to action, her humble beneficiaries are far in advance of her, not in charity or singleness of purpose, but in self-sacrificing action. She reaches the old-time virtue of humility by a social process... She has socialized her virtues not only through a social aim but by a social process.

The realization of democracy requires identification with the common lot; this identification “becomes the source and expression of social ethics.” Participants in the settlement movement “aimed to blur class lines by helping their neighbors to achieve full participation in American democracy and social life.”

Addams’s wider experience is a kind of social scientific inquiry. It is a mode of data collection; a broadening of the “sample” of life and thereby a testing and enlarging of views. The effort to build social consciousness through immediate experience throws out of the undertaking “all those who shrink before the need of striving forward shoulder to shoulder with the cruder men, whose sole virtue may be social effort.” Addams insisted that experience builds social perspective and combs insularity.

The search for social morality builds a democratic spirit, “for it implies that diversified human experience and resultant sympathy which are the foundation and guarantee of Democracy.”

To attempt to attain a social morality without a basis of democratic experience results in the loss of the only possible corrective and guide... A man who takes the betterment of humanity for his aim and end must also take the daily experiences of humanity for the constant correction of his process.

One must know of the lives of others, “not only in order to believe in their integrity, which is after all but the first beginnings of social morality, but in order to attain to any mental or moral integrity for ourselves or any such hope for society.”

The acquisition of social morality is a dialectical process. One’s views and perspectives must be constantly tested by broader experience. Democracy

carian society, not just because women were now included, but because of what women cared about. Women, it was at least implied, could be better citizens than men.

One of the best statements of the Darwinist-influenced view of woman’s biological contributions to the development of society and citizenship is found in Gilman’s Herland (1915). Gilman organized an entire fictional society without men: a peaceful, noncompetitive society, reproducing by parthenogenesis and enjoying prosperity without distinctions of wealth. In this society, deep within the jungle, there is no concept of home, no private realm. Artificial characteristics commonly alleged to be innately feminine are stripped away from the women of Herland, but once artificial sex distinctions disappear, women remain biologically and psychologically distinct from men. They value peace, nurturance, industry, cooperation, motherhood, and a broader citizenship. Gilman criticized not innate female nature but its distortion in the course of evolution. For the modern home to be more meaningful, Gilman argued, women must be able to enter the world of work, expanding their experiences and skills as men do. Consigned to the narrow circle of the home, women become selfish drones. Instinctively nurturant women need to be accorded larger roles in society if society is to benefit from female values.

Addams and settlement house leaders did not base their entire argument about women’s contribution to a larger citizenship on instinctual or home-based knowledge. Experience must also be born of contact with wider ills, and it is women who have invested their time and energy in cultivating such experience. According to Addams, “the fate of all the unfortunate, the suffering, and the criminal is daily forced upon woman’s attention in painful and intimate ways.” We are unable “to see the duty ‘next to hand’ until we have become alert through our knowledge of conditions in connection with the larger duties.” Those who would develop a social morality “must be brought in contact with the moral experiences of the many in order to procure an adequate social motive.” This contact with all kinds of life must be firsthand, not at arm’s length or from books. A “wider acquaintance with and participation in the life about them” is essential for citizens, “for much of the unsatisfactoriness and hardness of the world is due to the lack of imagination which prevents a realization of the experiences of other people.”

Differing types and degrees of experience with the larger life make it very difficult for people to understand each other. It is hard for people to free themselves from the individualistic point of view. “Most of the misunderstandings of life are due to partial intelligence, because our experiences have been so unlike that we cannot comprehend each other.”

Experience was a corrective to doctrine, for “experience gives the easy and trustworthy impulse toward right action in the broad as well as in the
requires a common belief in the integrity—the personhood and presumably morality—of the other. The privileged citizen acquires integrity only by developing the larger social morality.

Genuine experience cannot lead one astray, Addams believed, any more than scientific data can. And she had the utmost faith in "the illuminating and dynamic value of this wider and more thorough human experience." With faith in progress, Addams was confident that the social ethic was growing: "to see farther, to know all sorts of men, in an inimitable way, is a preparation for better social adjustment—for the remolding of social ills."77

If women interact with the poor on a far more sustained basis than men do, the implication is that women tend to develop the social ethic, while men are more likely to retain the individual, insular ethic. This leads to the feminist argument that women who have experience with the urban poor and their problems are better equipped for citizenship than are males who still retain industrial mentalities. In addition, the different experiences of men and women result in different views on public matters. The sensitivities of both men and women are essential if the city is to transcend its ills. If "government is undertaking, more and more those ultimately human affairs which have to do with daily life and daily experience," women have a natural place in government.78

Addams considered the participation of women in public affairs necessary for the fulfillment of the polis. She argued that

If woman had adjusted herself to the changing demands of the State as she did to the historic mutations of her own household she might naturally and without challenge have held the place in the State which she now holds in the family.79

For Addams, "each advance in ethics must be made fast by a corresponding advance in politics and legal enactment." The state must have the right to regulate and control the industrial system, which "is in a state of profound disorder"; "there is no guarantee that the pursuit of individual ethics will ever right it."80

For many years Addams had focused on the municipal rather than the national franchise. By the time she embraced national suffrage, Addams would have concurred with Logan that "women who see that they need the vote see also that the vote needs them."81

Transcending Individualism: Citizenship and the Social Ethic

Even Mill claims that the social feelings of man, his desire to be at unity with his fellow-creatures, are the natural basis for morality, and he defines a man

of high moral culture as one who thinks of himself, not as an isolated individual, but as a part in a social organism....

