Economics 181
SEMINAR IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Swarthmore College

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Fall, 2012

A survey of development economics, excluding the transition economies. This seminar can be used towards a minor in Asian Studies, Black Studies, or Public Policy. Students wishing to use it for Asian or Black Studies should consult with me at the beginning of the semester in order to adapt writing assignments. Students who have taken Ec 81 or its equivalent elsewhere can get only 1 credit for this seminar.

Prerequisites: Ec 11 and Ec 21. Recommended: Ec 31

REQUIRED TEXTS

OTHER REFERENCES
United Nations Development Program (annual) Human Development Report. [Treats distributional and gender issues as central to development; extensive cross-country data.]
World Bank (annual), World Development Report. [Covers a new topic each year and includes an extensive appendix with cross-country data; series is on Honors Reserve, recent issues on Tripod as e-books.]

You can also browse the Honors Reserve section for many useful references. There are good advanced surveys of most major development topics in the multi-volume Handbook of Development Economics (Honors Reserve). For an indication of what’s hot in development circles, see the World Bank’s ABCDE series (Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics). EconLit, accessible from the library web site, is a searchable index of the journal literature. For browsing, the key journals are Journal of Development Economics, World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Research Observer, World Development, and Economic Development and Cultural Change (the latter three have the advantage of being less technical). For data, use Tripod>Databases>Economics to find the World Bank’s annual World Development Indicators online with general country economic data and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics online with macroeconomic data. Also check out worldbank.org and imf.org and other obvious websites; development agencies are under increasing pressure to make data available on a timely and accessible basis.

SEMINAR REQUIREMENTS AND GRADING
Weekly readings and problem sets: An honors seminar is a collaborative exercise in which students are directly responsible to each other. Reading assignments and problem sets must be completed in advance of each week’s seminar. Read actively and come prepared to convey your understanding of the material. I encourage you to collaborate with each other on the problem sets, but be ready to present your own solutions in the seminar. If you are one of the paper writers for a given week, you get a ‘waiver’ from the problem set – i.e., you don’t have to be ready to present your solutions.

Seminar paper presentations and discussion: Each week the seminar will begin with 2 student papers. We’ll devote 25 minutes to each paper, as follows:
• A 10-minute powerpoint presentation by the author
• A 5-minute discussion by a pre-assigned ‘first responder’
• An open discussion for 10 minutes

Instructions to paper writers:
• Seminar papers should be roughly 2,000 words. Make it clear, lively and fun to read.
• As soon as you have your assignment, check for the assigned readings in the Ec 181 binders and, if they are not there, in the Tri-co journal or book collection. Do not assume they are in the binders, and do not wait until the week your paper is due.
• In preparing your paper, do the assigned reading and check Meier & Rauch (in ‘other references’ above) for relevant material. You are not restricted to these sources; be enterprising.
• Seminar papers must be emailed to all participants by 5pm on the day prior to the seminar. Please also leave a hard copy in my box (K205) by 6pm.

Term paper: This paper of roughly 3,000 words provides a critical overview of development policy and performance in agriculture, industry, international trade, income inequality and poverty, or environment in some developing country (transition economies are ruled out). We choose countries collaboratively in week 7, and several students will work on each country. Here are the ground rules:
• Topic outlines with starting bibliography are due at the Week 9 seminar.
• Students will present their papers in a roundtable discussion at the final seminar (week 13).
• Papers are due at 5pm on the day before the seminar.
• Students must email a 1-page “executive summary” of their paper to all participants by 5pm on the day before the seminar.

Grading: The seminar is worth 2 credits and you will get 2 letter grades (which may be the same). The first is for seminar papers, 20% each (= 40%) and your term paper (60%). The second is for your final exam (during finals week in December, 80%) and your performance on problem sets (20%).

IMPORTANT: on plagiarism: Plagiarism is defined as passing off the work of someone else as your own. Like other forms of cheating, it is a serious violation of academic honesty. Penalties are severe, ranging from failure on an assignment or course/seminar through suspension or expulsion by the College Judiciary Committee. The good news is that plagiarism is very easy to avoid. See my web page for a discussion of how to cite source material in economics.
OVERVIEW OF TOPICS

Week 1 (of Mon 9/3): Overview
No papers this week.

Week 2 (Mon 9/10): Economic growth
Paper #1, Governance and productivity / Paper #2, Too poor to grow?

