Tim Hoyt:	Okay. Well, welcome. We'll allow other people to file in as they come. You know how important it is. It's Swarthmore reunion to make sure everything starts and ends on time. We have a start time. I don't know what the end time is. I'm sure we'll be glad to stay around as long as we can and answer questions either on the podium or off, depending.
	First off, I'd like to thank Greg Davis from the Class of 1980 for coming up with this idea. It's an unusual panel. Greg is a Swarthmore graduate, Class of 1980, who now works for the U.S. Navy in Intelligence Affairs. I had the honor of at least reviewing his Master's thesis, the National Intelligence University, earlier this year.
	I'm Tim Hoyt, Class of 1982. I'm now the Professor of Strategy and the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Unlike Greg, I have no experience in the military. I'm one of their civilian academics who serves as a gadfly among other purposes. 
	And then last but not least, of course, Professor Dominic Tierney here at Swarthmore, who has just finished an excellent book that has received outstanding reviews on war in the 21st century and American foreign policy. The title of the panel is War and Peace in the 21st Century. 
	I suspect we'll each keep our remarks fairly brief and talk mostly about the war side because that's something we've all been working on or writing on. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't have a much broader range in discussion because war and peace are obviously intimately linked. The closer one is to one extreme, the less one has of the other. The world in which we live usually contains a mixture of the two and we can anticipate that in the future, I think. 
	So with that, I'd like to start with Dom, and then Greg, and then I'll fill in a couple of gaps myself, and then we'll open it up for questions and discussion.
Dominic Tierney:	Can you guys hear me okay? Is this good? It's a great pleasure to be here and to see so many alumns here. Thank you very much Greg and Tim for setting up this very interesting panel and for the kind introductory words. I'm going to do something very un-Swarthmorean, a little self-promotion. This is the book, the Right Way to Lose a War, just came out last Tuesday, actually.
Tim Hoyt:	The bookstore's now out of it.
Dominic Tierney:	Oh, well, that's good. My mom must have bought extra copies. Let me just say in just a couple minutes about what the book is on, really just raising the questions rather than trying to give any deep answer. In essence, why does America keep losing wars? Why did we stop winning wars? Up until about 1945, the United States won almost every major war that it fought certainly in the previous century from the Mexican-American war through the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and the World Wars. Then since World War II, the U.S. has really struggled on the battlefield. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, represent a string of stalemates and failures. If you think of the most visceral images of wars since World War II, it's prisoners being abused at Abu Ghraib, it's helicopters lifting people out of Saigon in 1975. Really, the Gulf War is the only victory in major war for the United States. 
	In trying to explain this dramatic shift in America's military performance, I think you have to understand the role of American power and the changed nature of war since World War II. America became one of two superpowers, of course, after World War II, and then with the end of the Cold War, the sole superpower. Ironically, just at this moment when American strength was at its height, this is when the United States has struggled in war. In fact, powers can be something of a curse because it has encouraged interventionism in distance quarrels in places like Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.
	The United States chose an unfortunate moment to discover its inner interventionist because the nature of war shifted quite fundamentally. There's been a decline in interstate war. That is the good news. Countries have basically stopped fighting each other. The great powers haven't fought each other for 60, 70 years. This is a wonderful thing. As the tide of interstate war retreated or receded, what we're left with are civil wars and insurgencies. About 90% of wars today are civil wars. In these new kinds of conflict, well, really an old conflict but now a dominant one on the state of war, the U.S. has been unable to adapt effectively. The U.S. military, for example, is still stuck in many ways in a interstate conventional war mindset. And meanwhile, America's adversaries are very willing to adapt. The Taliban, for example, has all kinds of connections and links with Iraqi insurgent groups. They learn about improvised explosive devices and so on.
	It has been dark age of American warfare. What the book explores is how the U.S. can try to get out the quagmire once we get in. Not only do we get into the quagmire, but have a very difficult time extricating the country. In Korea, we spent years trying to negotiate a truce. In Vietnam, we spend even longer trying to reach an armistice. The terms that Nixon achieved in 1973 were actually worse than the terms that North Vietnam offered back in 1965, eight years before. It took us 20 days to capture Baghdad, well over 2,000 days to leave. We captured Kabul in 2001 and we're still there. So we really struggled to extricate country. The book impart, sort of explores an exit strategy, a way out of these quagmires.
