Social Choice, Game Theory, and Politics
Spring Semester 2001
Swarthmore College
Trotter Hall 303
Wednesdays, 1:15 to 4:00
Professor Rob Boatright
Office: Trotter 304 328-7795
Office Hours: Tuesdays 3:00-4:30, Wednesdays 9:30 - 12:00
Course Description
In the 1940s and 1950s, several mathematicians and economists began to develop powerful formal ways to characterize economic and political behavior that we now call "social choice theory" and "game theory." At the same time, many philosophers were developing theoretical tools, encompassed in the term "rational choice theory," that served to justify the approach these economists and mathematicians were taking. While these approaches initially met with either puzzlement or hostility among social scientists, they have gradually achieved a prominent place within several social scientific disciplines, including political science. They remain, however, highly controversial.
The general approach of rational choice theories is to begin with deductive principles of human behavior, construct models of what results these behaviors ought to have, given particular rules or laws, and come up with hypothetical results. The results of these models can then be compared with actual data on social phenomena to see if the models accurately explain the "real world." If so, we can then use these models to develop theories about how different changes in rules and laws, or different incentives to the individuals who are making the decisions in question, will be affected. These models, then, are highly abstract -- they purport to explain things of interest to political scientists, such as election outcomes, voting decisions, the occurrence of war, the development of organized interests, and so forth, without reference to traditional empirical methods of research such as surveys or interviews. To many proponents of these models, they provide an important means of developing ideas about how human behavior could or should work, ideas which can be tested through using more traditional research methods. To critics of these models, rational choice theories represent a simplistic, and often unfalsifiable, explanation of human behavior that offers no role to chance, to personality, to human emotions, or other aspects of an event that cannot be neatly categorized within a mathematical model of what "should" happen.
In this class we will analyze both the mathematical and the philosophical
underpinnings of game theory, social choice theory, and rational choice
theory, and we will examine the uses to which these theories have been
put within political science. We will attempt to contextualize these theories
within the broader goals of the social sciences and to explore the controversies
that still surround the question of whether these theories are a legitimate
means of analyzing social and political phenomena. By the end of the class,
it is my hope that all students will have developed the tools to conduct
rational choice studies of their own, and will have formed their own opinions
on the uses of these theories and the merits of each side of the debate.
Readings
The following books are required for the course and are available at the college bookstore:
Chong, Dennis. 2000. Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society. Chicago: University of
Green, Donald, and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. New Haven, CT: Yale
Hardin, Russell. 1982. Collective Action. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Riker, William H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Requirements and Grading
The most important requirement in this class is attendance. This is a relatively small class, and your participation in discussion is crucial. You must be in class as frequently as you can, and you should come prepared to discuss the readings. For several sessions of the class, you will be required to write brief essays that will serve as talking points for the class; I will ask some students to present their arguments to the class and to structure class discussion, and on occasion I will divide students into groups to present their findings on particular readings to the class.
The level of the readings varies quite a bit; most require little background knowledge, but a few presume knowledge of statistics or of particular aspects of political science. Some background in political science, in microeconomics, or in calculus will be useful for you in understanding many of the readings, but it is not necessary. In fact, one of the goals of this class is to help those who are not mathematically inclined make sense of mathematical arguments that might seem daunting at first glance. You do not need to have a thorough understanding of everything in the readings, but you should be able and willing to discuss the main points of the readings and to ask questions about aspects of the readings you're unsure about. You also should be willing to discuss ideas about the class with me; no aspect of this course is set in stone, and we may have the flexibility towards the end of the course to consider a different topic or two if students want to do so. Class attendance and participation will comprise 30% of your final grade, and the six brief essays will comprise 45% of your final grade.
Finally, you will be required to make an in-class presentation during
the final class session and to complete a term paper of your own that constructs
a rational choice argument to analyze a political phenomenon you have a
particular interest in. We will discuss ideas for this project throughout
the class, and I will be happy to recommend supplemental readings that
will point you in this direction. Your term paper and in-class presentation
will be worth 25% of your final grade.
Schedule
January 24: Course Introduction
How do we define rational human behavior?