Week 3 (Mon 9/17): The role of the state
Paper #1, Institutions and growth / Paper #2, Structural change: macro and micro

Week 4 (Mon 9/24): Human development
Paper #1, Randomized evaluation / Paper #2, Interpreting the East Asian miracle

Week 5 (Mon 10/1): Modernizing agriculture
Paper #1, Learning about agricultural technology / Paper #2, Agriculture in Africa

Week 6 (Mon 10/8): Inequality and poverty
Paper #1, Dualism and inequality in China / Paper #2, The urban informal sector

FALL BREAK: Week of Monday October 15

Week 7 (Mon 10/22): Trade policy and industrialization
[Choose countries and term paper topics]
Paper #1, ISI in practice / Paper #2, Picking winners

Week 8 (Mon 10/29): Technology and globalization
Paper #1, Acquiring technological capability / Paper #2, Trade and agglomeration

Week 9 (Mon 11/5): Finance, insurance, and risk
[Term paper outline and at least 5 substantial references due]
Paper #1, Mutual insurance and self insurance / Paper #2, Microfinance

Week 10 (Mon 11/12): Public spending, development projects, and aid
Paper #1, Conditional cash transfers / Paper #2, Improving public service delivery

Week 11 (Mon 11/19): Fiscal and Monetary management
Paper #1, Populism / Paper #2, Commodity windfalls

Week 12 (Mon 11/26): Capital flows and financial crises
Paper #1, Sudden stops / Paper #2, Inflation targeting

Week 13 (Mon 12/3): Roundtable discussion
[1-page summary of term papers due by email 5pm the day before seminar]
[Term papers are due at this seminar]
WEEKLY ASSIGNMENTS ([m] = available on moodle site)

WEEK 1, Monday 9/3 – Overview
Readings
PRL Chapters 1 & 2
Ray Chapters 1 & 2, and Appendix 2 on Elementary Statistical Methods (skim Appendix 2 to be aware that it is there as a resource).

Exercises
See “Week 1 pset” [m]

WEEK 2, Monday 9/10 – Economic growth
Readings
PRL Chapter 3, Chapter 4: 103-135.
Ray Chapter 3.
UP Chapter 3 (Engerman and Sokoloff)
Discussion: What empirical phenomena are Engerman and Sokoloff interested in explaining? In their view, how did institutions that were adverse to growth emerge in parts of the Americas? Why did they persist? If this analysis is correct, what is required to get a growth takeoff in Latin America?
Discussion: Review Ray’s discussion of the neoclassical growth model – the original Solow model (also covered in PRL) and the augmented Solow model introduced by Mankiw, Romer and Weil in ‘A contribution to the empirics of economic growth’ (Quarterly Journal of Economics 1991). What is conditional convergence and why is it a property of the neoclassical model? Is Pritchett’s evidence consistent with conditional convergence?

Exercises
See “Week 2 pset” [m]
Also: at the seminar we need to assign papers for the remainder of semester, so come with your top 2 choices in mind.

Paper #1, Governance and productivity: Hall and Jones (1999) draw on the work of Sachs and Warner (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995), who developed variables measuring various aspects of the governance environment for growth (Hall and Jones use the term ‘social infrastructure’). What exactly do these variables measure? How do Hall and Jones use these variables to characterize the long-run impact of governance on economic performance? What do they find?


Paper #2: Too poor to grow? Conditional convergence says that poverty itself is not a trap, because poverty is associated with scarcity of capital and therefore with a high return to investment. What is a poverty trap, and what are some of the mechanisms that might produce a trap? How would you use cross-country data to test for the presence of traps? Contrast the approaches and findings of Lopez/Serven and Kraay/Raddatz [These 2 papers are econometrically demanding. Do not focus on estimation techniques, but rather on (a) what parameters these authors want to estimate; (b) why obtaining good estimates of these parameters would shed light on the prevalence of poverty traps; and (c) what they find.]
[Exhaustively long; focus on the poverty trap analytics at the beginning of the paper.]

WEEK 3, Monday 9/17 – The role of the state

Readings
PRL Chapter 5.
Ray Chapters 4 & 5.
UP Chapter 2 (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson)

Discussion: What institutions do AJR consider potentially important for economic prosperity? Use the reversal of fortune section of the chapter to illustrate how they use historical ‘natural experiments’ to establish causality between institutions and prosperity (the section on settler mortality is covered in paper #1). What are the strengths and pitfalls of this approach?