	Then the final thing I would say is that the last part of the book is about how the U.S. can try to start winning wars again. And here, the answer, in a nutshell, is that we need to prepare much more for the reality among conflict, both the society and also the U.S. military, this era of civil wars, including training for things that are very unpopular, like counterinsurgency and nation-building. Then we need to fight fewer wars. We're far too quick to seize the sword. Two of America's major wars since 1945, Vietnam and Iraq, should never have been fought. 
	In fact, one of the things I suggest in the book is that before we start the war, we should think about the difficulties of getting out if it goes wrong. In other words, think through what the exit strategy would be if it goes wrong before we actually begin. An analogy here would be, if you're thinking of a quick fire wedding in Las Vegas, I would suggest before you do that, maybe go and sit in the divorce courts for a while and just look at the marital exit strategies. Thinking about the difficulties of getting out can make you wary about getting in. I'll stop there. Thank you.
Tim Hoyt:	Greg.
Greg Davis:	A point that's particularly important for Tim and myself is that we are speaking for ourselves, not in his case, Naval War College, my case, the U.S. Navy.
Tim Hoyt:	Or, in fact, any other institution of the United States government. 
Greg Davis:	Part of my experience really is, whereas ... Tim gets to teach the people I work for, teaching them about strategy. Dominic is trying to teach everybody about it with his books. I'm involved in implementing a lot of this, both as a Navy Reserve. My civilian career is also in intelligence. I spent 13 months in Iraq for my civilian job. I spent 22 months in Afghanistan for the Navy. 
	It's painfully obvious the ways that we are not prepared to deal with things. We constantly have people going, "Well, I served in Iraq so I understand Afghanistan." It's like, "Really? So you've been to Alabama so you understand Scotland?" We think and we repeatedly don't bother to learn about the cultures that we're engaging with. We tend to think that the rest of the world is Americans dressed in funny clothes. People are not motivated by the same things. People are not offended by the same things. And we don't even bother to try to learn. You can do that in a conventional war to a certain extent, but you can't do that in a counterinsurgency because the whole point is getting people to want things that are more important with what we want. So you actually have to be approaching them by what motivates them. Anyway, we'll let Tim take over here.
Tim Hoyt:	Okay. Well, let me start because it's always good to have a donnybrook early by somewhat disagreeing with something Dominic just said. He argued that the nature of war has shifted. I would argue the nature of war hasn't shifted. 
	What is war? War is the use of organized violence in pursuit of a political aim. That's what distinguishes it from common murder. It's organized and it's used for political objectives. What's changed is the character in which war is currently being waged. He's correct to identify that there are far fewer interstate wars than there were 75 years ago. The last great power war was either the Second World War or the Korean war, depending on how you felt about China in 1950 to 1953. There has not been a major Naval War since 1945, and that actually is important because the United States is a maritime power, an heir to a long maritime tradition.
	The character of the wars that we fight has fundamentally changed. But the nature of those conflicts, again, I would argue, are fundamentally about a political dispute that one or both sides has decided to try and achieve through the use of purposeful, organized violence. As a demonstration of the changes and the character of war that we're facing today, I'd like to talk a little bit about the character of war since 2000, when the United States has found itself in something that we have desperately struggle to define and describe. On September 12th or 13th, the president called it a War on Terror. Well, terror is a hard thing to fight a war against. Terror is a fear, it's an emotion. It was later modified to a War on Terrorism, the practitioners of terror. Again, this is problematic because if you are an academic, states often are engaged in acts of terror against their own people. 
	Are we at war with every state that practices terror against its own people? That we would find quickly would be problematic. Are we at war with every terrorist group in the world? No, that too, we would quickly find problematic. Because again, terrorism is a manifestation of war. It is organized, purposeful violence in pursuit of a political aim by groups that lack political power. We have found in the past that we have supported the aims of some of those groups. Not every terrorist is evil and in the immortal words of Ronald Reagan, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." This is a constant struggle with the idea of terrorism. 