Upon this foundation it ought not to be difficult to build a structure of civic virtue.82

The alternative model of citizenship required transcendence of self-centeredness and the individualist ethic. The larger citizenship required social consciousness and concern for others. Women who would bring new values and standards to the American polity saw themselves allied with science and progress, with greater fellow-feeling and democracy.

Addams was influenced by the philosophy of Josiah Royce. He asserted "the virtues of social cooperation against the satisfaction of individual preferences, and the virtues of Royce's idealist philosophy against social Darwinism, laissez-faire doctrines that justified industrial capitalism."83

While Addams and her contemporaries were conversant with J. S. Mill's The Subjection of Women, it is Mill's Utilitarianism that was in the air, perhaps especially in Chicago. The firm foundation of utilitarian morality "is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures." As civilization advances, people "grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests." Strengthening social ties gives each person a stronger personal interest in consulting the welfare of others; "it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with his good." And "he comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others."84

According to this philosophy, our own happiness is increasingly bound up with that of others.

Belief in a progressive science of politics based on increasing social consciousness was not, of course, confined to American women, though they influenced the language and perceptions of some of their male peers. Walter Lippmann was one of these. In 1914 he wrote of a political revolution in the making: "The focus of politics is shifting from a mechanical to a human center." New statesmanship "proposes to fit creeds and institutions to the wants of men, to satisfy their impulses as fully and beneficially as possible." With this new tendency "to put men at the center of politics instead of machinery and things," he saw a turning toward "the creation of finer environments and toward shaping our own destiny. There is an ascendant feeling among the people that all achievement should be measured in human happiness. This feeling has not always existed...in America it belongs to the Twentieth Century."85 Lippmann placed women in the forefront of this great movement.

Lippmann had considerable hope in the progress that might be attained through the social scientific understanding of psychology and the human personality. Science could also help liberate women now. He seemed quite taken with Gilman's formulation that inefficient and outmoded home-based
work is retarding human progress. Women "have got to adjust themselves to a new world," he wrote in 1914. Science must enter the home and help women specialize, saving the home from stupidity, inefficiency, and wasted labor. And women "must go into politics, of course, for no home exists that doesn't touch in a hundred ways upon the government of cities, states, and the nation." 84

Academic voices echoed some of these themes about progress, while questionning feminist claims to lead. University of Chicago psychologist Jessie Taft found humankind progressing from the objective consciousness of self (the Greeks) and the subsequent subjective consciousness of self (Kant and the French Revolution) to the reflective or social consciousness of self. Advanced civilization is just beginning to glimpse this third level of consciousness, which includes a belief in a science of society and an understanding of the social character of all human experience. With an avowed attraction to socialism, Taft echoed Marx and Engels when stipulating the greatest chance for new forms of control and mastery, not only over nature but over social relations. With growing self-consciousness, Taft thought, we will no longer see merely economic relationships but will come to understand that we are engaged in a social relationship with those from whom we buy or to whom we sell, or with those who work for us or for whom we work. Becoming conscious of the social nature of our relationships teaches us that our goals are only realized in common. That "hard and unyielding individual with his boundless, empty freedom" disappears. 85

That freedom that was supposed to reside in the individual is seen to be real
ized only through society. The individual is not economically or morally free
except when he is able to express himself, to realize his ends through the
common life. 86

Again, the individual comes to take others naturally into account; it is a
matter of the proper inclusion and analysis of data:

[T]he value of his thought in handling social questions is tested just as it is
in handling physical problems, by the adequacy with which it covers all the
data involved. Hypotheses which ignore the interests of entire classes of people,
which fail to recognize existing social relations, will not work in the long
run. 87

While Addams wrote of the activist woman's experience as the basis of
a scientific knowledge of society and thereby social consciousness, Taft
insists that the social scientist who systematically collects "data," who incor-
porates the interests of all classes, and who thinks as a social being will be in
the vanguard of the movement for social consciousness and facilitate greater

control over the human environment. Social scientists will lead in the pro-
gressive realization of "the reflectively conscious personality."

For the right attitude to prevail—for human to understand the impor-
tance of unsatisfied and unexpressed impulses and to devote expert attention
to such impulses—there must be "a sufficient number of people who are so
socially sensitive and adaptable that they feel within themselves as their
own the impulses and points of view of all classes and both sexes. The social
scientific vanguard will make theory real. The woman's movement must serve
the goal of producing these experts; indeed, this is its fundamental pur-
pose. 88

Taft rejected claims that woman's intuition and nurture were vital to the
emergence of social consciousness. The movement of labor and the movement
of women alike sought to address a tension between self and environment;
these two movements often failed to understand how close their relation was
and how they manifested a common problem in different aspects. However,
while granting that these movements expressed real, unfulfilled impulses and
an unhappiness over the untenable duality of self and environment, Taft con-
sidered the highest goal of any social movement to be the production of social
scientists whose hypotheses and data would increase social consciousness.

Women as a class were not at the forefront of this effort. Subject to external
authority and to the authority of fathers and husbands, women suffered dou-
ble restrictions on their activities and social relations. As a class, women were
more likely to remain childlike longer, and they were more lacking in self-con-
sciousness than others in the history of the race. 89

Academics interested in woman's nature had begun to abandon Darwin
and biological assumptions in favor of environmental explanations of many
kinds of human variation by 1900. Some of these academics were wary about
concluding that reason and progress would bring about greater equality
among the sexes. Columbia University-trained sociologist Elise Clews Par-
sons believed that, rather than seeking progress, humans feared change and
imposed progress. Sexual prejudice was part of a classification system by
which women were deemed anomalous in comparison to men; rules and con-
victions regulating behavior followed. 90 Women were not likely to change
unless social pressure and expectations about women's nature changed, and
this was not likely to occur soon.