Discussion: What does Evans mean by predation and embedded autonomy? Is the latter a requirement for rapid growth? Is embedded autonomy a universally desirable and feasible objective of institutional reform, or a special feature of a few Asian countries?

Exercises
See “Week 3 pset” [m]

Paper #1, Institutions and growth: What does Douglass North (Nobel laureate for the ‘new institutional economics’) mean by ‘institutions’, and what economic roles do they play? Why are institutions important in the context of economic development? We know that virtually all measures of institutional quality are positively correlated with per-capita income across countries, but we also know that correlation does not imply causality. What measures of institutional quality are Acemoglu et al interested in, and how do they establish that causality runs from these measures to income? How convincing do you find this argument? Finally (if you care to include this; your call): has Paul Romer gone completely nuts, with his charter cities initiative?


Paper #2: Structural change: macro and micro: In an efficient economy the social marginal product of each factor of production is equalized across all the activities that use that factor. Economic growth then requires factor accumulation and/or technological progress, because nothing can be gained by reallocating existing factors. If markets are incomplete or imperfect, however, then factors may be allocated inefficiently, whether at the macro level (e.g., between sectors like agriculture and industry) or at the micro level (e.g., across farms or manufacturing firms). Give examples of allocative inefficiencies that may be quantitatively important for understanding international income differences. Do we know what drives these inefficiencies and why they persist?

**WEEK 4, Monday 9/24 – Human development**

Readings
- PRL Chapters 7 – 9.
- Ray Chapter 9.
- UP Chapter 10 (Eswaran on fertility)
- UP Chapter 18 (Case on education)


**Discussion:** What does Rodrik mean by the ‘new development economics’? Are the macro and micro approaches he describes at odds intellectually? Are experimental methods applicable to most of the important questions in development economics? What methods are appropriate when experiments are infeasible?

**Exercises:** See “Week 4 pset”

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**Paper #1, Randomized evaluation:** What is randomized evaluation, and what are its advantages over alternative approaches to assessing the impacts of social spending? Explain the design of the worms study, paying attention not only to the role of randomization but also to how the authors handled third-party treatment effects, i.e., externalities, that would otherwise have produced misleading results.


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**Paper #2, Interpreting the East Asian miracle:** The East Asian miracle is the conjunction of very rapid growth and steady or falling income inequality over much of the period between 1960 and the mid 1990s. Birdsall, Ross and Sabot place human capital formation at the center of their account. What is their argument? Campos and Root give prominence to political economy considerations. What is the role of credibility in their argument? Are Birdsall *et al.* and Campos and Root offering competing or complementary accounts of the miracle? Are they pointing to peculiarly Asian economic and/or political configurations, or do you see lessons for emerging market economies in other regions?


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**WEEK 5, Monday 10/1 – Modernizing agriculture**

Readings
- PRL Chapter 4:136-end, Chapter 16
- Ray Chapter 10.
- Meier, Gerald M. and James Rauch (2005), “The LewisVersus the Harris-Todaro View of Underemployment in Less Developed Countries” in their Leading Issues in Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press). This is a short technical note that presents a unified diagrammatic view of the Lewis and Harris-Todaro models.

**Discussion:** Is there a Lewis model here? In the closed-economy case, how does an agricultural surplus emerge and contribute to industrialization? How do E/K rescue the case for a pro-agriculture policy when the economy is open to international trade (doesn’t it make more sense, if food can be imported, to pursue an unbalanced growth strategy that rapidly increases productivity and employment in manufacturing, even if this means depriving the agricultural sector of public support?)

Discussion: Mozambique’s national accounts data record a growth of real GDP per capita of about 5 percent per year between 2003 and 2009, implying that Mozambicans were on average roughly 1/3 richer in 2009 than in 2003. Yet survey data suggest that consumption poverty stagnated. Arndt *et al.* suggest that these observations can be reconciled after making a modest adjustment in the national accounts data. What adjustment, and what justifies this adjustment? What do these findings imply for policy?