	Therefore, the war on terrorism is fundamentally a problematic concept. More importantly, wars on tactics or forms of military operations tend not to be successful. Imagine a war against dive bombing, or a war on submarines, or a war on tanks. Actually, the way you ameliorate those problems is not through war itself; it's through negotiation. We have seen this successful for a long period of time, ban of certain types of weapons. But it requires broad multinational agreement. Banning chemical weapons worked for a long time. Chemical weapons were not used between about 1936 and about 1966. That's a significant period of time. That was done through multinational agreement, not through war. Wars against types of warfare tend not to be effective. I think that is the biggest indicator of changes in the character of warfare. It's also about changes in the way in which we receive and perceive news, information, and intelligence. 
	The latest reports on global terrorism, I pulled this up on the way down, it's the Global Terrorism Index, which is done by a group in Switzerland. It's considered probably the best, broad indicator of perspectives on terrorism and the use of terrorism in the international community. It's not affiliated with any government. It does not have any particular partisan point of view. It's simply a database. Among the important things that have come up from this database ... The most recent statistics are from 2013, so it's probably actually a little bit worse because 2014 was a year where there was a lot more terrorism. 
	There's been a 61% increase in people killed by acts of terrorism between 2012 and 2013. That figure went from about 11,000 to about 18,000. 82% of those killed, however, are killed in five places, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria. Over two-thirds of the deaths that are related to terrorism are carried out by four groups, which are common to those five regions, the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Boko Haram. If you look further at the data, it becomes apparent that actually terrorism is not necessarily a huge destabilizing global problem. 
	What we have done is we have conflated terrorism as a tactic and then try to isolate it as a global threat. When in fact, what appears to be happening is it is becoming increasingly focused on areas where there are weak political systems, a lack of political legitimacy, and a significant presence of states sponsored violence. Those are the three largest indicators of terrorism within states. 
	What we are doing now is we are trying to take a concept of terrorism that was useful before 9/11. And we're trying to keep it separate when, in fact, what we're seeing is terrorism is increasingly becoming conflated with civil war. That is important for Americans to know because so much of our political discourse is about terrorism is a fundamental threat to the United States. Well, since 9/11 and including 9/11, only 6% of the deaths that have occurred from terrorism globally have occurred in the OECD countries. The other 94% have occurred in the developing world. They're occurring because in wars in the developing worlds, terrorism is becoming the dominant tactic. That's an important change. If we are continuing to try to fight terrorism as a tactic, that means increasingly, there will be an effort to get us involved in resolving protracted and possibly insoluble political conflict in places like Nigeria, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
	That is a reality that we should probably confront. It will certainly be part of our political discourse in the presidential elections in 2016. I think it reflects a lot of what both Greg and Dominic were talking about. Having a better conversation about terrorism and war may help us do many of the things that Dominic is suggesting and may help us contribute more actively to something that looks more like peace in the international community. We may do that at some risk to those countries that are most unstable and racketed by violence. But it's not clear that our presence in those countries necessarily will either end that violence or make it better. And with that, I think we should open up to your questions because I'm sure you have many more interesting things to say than we do.
Dominic Tierney:	The definition of terrorism, we could probably spend the entire afternoon on it, it's incredibly important and also torturously difficult. The question I think gets a couple of very important aspects of it, one is that it is, of course, pejorative. Under most definitions, many heroes in American history might qualify as terrorist. What about the American revolutionaries? Or an easy case might be John Brown right before the Civil War. He engaged in acts of terror, in fact, murderous acts. But then, of course, many people would say it was justified. Some people would think that only force could destroy the slave system in the south. 
	I think most scholars would say that it's either military or civilian targets. So there's no distinction that are drawn in most definitions. An attack on the USS Cole, for example, would be considered a terrorist attack. But most scholars tend to say that terrorism is non-state actors. Because as soon as you include states carrying out these acts, now it's blurred into an entirely new category. I think to have any kind of precision, I think it's best to keep to non-state actors. The problem is that as soon as terrorist violence increases to a sufficient level, we tend to call it an insurgency. Groups are merging from one category to another. For example, al-Qaeda becomes al-Qaeda and Iraq. And they become cinched in insurgent group. By the mid-2000s they merged into ISIS, which is again an insurgent group in many ways, also carrying out acts of terrorism. It's torturously difficult indeed.