Academic feminism and social psychologists often disagreed with better-
known feminists on political and social issues, including protective legislation
for women and whether legislative remedies could end prostitution. In com-
parison with the preponderant feminist faith, these academic voices sounded
fault and dissenting during the early years of the twentieth century. 91

The most prevalent model of the female social engineer in the early twen-
tieth century was the "sage or prophetess who claimed access to hidden wis-

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For Dewey, natural evolution was not yet finished; "claims about reality cannot be permanently and completely valid." Every assertion had to be open to further scrutiny; "every proposition concerning truths is really in the last analysis hypothetical and provisional." And "moral values...are determined in the course of deciding what actions we should take." If such a view leads to a belief in moral plurality rather than moral community, then inquiry is culturally conditioned and every truth is provisional. Different cultures make distinct contributions to this inquiry.35

Imbued with this perspective, Hull House residents would have to be taught by their neighbors. Addams refused to call them "clients" or "cases." Neighbors would "collaborate in the settlement's own work." Hull House "had to rely upon its neighbors, not just to implement its goals, but to determine just what those goals should be." Residents were to learn from mistakes. "Their method was experimental in Dewey's sense: perform an action, observe its effects, and modify one's behavior accordingly."36

"The ethics of none of us are clearly defined," Addams wrote, for we act only on "circles of habit" which are "based upon convictions we no longer hold." The settlement house was a method, not a solution. In the science of social reform, investigation and moral learning were inextricably linked.5 Her criticism of general reformers centered upon their unreflective moral certainty and rigidity when confronting urban immigrants.

Neither science nor reform movements should segregate politics from moral and social life. Addams saw this as a male mistake:

The well-to-do men of the community think of politics as something off by itself, they may conscientiously recognize political duty as part of good citizenship, but political effort is not the expression of their moral or social life. As a result of this detachment, "reform movements," started by business men and the better element, are almost wholly occupied in the correction of political machinery and with a concern for the better method of administration, rather than with the ultimate purpose of securing the welfare of the people.8

While Hull House attempted two unsuccessful campaigns to oust a longtime corrupt alderman for the area, Addams found the choice between the aldermanic system and progressive reforms more difficult than many of her contemporaries did. Addams objected to the elitism of reformers, and their sense that the righteous do not need to be agreeable. She asked provocatively:

Would it be disastrous to conclude that the corrupt politician himself, because he is democratic in method, is on a more ethical line of social development than the reformer, who believes that the people must be made over

Experience, Engagement, and Ethics

As female settlement house activists claimed status as social scientists, activists male social scientists in the university were in retreat. By the end of the nineteenth century, "objectivity" replaced advocacy in the work of most male social scientists. A wave of political repression had hit American universities between 1886 and 1894; many male social scientists who were politically active social planners were either fired or threatened with firing for advocating "radical" ideas. Experts who had previously been activists often became capable policy advisers, but "not as leaders of a crusade for social justice," and they were much less likely than before to work closely with popular social movements.13 Thus, "the same forces that limited men's power to solve social problems actually promoted the power of women's political cultures." Women such as Addams and Florence Kelley, sustained by institutions such as Hull House, were "undeterred by the repression experienced by their male colleagues in universities, [and] continued throughout their lives to affiliate closely with popular social movements, particularly those dominated by women." Projecting a secular and professional image, these women used social science as a reform tool. Settlement house women "could collect social data and use it to design remedies for social problems just as well as any university professor."35

Movement toward a more moral order required coordinated, concerted action by those willing to experiment and remain open. By the end of the nineteenth century, the old Yankee-Emersonian certainty about the existence of a single moral community was yielding to a sense of moral inquiry. New urban immigrant communities were built on norms and customs unfamiliar to American Protestants. "Right-minded Yankees could no longer make a moral appeal and then correctly anticipate whether what others would do or even what their own consciences would tell them to do."37

Addams was drawn to John Dewey's pragmatism, where inquiry preceded collective action. Dewey served on the first board of Hull House and remained a friend of Addams. He insisted "on the decisive importance of an active, interpreting, human intelligence" and on the cultivation of every individual's cultural faculties. Ethical action toward all members of society was essential, for everyone had the capacity for moral and rational action.39
by “good citizens” and governed by “experts”? The former at least are engaged in that great moral effort of getting the mass to express itself, and of adding this mass energy and wisdom to the community as a whole.” There is a prescient criticism of the tendency of reform movements “to put more and more responsibility upon executive officers and appointed commissions at the expense of curtailing the power of the direct representatives of the voters.” They then become negative influences and “lose their educational value for the mass of the people.”

Aldermen live near the masses of voters, know them intimately, and “minister directly to life and to social needs.” They take care of the poor, pay funeral expenses, and distribute Christmas turkeys. The political success of these aldermen rests on an individualistic basis; it could hardly be otherwise in an ethnically heterogeneous ward where universal experiences “are perforce individual and not social.” Constituents believe the alderman virtuous and heroic because his individual acts are kind and generous; “they are at the same time unable to perceive social outrages which the alderman may be committing.”

Indeed, what headway can the notion of civic purity, of honesty of administration make against this big manifestation of human friendliness, this prevailing survival of village kindness? The notions of the civic reformer are negative and impotent before it.