Exercises: See “Week 5 pset” [m]

Paper #1. Learning about agricultural technology: Shultz is credited with having convinced development economists to view peasant households as profit-maximizing firms (“poor but efficient”). But how is it possible, then, to account for the persistence of traditional methods? Moving to contemporary research: Are smallholder farmers in Africa aware of the most profitable opportunities? How, and how rapidly, does social learning take place when new technologies become available?


Paper #2. Agriculture in Africa: Bates (1981) appealed to political-economy arguments to explain heavy discrimination against export agriculture in a number of African countries after independence. During the 1980s, the World Bank sought to liberate the agricultural sector throughout Sub-Saharan Africa from the damaging clutches of government. Conditional loans called for the removal of export taxation, the liberalization of agricultural marketing, and the devaluation of overvalued exchange rates. Reform was cumulatively substantial. But the agricultural sector has not taken off. What are the deeper constraints?


WEEK 6, Monday 10/8 – Inequality and poverty

Readings:
RPL Chapter 6
Ray Chapters 6-8.
UP Chapter 4 (Piketty)

Discussion: Writing in 1955, Kuznets hypothesized the inverted U as a description of the distribution of before-tax incomes in the industrial countries, basing his explanation mainly on the structural transformation associated with urbanization and industrialization. He noted that the U would be even more pronounced if the emergence if progressive taxation and a welfare state emerged at higher levels of income, as they did in the industrial countries. What does the more recent data on industrial countries suggest?

UP Chapter 14 (Ravallion)
Discussion: Ravallion refers to a conventional wisdom that discourages targeted transfers to the poor, on efficiency grounds (i.e. this is not an objection in terms of fairness). Does the evidence he presents strongly contest this view?

Exercises: See “Week 6 pset” [m]

Paper #1, Dualism and inequality in China: Chinese development strategy has made increasing use of the price mechanism, starting with the liberalization of agriculture and rural markets in the early 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s with privatization of many state-owned enterprises and the support of private-sector investment (both domestic and foreign) in the manufactured export sector in the coastal provinces. What major internal transformations are taking place within China? What do we know about sectoral patterns in GDP growth, and geographical patterns of income distribution and labor migration? Do you agree with Dooley, et al that what we are seeing is an export-led growth strategy designed to absorb a Lewis-style labor surplus over a horizon of two or three decades?


http://econ.ucsc.edu/~mpd/NBER%20Direct%20Investment..pdf

Paper #2, The urban informal sector: Informality is a broad concept that refers to economic activity that takes place outside of government regulation or taxation, often at small scale and with low productivity. What kinds of activity does this sector comprise in developing countries, and why is the informal sector so large, if productivity is higher in the formal sector? How would you strike the balance, in seeking to enhance the productivity of resources deployed in the informal sector, between reducing the costs of being (or becoming) formal and reducing the costs of being informal?


FALL BREAK, WEEK OF Monday 10/15
WEEK 7, Monday 10/22 – Trade policy and industrialization

[Term paper outline w/ starting bibliography due at this seminar]

Readings
PRL: Chapter 18, Chapter 19:709-728
Ray Chapter 17: 647-690
UP Chapter 6 (Banerjee).

Discussion: High trade theory (1930-60) predicts a favorable impact of trade liberalization on the internal distribution of income, for a labor-abundant developing country. What is the logic of this prediction? How well did it hold up before the mid-1980s? In Banerjee’s view, what has changed since then, and why? Should developing countries stay closed?


Discussion: Effective incentive rates generalize the effective rate of protection concept to include a wide range of policies governments may use to favor particular industries (not just tariffs or quotas but also preferential interest rates, income tax reductions, privileged access to import licenses, and other policies). In what sense do the calculations reported in Table 1 reveal a regime that was interventionist but decidedly export-oriented? Looking at the bottom row: what do these figures for the entire manufacturing sector imply about effective incentive rates in agriculture?

Exercises: See “Week 7 pset” [m]

Paper #1, ISI in practice: During the mid-1970s, Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne Krueger coordinated an NBER project that produced a celebrated set of country studies of trade and industrialization policy. Choose any two countries that adopted inward-looking trade strategies characteristic of import-substituting industrialization (i.e., exclude Korea which was not inward-looking after the early 1960s). When and why was ISI adopted, what policies were used to implement the strategy, and what findings did the Bhagwati/Krueger study report with respect to the impact of ISI on resource allocation, efficiency, and growth?