Tim Hoyt:	I would add if I may. I know there's a couple other questions. We have no common definition of terrorism. There's been an effort to make this happen since the League of Nations in the 1930s. The international community simply is unable to come to a common definition. The primary obstacle I would argue, we may disagree, would be that because terrorism is inherently political, a blanket ban on any type of violence that would support politics that you support is uncomfortable for states to commit to. That's why if you look at the Organization of Islamic States, have a definition of terrorism that is just torturously vague. It's almost impossible to know what it means because even among that group would share a cultural similarities, would share a common concern, at least at the time that they had those negotiations in terms of regime types and threats to regimes. They could not come up with common definition. 
	Part of that is, one of the key elements of terrorism, even though it is generally unsuccessful, 95% of non-state actors that begin violence against the state fail within two years. They are destroyed or defeated in some way. On the other hand, the 5% that do work, makes this continually an attractive topic or an attractive option for groups that cannot get their political agenda in front of the international community or engaged within a national community in another way.
	Terrorism continues and it's popular because people think it has some chance of success. You're right that it now has a negative connotation. That was not always the case. In the French Revolution, the French revolutionaries were proud of the fact that they had a terror. Anarcho-syndicalists and socialists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were proud of the term terror. They used the term terror because they had to strike terror in the hearts of the aristocracy in order to make those regimes crumble. 
	The last group curiously to use terrorism to define itself is actually Etzel and Lehi, the pro-Israeli terrorist groups in the Palestinian mandate in the early 1940s that later become the basis of the Likud party. Menachem Begin becomes the head of state in Israel after having been a self-devout terrorist. I think that begins at get at some of the torturous elements of these definitions. 
Dominic Tierney:	The military industrial complex is real and it is significant. I think it has effects that are somewhat more subtle than some people suggest. I think the idea that the United States goes to war at the whence of a military industrial complex is somewhat simplistic. That said, the military industrial complex has quite negative effects. I'll just give you one illustration tn terms of how the United States thinks about war, prepares for war, trains for war. 
	The military industrial complex encourages the U.S. to spend vast sums of money on big ticket hardware that is designed really for the kind of conventional interstate wars, as Tim was saying, have become very rare. An example of this is the F-35 warplane. This is the most expensive defense program in the history of the world at over a trillion dollars in its lifetime span. Now this is not a weapon that is particularly useful in the 90% of wars that are civil wars, counterinsurgency, nation-building. It is very useful if we have a big war against China, the kind of war that's probably not going to happen any time soon. 
	So why are we pouring money into weapon systems that are in large part obsolete? Well, the military industrial complex makes a lot of money out of this. And they're also very clever in the sense that the F-35 is built in whole bunch of different states around the United States. So lots of Senates' have an incentive to sort of turn away when they hear stories of cost overruns, etc., etc. What the military is not doing is putting sufficient resources into training for the wars that we're actually going to fight, which will include things like cultural training, which was mentioned earlier on, language training. There's no language industrial complex to push back against the military industrial complex. 
	The military industrial complex is real. I interviewed Stanley McChrystal for the book, for example, the commander in Afghanistan. You wouldn't think of him as a far left-wing observer. But he talked about the military industrial complex to me very clearly as having complex effects but some very real negative effects. 
Tim Hoyt:	Greg. No? I guess the one other thing I would point out. We tend to think of the military as an enormous part of the United States budget, and actually it's not the majority. It actually, at the moment, is a percentage of gross domestic product. American military spending is down around the level that it was before the Korean war. Now that's 3% of gross domestic product. It's $600 billion in a national economy. Government's spending's around 3 trillion, I think. So it's about 20%. At least in theory, this should not be unaffordable based on past history. It's much lower levels of spending than we were at through most of the Cold War, not in terms of current dollars compared to 1968, ma'am, but in terms of relative dollars. Spending in 1952 was 15% of gross domestic product.
Speaker 4:	We still spend more than all the other countries in the world.
Tim Hoyt:	No, I think it's the top 14 now, ma'am, about the top 14. It's an enormous amount of money.
Speaker 4:	Yes. And it's killing us.
Tim Hoyt:	It might be worth thinking about that. There may be some benefit to some of that, which occurs not only for the United States but also to the rest of the international system. People in the world today are wealthier and live better lives and live longer than they ever have because of a global trading system. Much of the money that we spend on the military is to protect that global trading system. 