The aldermanic code of behavior involves acting for the benefit of oneself or one’s friends. Insiders belong “to a set of fellows who understand things, and whose interests are being cared for.” Addams would find this “perfectly legitimate, and all in the line of the development of a strong civic loyalty, if it were merely socialized and enlarged.” However, “it is a long step in moral progress to set the good of the many before the interest of the few, and to be concerned for the welfare of a community without hope of an individual return.” Ultimately, the alderman does the ethical development of the community no good.

A “fixer” impresses his constituents; many think “that the aldermanic power is superior to that of government.” People see the alderman shielding them from the law and the police passing by illegal establishments owned or protected by their representative. “A certain contempt for the whole machinery of law and order is thus easily fostered.” The undermining of civic loyalty and respect for the power of law is a “cost” of the aldermanic system. The alderman “cares more for the feelings and pocket-books of his constituents than he does for the repute and cleanliness of his city.” The entire community pays the price for corruption, but the “evils of corrupt government are bound to fall heaviest upon the poorest and least capable,” who experience the disease-carrying public water and garbage in the streets.

But even the most corrupt aldermen are better champions of democracy than reformers and proceed upon a sounder theory. “The real leaders of the people are part of the entire life of the community which they control, and so far as they are representative at all, are giving a social expression to democracy.” Machine politicians are not frightened by democracy, as are a certain type of businessmen, who have lost their faith in the people. Reformers, businessmen, and social scientists who shun public engagement are all guilty of failing to learn from experience.

Compared to elite reformers, “the poor turned out to have the more genuinely sympathetic, neighborly, and self-sacrificing moral code.” Addams here gives Mill a Rousseauian twist, arguing that the simplest people have fellow-feelings upon which a politics of social consciousness can and should build. “Primitive” humans, such as the urban ethnic poor, have a ready willingness to help friends and neighbors in need, whatever the inconvenience to themselves.

Addams tends to identify immigrants as childlike and having a primitive, simple moral code. They have a sense of goodness, but for people at an early stage of moral evolution (Addams mentions southern Italian peasants), “abstract virtues are too difficult for their untrained minds to apprehend.” Good personal example is essential. “It is obvious that ideas only operate upon the popular mind through will and character, and must be dramatized before they reach the mass of men.” The primitive sense of goodness is a better instinct upon which to build a social morality than the businessman’s ethic and individualistic morality of the adult male. Women, with their housekeeping skills, are more in touch with the childlike and simple. Boys need guidance.

This preference for primitive goodness and a sense of social interdependence carried over from the urban arena to labor struggles. Addams placed hope in the common turn-of-the-century assertion that America was passing from an age of individualism to an age of association. Action carried out along the line of associated effort is “more highly developed”; even if inefficient, it “may represent a finer social quality and have a greater social value than the more effective individual action.” The struggles of cooperating, associated workingmen against even the most benevolent individual employer exemplify the higher value of association.

The ethics of the mass of men surpass that of the employer. Their desire for self-expression, self-government, and the amelioration of their condition is nobler than the employer’s desire to provide for their good as he sees fit. Workingmen have a more general vision and a greater sense of morality than the industrialist. They talk of justice and brotherhood, attempt to inspire and encourage each other, and appeal to the “identity of the interests of workingmen the world over.” Addams admires the proletarian sentiment that “the injury of one is the concern of all.” The social virtues “express themselves
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Progressive-era debates about membership in the polity and the terms of citizenship gave rise to new visions of progress and political incorporation in the United States. The ramifications of these debates were broad. Wider understandings of citizenship paved the way for and shaped the American version of the welfare state.

Gendered rhetoric of citizenship pervaded the public sphere. Neither gender spoke in unison, yet it is fair to conclude that masculinist political rhetoric, with its emphasis upon manliness, autonomy, vigor, and independence, was gradually and at least temporarily displaced by feminist rhetoric. Gendered visions of the state and of the meaning of citizenship became public visions.

Mark Kann's assertion that historically "ours was a Lockean liberalism that required, incorporated, and perpetuated republican civic virtue according to an enfranchised division of labor" helps us understand the need to qualify claims for the pervasiveness of the liberal tradition. As the cult of true womanhood permeated the suffrage movement, women insisted that their civic labor could no longer be private or merely family-directed, but rather that notions of citizenship and state had to be transformed.

The Progressive vision was, in considerable measure, a female vision, inspired by the rhetoric of social responsibility. As Skocpol has forcefully argued, "women's politics played a much more central role in progressivism than most historians have heretofore acknowledged." Turn-of-the-century women made "collective and hegemonic demands—that is, demands not only for themselves but also on behalf of the entire society—to a degree highly

in associated effort." Working people know that an individual employer is lodged in an industrial system with competitors and that their wages and conditions in a trade do not depend merely on their employer's goodwill. They know that the relationship is not merely one between individuals. For Addams, "the real sin of capitalism was not the economic fact that capitalism made profits, but the social consequence that the poor had no genuine (rather than merely formal) opportunity for cultural expression and self-development." Because of business demands, employers are often cut off from the emerging social ethic and "from the great moral life springing from our common experiences. This is sure to happen when he is good to 'people rather than 'with' them, when he allows himself to decide what is best for them instead of consulting them." Addams helped workers form organizations, sided regularly with workers in Chicago strikes, and bitterly attacked George Pullman's paternalism toward his striking workers. In the Pullman strike, she noted how much the men resented the extension of industrial control into domestic and social arrangements. "They felt the lack of democracy in the assumption that they should be taken care of in these matters, in which even the humblest workman has won his independence." Pullman did not consult worker feelings or needs; his attitude was rather that of the artist toward his creation. The benefactor too frequently fails to cultivate a frank equality with his or her beneficiaries, "and there is left no mutual interest in a common cause." The performer of too many good deeds may lose his or her capacity to recognize good in others.