Volumes 1-9 are country case studies published separately and listed in the Bhagwati and Krueger books.

Paper #2, Picking winners: Some scholars believe that “selective intervention” by government played a crucial role in the successful industrialization of Korea after 1960. What industries did Korean policy favor over time, and what policy instruments were used? To what degree, if any, did selective intervention play a similar role in Taiwan? How did intervention in these countries differ, in tactics and results, from that pursued in India between 1960 and 1991? Finally: Noland and Pack are skeptical of the importance of industrial policy in Korea and Taiwan, and certainly of its potential in other countries; why?


WEEK 8, Monday 10/29 – Trade, technology, and globalization

Readings:
Ray Chapter 16; Chapter 17: 690-end
PRL Chapter 11: 415-end, Chapter 17, Chapter 19:729-end.
UP Chapter 7 (Bardhan)

Discussion: What are the main channels through which globalization affects the jobs, wages and incomes of poor people in developing countries? What institutional mechanisms are available to compensate the losers from liberalized trade?


Discussion: What is ‘self-discovery’ and why is it subject to market failures? What policies are appropriate? What insights does this framework suggest when applied to regional patterns in trade policy in the 1970s and 1980s?

Exercises: See “Week 8 pset” [m]

Paper #1, Acquiring technological capability: Westphal (2002) argues that (industrial) technology policy played a critical role in enabling Asian countries – with varied approaches – to seize the development opportunities afforded by globalization following World War II. Summarize his argument and very briefly characterize the variation in approaches within the Asian group. Now: India and Argentina are briefly mentioned as having pursued technological development in industry, but with limited success. Choose one of these countries, and within Westphal’s framework, compare its experience with that of the Asian countries. What do we learn about technology policy?

Lall, S. (1987) Learning to Industrialize: the acquisition of technological capability by India. (Especially Chapters 1, 2, & 8 plus one case study chapter.)

Paper #2, Trade and agglomeration: Krugman shows how agglomeration externalities can create long-lasting “first-mover” advantages in producing and exporting manufactured goods. Is there any evidence that such effects are empirically important? Should policymakers seeking to promote manufacturing exports in low-income countries pay attention to agglomeration effects, and if so, how?


WEEK 9, Monday 11/5 – Rural markets: risk, credit, and insurance

Readings:
Ray Chapter 11 (skim); 12, 14, 15
UP Chapter 22 (Morduch)

Discussion: Are uninsured risks important in low-income countries? What are some of the key risks, and what prevents financial institutions from insuring them? What innovations look promising in delivering insurance to low-income households?

Exercises: See “Week 9 pset” [m]

Paper #1, Mutual insurance and self insurance:
Fafchamps (1992) provides an overview and Udry (1990) a detailed example of the mechanisms households use to achieve ex post risk-sharing at the village level in rural Africa. What are (some of) these arrangements and how do they work? Do these mechanisms appear to achieve full pooling of income risks at the village level? Why must they fail to protect a rural household from all risks, even if they achieve full pooling at the village level? What are some of the self-insurance mechanisms rural households use to deal with uninsurable risks? What do we know about the consequences of self-insurance for the level and growth of rural incomes?


Paper #2, Microfinance and group lending
Muhammad Yunus shared the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize with the Grameen Bank, a micro-credit institution he founded in Bangladesh in 1976. What was innovative about the lending program of the Grameen Bank, and what features (if any) differentiate the Grameen Bank’s approach from that of other leading forms of microfinance? What do we know about the impact of the Grameen Bank, or other micro-lending initiatives, on the welfare of participating households in developing countries? Is the evidence from randomized evaluations as favorable as early proponents of microfinance expected? Would it be fair to say that while micro-lending fails a private cost-benefit test, it passes a social cost-benefit test?