	The U.S. Navy does not fight big naval battles right now. We haven't had a big ship battle. But the ships that are at sea protect the commerce lanes and prevent the interruption of that trade, which works for the benefit of a lot of people. I don't know what the trade-off is there, honestly. I'm not an economist. But it seems to me that that money may not be well spent. If at some level, it provides a kind of an insurance pool for a concept of a global good. That might be a debate that we need to have more of in this country to have a better understanding of what military spending does and doesn't actually get. Because I think we tend to focus on big numbers and we tend to focus on military interventions. And those are stark things. We tend not to look and see if there are second and third-order effects. That's partly, I think, also a function of our political system. We prefer to debate over hard lines rather than look for new ones. 
	There may be more to what we are spending than we give credit for. Dom just wrote the book on this. It's entitled The Right Way to Lose a War. It may be that he can begin to respond to some of your concerns.
Speaker 4:	Can you repeat the five questions? [crosstalk 00:27:25].
Tim Hoyt:	Okay. What I got was, defense expenditures and did that include veterans spending. The importance of culture and understanding religions. Two concerns about ISIS regional war and the makeup of the new Islamic State. Now a concern about traditional war and whether the American political system is competent to manage wars that appear to be protracted beyond political terms. Does that sound about the same that everybody else heard? Dom, you're on.
Dominic Tierney:	All right. I suggest that we also throw Israel into the mix just to make this even more impossible to answer. Okay, no, I'm not going to mention Israel at least for this question. 
	Okay, so religion first. This sort of gets a little bit to what we said right at the start. The U.S. often doesn't understand the cultures of these countries that it intervenes in. I think it's fundamentally because American powers are launching us into these global missions. This has a couple of different effects. One is that, on the ground, there is cultural incomprehension. In 2006 in Iraq, there were 1,000 officials in the American Embassy in Baghdad. Only six of them spoke Arabic fluently. So that gives you an idea. 
	This cultural incomprehension means we tend to lump together lots of different adversaries into these very simplistic kind of models. We have monolithic communism. Well, that turned out to be absurd. Communist Vietnam, communist China, actually went to war with each other. We have the War of Terror, lumping together the Taliban, al-Qaeda, etc., etc. We have the acts' of evil. North Korea, and Iran, and Iraq, supposedly, somehow are ally. I think this all comes back to cultural incomprehension. 
	ISIS, on paper, they only have 20 to 30,000 troops, which is a small fraction of the enormous coalition array against them. But then the Bolsheviks only had tiny numbers in Russia in 1917. And they came to power and they won the civil war. So numbers aren't everything. The huge advantage ISIS has is that ISIS is committed and united, just like the Bolsheviks were. Its adversaries are disunited and uncoordinated, just the opponents of the Bolsheviks were. 
	ISIS may one day implode, but they seem to be pretty resilient at the moment. They've emerged from Syria and a process that's almost like natural selection. The Syrian Civil War is so brutal that you, as a group, either survive and thrive, or you die. And ISIS has survived, like survivor of the fittest, from that process. It is now adaptive to American Airpower. It doesn't move its forces across the road in daytime like it did last summer and got blown up. Now it moves in populated areas. It's a quick-moving, adaptive, evolving adversary. 
	Obama faces incredibly difficult challenge about what to do in ISIS. I would broadly support this limited intervention versus the alternatives. But he faces what chess players call zugzwang. This is my favorite new word. Zugzwang means move anguish. It's a situation in chess for those of you folks who play chess where you have no good moves. Every single move is bad and worsens your position. Well, that's kind of what Obama faces in Syria and Iraq. The alternatives of huge boots on the ground or just doing nothing are not attractive to me. Then finally, on the four-year cycle of war point. Well, it's interesting. The three longest wars in American history. Does anyone know what those wars are?
Greg Davis:	Afghanistan.
Dominic Tierney:	Afghanistan.
Greg Davis:	Iraq. 
Dominic Tierney:	Iraq.
Greg Davis:	And Vietnam.
Dominic Tierney:	And Vietnam. The three longest wars in American history are all in this recent modern era of war, right at the time where America has its most spectacular power, where it bestrides the world like a colossus. It's exactly the time when we are struggling at war.