In an attempt to aid and educate working people, the middle-class moralist or industrialist "has constantly and traditionally urged upon the workingman the specialized virtues of thrift, industry, and sobriety—all virtues pertaining to the individual." But in a highly organized, complex, and interdependent environment,

if a workingman is to have a conception of his value at all, he must see industry in its unity and entirety; he must have a conception of it that will include not only himself and his immediate family and community, but the industrial organization as a whole.

Working men and women need the kind of education that develops an understanding of interdependence; "if the workingman is to save his life at all, ... he should get a sense of his individual relation to the system." It is intellectually and morally debilitating to be engaged in "feeding a machine with a material of which he has no knowledge, producing a product, totally unrelated to the rest of his life, without in the least knowing what becomes of it, or its connection with the community." What workers need is a social consciousness of the value of their work, a sense of participation and pleasure in

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unusual for any broad category of people in American politics.” Sklat concurs that “to an extent unequalled elsewhere, middle-class American women were crucial and central to the responses state and federal governments made to social pressures created by massive immigration and rapid industrialization and urbanization.” In the United States, “so much of the path to the welfare state [was] blazed by middle-class women” because their activism “served as a surrogate for working-class social-welfare activism.” Political mobilization by these women “formed the largest coalitions that broke through the male-dominated American social and political priorities at the municipal, state, and federal levels.”

While most still lacked the ballot, “women became civically involved in a polity where plenty of ‘space’ was available for new forces who favored collective as opposed to distributive, patronage-oriented policies.” In preparation for a new leadership role, women’s clubs and branches of NAWSA provided a training ground for public life. They staged parliamentary debates, read and discussed scholarly works of the day, entertained distinguished visitors, including Beatrice Webb and Eleanor Marx, and discussed political questions such as “Free Trade,” “Socialism in the Home,” “Bismarck and His Policy,” and “The Eight Hour Day.”

Women activists were more supportive of an expanded public sector than were their male counterparts. Their associations generally supported the expansion of governmental responsibility for the welfare of the able-bodied. Shorter hours and higher wages plus safer work sites would create sounder citizens and improve society. Women’s groups lobbied for legislation that they “authoritatively claimed was in the moral best interest of society as a whole.” Maternal values were presented as progressive democratic values.

Women’s vision of citizenship included much of what T. H. Marshall termed “social rights.” This vision refused to accede to the separation of ethics from politics or to accept an individualistic ethos. Women’s political culture had faith in democratic processes and in the “capacity of large social organizations”—like state and federal governments—to respond positively to social needs. The state was not an enemy of human liberty; rather, it was “a potential guarantor of social rights.”

It would appear that Progressive-era paternalists did have “an advantage in defining what the public interest meant.” The rhetoric used by these women proved effective with legislators and civic leaders; it claimed to rise above narrow partisanship in the name of selfless morality. Organized American women, in a structurally and culturally privileged position, were able to attract support from male elites and shape the agenda of progressive politics. Their critique of individualism was heard in a way that class-based critiques were not.

Influenced by the rhetoric of the social ethic, political leaders began to envision American identity and strength differently by the time of Wilson’s first inauguration. Presidents increasingly mentioned women’s positive influence in public life or noted approvingly the growth of those virtues that women liked to claim as their special domain.

In his first inaugural address, Wilson invoked the great moral force of American life.

Nowhere else in the world have noble men and women exhibited in more striking forms the beauty and the energy of sympathy and helpfulness and counsel in their efforts to rectify wrong, alleviate suffering, and set the weak in the way of strength and hope.

He aspired to find and perfect “the means by which government may be put at the service of humanity.” Men, women, and children must be shielded “in their lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of great industrial and social processes which they can not alter, control, or simply cope with.” “Sanitary laws, pure food laws, and laws determining conditions of labor which individuals are powerless to determine for themselves are intimate parts of the very business of justice and legal efficiency.” Four years later, Wilson celebrated the “significant changes in the spirit and purpose of our political action.” Americans were attempting to “lift our politics to a broader view of the people’s essential interests.”

Elected after ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, Warren G. Harding extolled woman’s contribution to politics in terms of her special talents and virtues:

[We may count upon her intuitions, her refinements, her intelligence, and her influence to enliven the social order. We count upon her exercise of the full privileges and the performance of the duties of citizenship to speed the attainment of the highest state.]

He proclaimed that “service is the supreme commitment of life” and pledged “an administration wherein all the agencies of Government are called to serve.” Harding found American strength, greatness, and citizenship to be home-centered. In an inventory of what the nation stands for, his successor, Calvin Coolidge, declared that American government stands “attentive to the intuitive counsel of womanhood.”