WEEK 10, Monday 11/12 – Public spending, development projects, and aid
Readings:
PRL Chapter 10, Chapter 11: 399-415, Chapter 12, Chapter 14
UP Chapter 15 (Mookherjee)
Discussion: A standard microeconomics theory argument (see WWS handout) suggests that the utility of a poor household is higher if that household receives a given amount of resources in cash rather than in kind. Mookherjee argues that in-kind transfers may be superior in terms of lowering the headcount ratio in the long run. What is his argument?
UP Chapter 21 (Kremer) <Note: we covered this topic in week 4>
WWS 2005 Handout on poverty targeting [m]

Exercises: See “Week 10 pset” [m]

Paper #1, Conditional cash transfers: Does the conditionality in CCTs make these transfers superior, as a way of raising social welfare, to unconditional transfers? Why are CCTs typically paid to women? Are they a ‘magic bullet’ against poverty? Do they have a lasting impact? Finally – a question not about CCTs per se, but about the ambitious redistribution programs of which they are now a part in many countries: what is Levy’s general-equilibrium critique of social programs in Mexico (Levy was the architect of the Progresa program)?
Paper #2, Improving public service delivery: As documented in the World Development Report 2004, the delivery of public health and education services, particularly in poor communities, is extremely weak in many developing countries. The WDR argues that inadequate budgets are part of the problem, but that solutions mainly require institutional innovations, not bigger budgets. What institutional innovations is the WDR talking about? Are the results from Reinikka and Svensson (2011) consistent with the WDR framework? Go to the J-PAL website and look for another paper with microeconomic evidence on the determinants of public service delivery (in either education or health). Motivate it using the WDR framework, and assess the quality of the evidence.


WEEK 11, Monday 11/19 – Fiscal and monetary management

**Readings:**
- PRL Chapters 13 and 21
- SO’C Handout on Tools for fiscal and monetary policy analysis [m]

**Exercises:** See “Week 11 pset” [m]

**Paper #1, Populism:** Does the notion of “populism” provide important insights into the linkages between income and/or wealth distribution and economic growth in Latin America? Clarify the central ideas and develop a specific country example. Given the wave of Latin American economic reforms since the 1980s: is populism dead?


Symposium: Latin America’s Growth Record. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(2), Spring 2004: 67-106 [read both the Ocampo article and the Fraga article].

**Paper #2, Commodity windfalls:** The permanent income hypothesis suggests that if consumption volatility is socially costly, the temporary component of a commodity boom should be invested rather than consumed. Oil-producing countries are now going through a boom similar to what Indonesia and Nigeria experienced during the 1970s. Yet while the current boom dominates Nigeria’s fortunes at least as much as it did in the 1970s, oil no longer seems a major part of the Indonesian story. How did Indonesia manage to turn natural resources into a platform for long-run development? Why didn’t this happen in Nigeria? Is Nigeria’s current management of its oil revenues any different than in the 1970s?


WEEK 12, Monday 11/26 – Capital flows and financial crises
Readings:
PRL: Chapter 15
Sachs and Larrain 1993, Chapters 6, 21, & 22 [m]

Exercises: See “Week 12 pset” [m] <Note: many of these problems are directly from Sachs and Larrain.>

Paper #1, Sudden stops: Drawing on Calvo/Reinhart, what is a “sudden stop”? How large a swing in net capital flows did emerging market economies experience in the 1990s? Why does a measure combining reserve losses with real exchange rate depreciation make sense as a measure of the severity of a currency crisis? What are the real costs of a sudden stop? Contrast dollarization and capital controls as alternative means for reducing vulnerability to sudden stops. Now consider Henry’s paper on the impact of capital account liberalization; how does his evidence square with the dangers identified by Calvo and Reinhart?

Calvo, G. and C. Reinhart 1999 “When Capital Inflows Come to a Sudden Stop: Consequences and Policy Options” University of Maryland.


Paper #2, Inflation targeting: During the 1990s, inflation itself emerged as a serious alternative to monetary aggregates or the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. What are the key components of a formal inflation targeting system, and which countries have adopted IT? What are the theoretical advantages of IT over alternative systems? Is there any evidence that adopting formal IT improves macroeconomic performance? What characteristics of a country’s policy environment would suggest caution in adopting formal IT?

Batini, N. and D. Laxton (2007) “Under what conditions can inflation targeting be adopted? The experience of emerging markets” in F. Mishkin and K. Schmidt-Hebbel, eds, Monetary policy under inflation targeting (Santiago: Central Bank of Chile) [should be available on Bank of Chile web page]


WEEK 13, Monday 12/3 – Roundtable presentation of term papers
**NOTE: 1-page executive summaries of your term papers are due at 5pm on Sunday 11/27.
**NOTE: Term papers are due in hard copy at the seminar, and also electronically by email after the seminar.

Exercises: None for this week.
Subject to revision. This version August 31, 2011.