Tim Hoyt:	Greg.
Greg Davis:	I would say, in regards to religion and understanding religions, we are crippled in that. One of our biggest problems, and actually goes back to a point that Professor Kurth made to friends of mine years back, is who is in our military. Our military is made up predominantly of socially conservative evangelical Christians. That is the largest single group. They understand other religions, they're wrong. That's all they need to know. That is one of our problems. We do not have people with a broad understanding of the world going into the military, or well, in large enough numbers.
Speaker 5:	How do can shed the idea of a war's termination, an unconditional surrender of Allah in regards to [inaudible 00:32:50] because there's no way and [inaudible 00:32:53].
Greg Davis:	And the length of the war's one of the points that I've try to make to people repeatedly. You can win counterinsurgency wars, but it takes pretty much 20 years. You can lose them a lot faster. But you're going to be looking at 20 years to successfully defeat an insurgency. Doctor [Henley 00:33:25] actually points to one of the successful ones we did fight here in our own country, the war against the Ku Klux Klan. We did it by defeating their narrative. That's how you defeat a terrorist group. You make their version of reality. You demonstrate to enough of them, it doesn't match reality.
Tim Hoyt:	Okay, ma'am, I am not going to let your question go away because you were so patient. The figures that I was citing did not include Veterans Administration. That actually is something that's very real. It's a cost that will continue to be with us. It's an important one because you all read the newspapers periodically and you read one of those bad accounts about the Veterans Administration. I know people who work for them. They are working as hard as they can. 
	The strain on the VA is only going to go up. That's because of hard science. In the Civil War, out of every two wounded, one died. In World War II, it was out of every four, one died. In Afghanistan and Iraq, because of the quality of our medical care, because of changes in medicine in the 20th and early 21st century, that figure is somewhere between 1 in 8 and 1 in 10. People who would have died we are now saving. But that includes with it a long-term burden to care for those veterans. That is an unspoken cost of these wars. It's one that we have made a promise about to our soldiers. If the past is any indication, it's one that we may consistently try to fail on, the same way that we try and cut pensions for workers even after we promise them. At some point in the future we may try and cut health care for these veterans who served in wars that were ugly and politically controversial. That would be a shame. 
	On the culture thing, one of the things that was fascinating to me, I was in Washington in 2001 and early 2002. I was on the periphery of the Iraq debate because sometimes they like to bring in trained academics, like sort of pet monkeys to sit in rooms and pop up and down and agree with them if you can. They don't like disagreement, which is something I found out. What was fascinating to me in the Iraq discussion was so much it emphasized how the Iraqi regime was secular. I don't know if you remember that or not. But secular was very important. It was a constant part of the transmission that was coming from the administration. 
	Compared to a neighboring regime in Iran, yes, it was secular. But that word massed all of the religious difference and tension in Iraqi community. In the Iraqi community, it massed the fact that Saddam had used both Sunni and Shi'a mullahs to assure his rule in the 1990s when the times have got difficult. By saying secular and not drilling down, we ignored some fundamental elements of Iraqi society that then exploded on us on 2003. Again, there's plenty of discussion about this. It simply was ... In the policy formulation, it was ignored. There were lots of people who knew a lot of things. Getting that information to the planning process ended up proving and losing. 
	On the ISIS problem, I would say one of the biggest parts of the ISIS problem is its transnational nature. We cannot solve ISIS by defeating it in Iraq or by defeating it in Syria. To defeat ISIS, one would have to do it in both places. And as we've seen, options in Iraq are bad, options in Syria are terrible. If one isn't going to go in with a big footprint, which I think no administration will at this point, even if Republicans are elected in 2016. 
	I think ISIS is here to stay in some form for some time. It controls about 6 million people in fairly barren areas of Syria and Iraq without connection to the sea. That's important in terms of economic development. But like the Taliban and Afghanistan in the late 1990s, you can see consolidation of a very radical, very militant somewhat capable government that then begins to think about acting beyond its borders or supporting people who will act beyond its borders. I'm not sure it will be anything like the Taliban in 2000 or a home for terrorism. We don't know yet. But that should be a matter of concern because it's real.