**Conclusion: Political Traditions and Political Possibilities**

This alternative vision of citizenship had some real, if limited, success in attacking the truncation of public space and the impoverished vision of citizenship of the era. But these broader visions failed to completely transform
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or dislodge resilient autonomy-based understandings of citizenship. By the mid-1920s, "powerful backlashes developed against policy gains that had already been achieved."128 As we stand at the end of the twentieth century, the vision offered by Addams and her contemporaries seems no longer to pursue much legitimacy in public space. One might well conclude that "all normative concerns have increasingly been relegated to the field of private morality, to the domain of 'values,' and politics has been stripped of its ethical components."129

Do the limits of the power of this vision vindicate claims for the brute strength of Hartzian liberalism, or even of the boundary conditions of a more bipolar liberal discursive community? Was this as far as rules of the language game somehow allowed Americans to think and move? Is this a mapping with which a reified political culture confronts political actors, holding out certain roles, cues, and prospects for would-be participants in social transformation? I don't think so. Let me instead modestly examine some reasons for the limited extent to which this particular vision of citizenship was successful, while allowing some possibility of a broader historical contingency.

Maternalism helped some women attain more masculinized, paternalistic public roles. After the Civil War, white middle-class women increasingly sought and began to assume "the masculinized, powerful role of 'protector'" through their work as missionaries, with the settlement house movement, Indian reform, and temperance. This protector or rescuer role provided a vehicle through which some women could transcend domesticity and "could demonstrate independence and autonomy."130 This was an important role for women looking to influence politics and society. Increasing numbers of these women altered their status from 'dependents' in need of protection to 'protectors' of 'working girls,' 'primitives,' immigrants, Indians and others, and in so doing they created a recognized political role for themselves.131

White middle-class women exerted control and demonstrated their own public competence by taking care of those who were not capable of doing so themselves; in so doing, they helped negotiate their way through the state. Addams is one woman who derived some title to citizenship on behalf of women for representing and caring for urban dependents. Settlement houses around the nation dispensed educational and social services to surrounding working-class residents, and got involved in politics on their behalf. They organized social and instructional clubs, ran day nurseries, agitated for better city services, and—over time—pursued new social legislation on behalf of the less privileged.132

In another sense, too, the maternalist legacy was not simply liberal. Maternalist policy underlined responsibilities to dependents, "Policies toward the 'dependent' classes of wage-earning women and children set precedents for state intervention that later could be extended to wage-earning men and to non-wage-earning women and children."133 This continuum underscores the extent to which the narrative structure of the welfare state remained rooted in the notion of dependency. Recipients of many kinds of benefits were dependents—wards or或ives of the state—and not fully citizens. With the rise of the welfare state, many recipients of state benefits lost out in terms of citizenship. "To be on welfare is to lose one's independence and to be treated as less than a full member of society."134 Thus the victory of the limited welfare state was hollow in terms of redefining the social ethic—the social web of interdependence—that Addams and some of her contemporaries envisioned.

Despite Addams's best efforts to avoid it, the maternalist framework itself appeared to generate a trap. Motherhood of necessity conjured up dependents who required nurturing. A mothering, nurturing relationship was one among those who might someday be equals but were not at that point in time. Addams disliked the "doing for" model of women's leadership, stressing instead interdependence, but it seems to have followed almost necessarily from the imagery of the cult of true womanhood.

When using maternalist rhetoric and drawing upon analogies to the home, women very easily conflated the asymmetrical mother-child bond with that between the middle-class woman and the immigrant, or that between white women and Native Americans or African Americans. Because mothering and housekeeping, associated with women's traditional roles, remained so central to Addams's claim to authority in public spaces, the imagery of caring and interconnection that influenced policy visions was modeled on parent-child relations rather than the special bonds forged among equal citizens. While maternalism opened up some opportunities to radically revision the state, relations of dependence and asymmetry that were so prevalent in much of its rhetoric were not liberal relations of equality.

Maternalist imagery created dependents and reinforced hierarchal citizenship. It did not ultimately dislodge the independence/autonomy model of citizenship, but rather paved the way for some privileged women to approximate male standards of independence and autonomy. A class fragment of white women not only gained the vote and an additional avenue to speak for themselves, but had given themselves leave to speak in public for all women.

Maternalism may have created a sense of responsibility for public caring, but the model of caring also tended to affirm the infantilization of recipients. Dependents who were objects of policy, such as female recipients of welfare, could be told what to do and how to do it. These attempts to regulate behavior were much like the mother's attempt to control unruly or wayward children lacking in mature judgment. The social welfare state formulated,
with women's help, in the United States was in many ways a maternal social welfare state.

The dynamic interaction of race and gender also constitutes a key piece of this story, and it is linked to the discourse of republican virtue. While speaking of "woman" without racial specification, NAWSA leaders and other prominent feminists increasingly meant white women. This was quite clear among white suffrage leaders by the 1890s; suffrage leaders turned increasingly to arguments based in egalitarianism. Egalitarianism was supplanted by the politics of virtue. Suffrage and virtue could no longer be dissociated, and virtue was measured relationally. Smith's ascetism and republicanism were intermingled, not separated, in this discourse, as Horton has noted.

Women argued their claim to citizenship by contrasting their virtue with the corruption and greed of a male-dominated economy and polity. They argued their virtue by contrast with that of the foreign-born immigrant, and with the level of civilization disfranchised African-American males had attained. If Addams insisted that the argument for women's incorporation was compatible with the claim that other, "simpler" peoples had much to teach Americans about compassion and the social ethic, hers was a relatively lonely voice. Such a discourse of virtue limited the appeal of this vision of citizenship across racial, ethnic, and class lines.

