ate last summer, Sam Bell set out to acquire an unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV). It was an unusual shopping expedition for a
private citizen, much less a 22-year-old only a few months removed
from his political science and philosophy studies at Swarthmore
College. But, ever since graduation, and even while in school, Bell
had been working to do what the U.S. government and the United
Nations had so far failed to: stop the genocide in Darfur. He
believed a UAV might help that goal, and so, one September
afternoon, he put on his one-and-only suit and paid a visit to the
Washington, D.C., offices of an aviation contractor called Evergreen
International.
Two Evergreen executives received Bell as they would any
potential client: enthusiastically. They regaled him with details of
their UAVs--how they could be piloted by remote control from the
company's Oregon headquarters and how their cameras had a
30-kilometer range and took remarkably precise pictures--and they
proposed a strategy for using them. Evergreen would divide Darfur
into four sectors, dedicating one UAV to each quadrant; the UAVs
would then send photos of the whereabouts of the murderous
Janjaweed militia to the African Union (AU) peacekeeping
force.
Bell liked the idea, but not the $22 million annual price tag. He
asked if the firm had any options for shoppers on a tighter budget.
The executives offered an old, low-end, limited-range UAV for $5
million. That was still, as Bell puts it, "a bit out of our price
range," but he thought it might be worth splurging--until he and
fellow anti-genocide crusader Mark Hanis ran their potential
purchase by an expert. "He said, one, a sandstorm could knock the
UAV out; two, it could get shot down; and three, if either of those
things happened, the Sudanese government could get a hold of it and
take hold of its technology," Hanis explains. "So it turned out the
UAV wasn't such a good idea."
ell and Hanis's aborted foray into the world of discount
drone shopping was done on behalf of the Genocide Intervention
Network (GI-Net). Founded at Swarthmore in October 2004 by Hanis and
another student, Andrew Sniderman, GI-Net sought to raise money from
private citizens to support the underfunded, undermanned AU
peacekeeping force. "We treat genocides like natural disasters, and
we throw bags of rice at the problem," says Hanis, who, like Bell,
graduated last spring. "We wanted to treat genocide as a security
issue."
It was an out-of-the-box, arguably ludicrous idea--college
students passing the hat to support a military force for a foreign
intervention--but the idea got people's attention. After pitching
the concept to a host of foreign policy luminaries--"I'd pull
all-nighters e-mailing former secretaries of state," says Hanis,
whose prior political outreach experience included running for
Swarthmore's student council--a number of them, such as Roméo
Dallaire and Samantha Power, gave GI-Net their endorsements, as did
several members of Congress. The Center for American Progress (CAP),
a liberal think tank in Washington, gave the group office space.
And, most importantly, hundreds of people started giving GI-Net
money. Students at Cornell University hosted a special showing of
Hotel Rwanda, raising $5,000 for the group. A Mamaroneck, New
York, high school held a battle of the bands. And a Salt Lake City
piano teacher donated two weeks' worth of earnings. A year after
Hanis and Sniderman first conceived of the idea during an
International Club dinner in the college dining hall, GI-Net had
collected $250,000 to support the Darfur peacekeepers (and an
additional $250,000 to support GI-Net's operations). Now the group's
members just needed to figure out how to spend the funds. But, as
they soon discovered, raising money to stop a genocide is a lot
easier than giving it away.
As GI-Net's founders originally envisioned it, their project
would involve a straightforward transaction. They would raise the
money, and then they would immediately bequeath it to the AU for
items like walkie-talkies or tents. "We wanted the money to go to
something tangible, something our donors could touch, not just some
fund somewhere," says Bell.
To that end, Gayle Smith, a former Clinton administration
National Security Council staffer who's now a senior fellow at CAP,
met with AU officials in Addis Ababa on GI-Net's behalf early last
year. But, while heartened by the American college students'
efforts, the officials told her that they couldn't earmark GI-Net's
money for a specific purpose and would be able to put it only into a
general fund. "They don't have the time to handle the administrative
hassles of keeping track of a $250,000 contribution," Bell
explains.
So GI-Net's members began scrambling to find another way to come
to the AU's aid. They became intrigued by the idea of giving their
money to Rwanda--not exactly a historic model in combating genocide,
but one of the most active contributors to the AU's peacekeeping
mission. "We approached [Rwanda's U.S. ambassador] and said ...
'Could you take our contribution and deploy a contingent of female
police officers to Darfur to protect women when they leave the
refugee camps to forage for firewood?'" Bell says. The ambassador
was interested, but he said that GI-Net would have to go through the
AU--which reiterated its original reluctance.
Getting the runaround on the ground, GI-Net looked up in the
air--and to the north. The Canadian government had provided a fleet
of transport helicopters to the AU, and Sniderman, who is Canadian,
thought his countrymen might be interested in expanding the
contribution. "We hoped we could give our money to the Canadians and
then they could increase the helicopter fleet by one," he says. He
pitched the proposal to some interested mid-level foreign affairs
officials, but higher-ups ultimately nixed the idea. "Their bosses
said they had concerns about accepting citizen money for a
government program," says Sniderman.
But private contractors had no such qualms about taking citizen
money, and so GI-Net began to explore ways in which the private
sector might help the group help the AU mission. In addition to
Evergreen, the group spoke with Pacific Architects & Engineers,
a U.S. firm that has a State Department contract to provide
logistical support to the AU and was willing to use GI-Net's money
to help fuel helicopters. There was just one problem. Fuel isn't
"very visual," says Hanis. "A photo of two barrels of petroleum
doesn't really motivate people to give more money."
The most surreal moment of GI-Net's search came last November
when Sniderman--who is still in school (although no longer a member
of the golf team, because he's now too busy)--e-mailed more than 100
private security firms. "I asked whether they'd be willing to deploy
armed staff to protect refugee camps in Darfur," he says. "Within 36
hours, I got dozens of replies. Most were saying, 'We've never done
anything like that, but we'd love to work with you.'" Operating from
his dorm room--he made sure to change his voice mail greeting to
"something more serious and somber ... something you'd want your
business partners to hear"--Sniderman spoke with several firms about
what sort of protection they could offer. "They were taking it very
seriously. We were a potential client, and they were trying to
figure out exactly what we wanted to do." One firm, whose identity
Sniderman refuses to divulge, said that it would go to Darfur even
if it did not receive permission from the Sudanese
government.
I-Net quickly concluded that going with mercenaries was a
bad idea. But, as their search dragged on, the group's members
became increasingly frustrated that they were sitting on a pile of
money when, seemingly every day, there was some new horror in
Darfur. Finally, in January, GI-Net had a breakthrough. An African
NGO was willing to take GI-Net's money and, in tandem with the AU,
train a contingent of female escorts to protect Darfurian women when
they leave their refugee camps to search for firewood. This week,
Smith is in Addis Ababa putting the finishing touches on the
deal.
As soon as it's a go, GI-Net will begin raising money to fund
more security efforts in Darfur. But trying to do as private
citizens what should, after all, be the job of governments has
proved tougher than the group ever expected. "Some of us thought
we'd do the fund-raising, hand it over, and they'd do the rest,"
Hanis says. He adds, somewhat wearily, "With giving money, there are
a lot more details."