Games and exercises
January 31: What is Rational Choice Theory?
Elster, Jon. 1989. Nuts
and Bolts for the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shepsle, Kenneth, and Mark
Bonchek. 1997. Analyzing Politics: Rationality,
Behavior, and Institutions. New York: W.W. Norton. pp. 1-35
Riker, William H. 1997. "The
Ferment of the 1950s and the Development of Rational Choice Theory." In
Contemporary Empirical Political Theory, ed. Kristen Renwick Monroe.
Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Riker, William H. 1990.
"Political Science and Rational Choice." In Perspectives on Political
Economy, ed.
James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hardin, Russell. 1997. "Theory
on the Prowl." In Contemporary Empirical Political Theory, ed. Kristen
Renwick Monroe. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Monroe, Kristen Renwick.
1997. "Human Nature, Identity, and the Search for a General Theory of Politics."
In
Contemporary Empirical Political Theory, ed. Kristen Renwick Monroe.
Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Almond, Gabriel. 1995. "The
Early Impact of Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy on Political Science."
In Information, Participation, and Choice, ed. Bernard Grofman. Ann
Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The
Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
pp. 1-65.
Hardin, Russell. 1982. Collective
Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ch. 1-5.
Shepsle and Bonchek, pp.
220-296.
February 21: Classic Rational Choice Paradigms II: Spatial Theory
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An
Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: HarperCollins. Ch. 5-8.
Hirschman, Alfred. 1970.
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ch. 1-4, 6.
Shepsle and Boncheck, pp.
82-136.
February 28: Classic Rational Choice Paradigms III: Conflict, Bargaining, and Institutions
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960.
The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ch. 4-6.
North, Douglass C. 1998.
"Five Propositions About Institutional Change." In Explaining Social
Institutions, ed.
Jack Knight and Itai Sened. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Knight, Jack. 1998. "Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing
Explanations of Institutional Emergence
and Change." In Explaining Social Institutions, ed. Jack Knight
and Itai Sened. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press.
March 7: To What End?
How do we "prove" rational choice explanations?
Morton, Rebecca B. 1999. Methods and Models. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1-3.
Austen-Smith, David. 1995.
"Campaign Contributions and Access." American
Political Science Review 89: 566-581. At www.jstor.org.
One of the following (to be determined in class on Feb. 28):
Wittman, Donald. 1977. "Candidates
With Policy Preferences: A Dynamic
Model." Journal of Economic Theory 14: 180-189.
Ferejohn, John. 1986. "Incumbent
Performance and Electoral Control." Public Choice 50: 5-26.
Cox, Gary. 1990. "Centripetal
and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems."
American Journal of Political Science 34: 903-935. At www.jstor.org
Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry
Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." American
Political Science Review 81: 85-104. At www.jstor.org
Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew
McCubbins. 1995. "Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative
Decision Making." In Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions,
ed. Kenneth Shepsle and Barry
Weingast. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Feddersen, Timothy, and
Wolfgang Pessendorfer. 1998. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority
of Unanimous
Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting." American Political Science Review
92: 23-36.
March 14: No Class -- Spring Break
March 21: Irrational Behavior: Passions, Emotions, and Altruism I
Frank, Robert H. 1988. Passions
Within Reason. New York: W.W. Norton.
March 28: Irrational Behavior: Passions, Emotions, and Altruism II
Elster, Jon. 1984. Ulysses
and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.
New York: Cambridge University Press. Pt. II.
Schuessler, Alexander. 2000. A Logic of Expressive Choice. Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton University Press. Ch. 1-4.
Chong, Dennis. 2000. Rational
Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
April 11: Rational Choice Theory and History II
Bates, Robert H., et al.
1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press. Selections TBA.
Elster, Jon. 2000. "Rational
Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition."
American Political Science Review 94: 685-695.
Bates, Robert H., et al.
2000. "The Analytic Narratives Project." American
Political Science Review 94: 696-702.
April 18: Critics of Rational Choice
Green, Donald, and Ian Shapiro.
1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Friedman, Jeffrey, ed. 1996. The Rational Choice Controversy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.