While contributing to the creation of new political spaces, feminists did not speak with one voice about who could be readily incorporated as citizens. Claims to entry that were framed in terms of white female cultural and moral superiority relative to non-Caucasians sometimes fueled the immigration restriction movement. Gilman's maternalist vision sent women outside the home to seek independence; she regarded self-sufficiency as critical to citizenship. She also became a highly vocal supporter of immigration restriction. Those "below a certain grade of citizenship," who are not self-supporting, who are not fully capable of entire personal responsibility, and who might degenerate into becoming social burdens or criminals, exist in a different relationship to the state than do (real) citizens. They might require compulsory state supervision and tuition. Supporters of the cult of true womanhood frequently rejoined white males over the citizenship status of African Americans and immigrants.

Skocpol argues that within the vast array of women's organizations, grassroots community organizations and intellectual leaders worked together well, establishing cross-class gender goals and even being able to speak at times with one voice. I contend, however, that the terms of political incorporation of women are incomprehensible without understanding the centrality of race in American politics. Twentieth-century politics was shaped in no small measure by the limits within which activists were able to rethink the meaning of citizenship during the suffrage struggle. While the cult-of-true-

womanhood arguments of white and African-American feminists looked much alike, African-American women were not fully accorded the status of "true women" by their white counterparts. Even white women belonged to the civilizing race and generally insisted on their authority to speak for and make claims on behalf of the interests of others. African-American, immigrant, and poor and working-class women may have become objects of state and national policy making, but they were often deemed suspiciously lacking in the virtue that "real" citizens possess. They lacked real personhood. Though they spoke, they would continue to be spoken for. The suffrage struggle had missed the opportunity to extend the meaning of citizenship by learning from multiple experiences with exclusion.

Maternalism had another confounding legacy. It tied[ed] one's identity as a social critic to acquiescence in the traditional stereotype of women. Even if women left the home, they maintained they were merely extending it. However, if women chose or were compelled to leave home—or curtailed those community works that helped legitimate their claim to know—the special, intuitive, and/or experiential source of their authority was severely jeopardized. So, too, was the claim to a unity of interest.

If public officials recognized a broader vision of the state and accepted some version of the social ethic as part of official conceptions of citizenship, they did not always remember (or wish to remember) the extended definition of home. Linking virtue to the home, rather than escaping from narrow definitions of it, President Harding sought a nation of homes "where mothers, freed from the necessity for long hours of toil beyond their own doors, may preside as befits the hearthstone of American citizenship." If the cradle of American childhood [is] rocked under conditions so wholesome and so hopeful that no blight may touch it in its development, this is the education so essential to hest citizenship. Harding's desire for a home-centered citizenship echoed arguments for protective legislation for women in the workplace. Reflecting how strongly traditional homes figured in women's allotted roles in the absence of the expanded definition women tried to give those roles, by the outset of the New Deal, federal legislation—followed by state and local legislation—began to bar married women from civil service work. While feminist leaders active in reworking the definition of the public did not contend the private realm was superior to the public, male public officials linked women's title to virtue closely to their home-based activities. The state would play an important role in preserving the home in the name of citizenship.

Race, class, ethnicity, republicanism, patriarchy, and liberalism all figure importantly in the story of what white reform women won, and what they failed to win. In part because they could not adequately clarify or convince others "what home has to do with it" (to borrow from a popular feminist tract), these women failed to move their transformative vision further in the
post suffrage era. The failure to transcend a specifically gendered conception of a larger citizenship limited the public life expectancy of these women's social vision. And because their discourse of virtue was so closely specified by race and class, it was hard to extend the meaning of the social ethic beyond caring for dependents.

The constitution of a "we" is part of the process of defining citizenship. Who we are is also a statement about what we do. Gilded Age elite male reformers, critical of patronage parties, were frequently ridiculed as unmanly and politically impotent. In the Progressive era, many of the new reformers were adamantly feminine. Could men regard transformative visions of state and citizenship, and the reforms undertaken in the name of these visions, as collective action done in their name, indeed, in the name of all citizens? In part, the limited duration of what Progressive-era women helped achieve reflected discomfort with a feminized state.

The late-twentieth-century politics of citizenship also suggests that the broader vision of citizenship remains a specifically gendered vision. The politics of exclusion prevails, as does deep doubt that we constitute a nation of shared values. The legacy of Addams's vision of interdependence and of growing social consciousness appears relatively weak amid growing social insularity and political polarization. Without the continual mobilization and deployment of an authoritative alternative rhetoric of citizenship, the narrative underpinnings of both the welfare state and of more inclusive visions of American political identity are gradually being deprived of lifeblood.

It can hardly be accidental that masculinist politics and rhetoric in the 1980s accompanied the assault on both the limited welfare state and on feminism. The demise of the welfare state is most closely associated with a president with a distinctively "masculine" public image and rhetoric: Ronald Reagan. George Bush became a "wimp" in part because of his supposed lack of stomach for the visionary politics of his predecessor. To be for government, especially for social welfare programs, is seen as feminine. Gender gap research suggests that women are more likely than men to support governmental social programs. Male imagery helped reframe the political agenda from an era seen as bankrupt, soft, feminized.

Creating a "we" in political discourse is a matter of negotiation and struggle. Women activists in the Progressive era were attempting to reformulate a collective identity, yet "part of the knowledge revealed in political discourse is the scope and validity of the claim entered in saying 'we': i.e., who turns out to be willing and able to endorse that claim." 145

Public space is contested space. The alternative narrative of citizenship, which became in part and for a time a public vision, needed to cross not only class lines but also race and gender lines if it was to become the basis of an enduring collective vision.
Notes

69. This was not uniformly true, as many blacks were involved in the labor movement (despite the fact that white unions continued to exclude them), for example, the National Colored Labor Union in 1869. While this involvement may have had more of an impact on black republicanism with regard to class issues than I indicate here, if this was the case, it is not noted in the generally excellent secondary literature on the subject. Consequently, my working assumption is that it did not.

70. Giddings, When and Where I Enter, p. 65. Again, see also Nackmoff's essay in this volume.

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15. See Norton's essay in this volume for a critique of David Greenstone's corrective to Hartz for its failure to adequately conceptualize the individual subject.


25. Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House (New York: Macmillan, 1925 [1910]), ch. 18; Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics, p. 86.


29. "To the Male Citizen: If This Is Womanly—Why Not This?" suffrage cartoon, Sophia Smith Collection.

30. Addams, "Why Women Should Vote," p. 19. Conway claims that men were "discarded as irrelevant in the planning of Hull House and other women's settlements because they were thought of as less Christian in spirit than women and motivated to action almost entirely by commercial rewards." See Conway, "Women Reformers," p. 171.

31. "For a good job of a clean sweep SHE can't be beat," suffrage cartoon, Sophia Smith Collection.

86. Among these academics were University of Chicago-trained psychologist Helen Thompson (Wooley), author of *Psychological Norms in Men and Women* (1903), and University of Chicago sociologist William I. Thomas, whose social-biological views had moderated over time. See Rosenberg, "In Search of Woman's Nature," pp. 146, 147, p. 150 (citing Elsie Clews Parsons, *Fear and Comformity and Social Rule*).
95. Greenstone, "Dorothea Dix and Jane Addams," p. 552 (citing Addams's *Twenty Years at Hull House*, ch. 8).
97. Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, pp. 3, 247 (on the campaign to unseat the local alderman).
102. Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, pp. 233, 244, 250, 260.
118. Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, p. 318.
119. Letters and columns in the *Women's Tribune*, the weekly vehicle of NAWSA. On discussion copies at the Chicago Women's Club in the early 1880s, see Sklar, "Historical Foundation of Women's Power," pp. 63–64.
125. Wilson, "Inaugural Address" (4 March 1913), pp. 200–2; Wilson, "Inaugural Address" (4 March 1917), p. 203.
127. Harding, "Inaugural Address" (4 March 1921), p. 213; Calvin Coolidge, "Inaugural Address" (4 March 1923), p. 223.
132. Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, p. 344.
138. Confronted with the need to confront racial stereotypes and assert their own worthiness in society and polity, African-American women activists were generally less concerned than was Addams with learning from their poorer neighbors and sisters. These women sought to lift the poor while setting the values and standards to be met. See Bois, "Power of Motherhood," p. 222.
140. Harding, "Inaugural Address" (4 March 1921), p. 213.
Notes

142. “Man whose loyalty to a party was questionable were referred to...as the ‘third sex’ of American politics, ‘man-milliners,’ and ‘Miss-Nancies.’” See Paula Baker, Domestication of Politics, p. 623, n. 27.

Chapter 8

I would like to express my appreciation to the James Monroe Professorship Research Fund and the Ronald E. McNair Post-Baccalaureate Program, Oberlin College, for financial support. I am indebted to McNair Fellow Susan Dennelly and research assistants Sam Marcus and Steve Manthe, who ably assisted at various stages of this project, and to the editors of this volume for their very helpful suggestions.

1. J. David Greenstone, “Against Simplicity: The Cultural Dimensions of the Constitution,” University of Chicago Law Review 55 (1988): 428–29. Whether one considers Greenstone’s work on labor, in Labor in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), or the political power of the poor in cities, in Race and Authority in Urban Politics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), coauthored with Paul E. Peterson, or the historical foundations of liberalism, in The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), or in the underclass, in “Culture, Rationality, and the Underclass,” in Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, eds., The Urban Underclass (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991), his scholarship has always considered whether the American political tradition could sustain the important task of incorporating the weak and less advantaged into our nation’s political, social, and economic system. Also, Greenstone’s scholarship is about understanding (and at times furthering) the transformative potential of our nation in a way that is true to important constitutional values, even when such values were denied in the short run by those who call themselves progressive. This project—my search to understand the constitutive nature of Supreme Court decision making, my rejection of instrumental assumptions about Supreme Court decision making, and my search to explore constitutional theories that can help in the (re)definition of the rights of subordinated groups—is testimony to Greenstone’s vision as a scholar and as a person. I see in the many wonderful scholarly projects that are reported in this volume additional testimonies to Greenstone.


13. Greenstone, “Against Simplicity,” p. 435. At this point, I note that the problems that Greenstone has identified for scholars and politicians who subscribe to either the doctrinal approach or its radical critique can also be found to an even greater degree among scholars who use the attitudinal or rational-choice approach. Attitudinalists assume that the law is simply the result of the policy wants of judges, while rational-choice scholars assume that law and constitutional choices are simply the result of the strategic desires of legal actors. Both approaches to Supreme Court decision making assume a static, consensual model of liberal and legal values that Greenstone persuasively argues against.
17. See Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 29, for a superb study of how presidents differ in the degree to which they engage in “order-shattering, order-affirming, and order-creating impulses of presidential action.” In part, this book is about how presidents seek to be successful but are limited in their success by the ways of acting developed during earlier regimes and the willingness of the public to rethink these precepts.
19. We shall leave that task to colleagues such as Rogers Smith and others in collateral essays in this volume.
21. See Kahn, Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory, chs. 3, 6.
22. See Ira Katznelson, “Sinned Rationality: A Preface to J. David Greenstone’s Reading of Y. O. Key’s Responsible Electorate,” in this volume, for an argument against instrumental notions of rationality in mainstream political science.