What is important for us to know about the
terrorist attacks and the U.S. response?
What might lead to peace? How are students engaged in the issues now compared with before Sept. 11? The Bulletin’s Alisa Giardinelli
spoke to faculty members from a range of
disciplines to find out.

James Kurth - POLITICAL SCIENCE

“The important task is for America to advance a conception of justice that is acceptable to the large majority of Muslims.”

We didn’t really have peace before Sept. 11,” says Claude C. Smith Professor of Political Science James Kurth. “There has long been conflict involving Islam and the West, Arabs and Israelis, and the United States, through its support of Israel and its presence in the Arab world. We merely had conflict occurring in areas other than the United States. On Sept. 11, the conflict came home.

“Such conflict is new to us but old and familiar to people in the Middle East, South Asia, and even in Europe—all regions where conflict based on ethnic and religious differences is endemic. The realistic goal is the minimization of violence and the maximization of justice. As for ‘peace’—not in our time.”

Kurth, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, has taught defense policy, foreign policy, and international politics at Swarthmore since 1973. In his defense policy class on the Thursday before Sept. 11, he and his students discussed what were the most serious military threats faced by the United States. “Of all those that we discussed, the students were most concerned with the terrorist threat,” he says. “My own old-fashioned, 20th-century view was that the most important threat would be China.”

That class’s next meeting was Tuesday at 9:55 a.m. Although the decision to suspend classes that day was left to individual professors, and many did, Kurth felt compelled not to. “I thought it was important to hold a class that took the events into account, but grounded the discussion in the material of the course,” he says. “The students needed to have a way to grasp this terrible thing, and holding the class was the responsible and professional thing to do. [Otherwise,] they were left alone to watch the mindless, frightening coverage on TV all afternoon and not have any guidance.”

Even on that Tuesday, they had a great discussion that naturally flowed from the previous class. “It was a classroom setting, in which we were engaged in systematic political analysis, and the students rose to the challenge,” Kurth says. “They anticipated what would become the big issues—can the military do anything effective? Can we really know the sources of the attack? How do we address the threat at home? Nothing was said that was refuted by subsequent events, despite the obvious tensions and anxieties that the students were experiencing.”

Kurth notes that “rising to the challenge” doesn’t mean that the students all think alike. “They had contrasting opinions on the major issues, such as U.S. policy toward Israel,” he says. “But they are thoughtful, intelligent, and articulate in arriving at their understandings and judgments. I have a very high regard for my students.”

In assessing the U.S. response, Kurth is not as forthcoming with praise. “I believe there will always be a few Muslims in the Middle East and South Asia who will reject any concept of justice emanating from the United States,” he says. “But the important task is for America to advance a conception of justice that is acceptable to the large majority of Muslims, to reach out to those whose views of peace and justice are congruent with our own, and to marginalize the extreme and violent Muslims whose views of justice will never be congruent with ours. This is more important than dropping bombs on Afghanistan, freezing financial assets, or beefing up security at airports—some of which should be done but which will be marginally effective.”

According to Kurth, any U.S. military action has to be evaluated based on two criteria: morality and justice, as articulated in the long tradition of just-war theory (JWT), and effectiveness, as represented in the long tradition of strategic and military theory. In this case, he says the two criteria more or less coincide.

“JWT has deep roots in both Christian and Islamic theology, and there is also a secular version that is codified in international law,” Kurth says. “It draws a sharp distinction between soldiers and civilians as targets of military operations, and all forms condemn the targeting of civilians in military action. Conversely, all forms permit the targeting of military personnel and, by extension, the governing leadership that gives orders to military personnel.”

In the context of Afghanistan, Kurth says, this permits the targeting of bin Laden’s training camps as well as Taliban military bases and government buildings. “But that’s about it,” he says. “As it happens, these targets are not extensive in Afghanistan, so this kind of limited use of force, particularly with air power, is not very effective.”

More important, Kurth says targeting large numbers of civilians or civilian buildings would not only violate JWT but, by enraging and mobilizing many Muslims in the Middle East and South Asia, would be just the opposite—counterproductive. “So using military force in a way that violates JWT would be ineffective,” he says, “and using it in a way that conforms to JWT would not do much harm but would also not do much good. That suggests that most forms of military action would have, at best, marginal value.”

As for freezing assets, Kurth says it might have worked in a period of relatively closed national economies and limited international transactions. “That is, in the world that existed 50 years ago,” he says. “But for the last generation, the United States has promoted globalization of the international economy and the free movement of capital transactions. It’s virtually impossible to freeze assets all around the world, and even if we and our allies do, there are at least 30 to 40 loosely regulated money-laundering havens around the world that will still be in existence. Any freezing that can be done is a good thing, but don’t expect much from it.”

Kurth is just as dismissive of new security measures at airports, federal buildings, power plants, and along U.S. borders, equating them with “the old French strategy of the Maginot Line,” designed to prevent another German invasion of France as occurred in World War I. “Indeed, it did do that,” he says. “The only problem was that during World War II, the Germans went around the Maginot Line and flew over it. The analogy is the idea that by beefing up security at fixed points, we can prevent another disaster like Sept. 11. That would be good. However, the most obvious thing for a terrorist to do is to find a way to attack another kind of target for which we don’t have a defense. Be it a biological attack in some city or a chemical attack or an explosion in some tunnel, there’s always another way for the offensive side to go around or over the static defenses of the defensive side.”

Kurth warns that an effective response to the terrorist attacks requires nothing less than a change in the country’s conception of war. “In all the American wars of the 20th century, the central front was a foreign front overseas, and the homefront was peripheral—hardly a front at all,” he says. “In this first war of the 21st century, a foreign front—in Afghanistan or somewhere else in the Middle East or South Asia—will be peripheral. The central front will be the homefront, and that cannot be defended with static defenses.”

According to Kurth, the principal focus in defending the homefront should be on terrorists who are present in the United States. “This requires detecting and detaining persons who are connected with extremist Islamic organizations and who have already committed some kind of legal infraction, such as a violation of immigration laws,” he says. “This group of people is not exactly the center of gravity of the terrorist threat, but it is the vital link necessary for its success. Conversely, the vast number of Americans who are law- abiding citizens, and immigrants of Middle East or South Asian origin and of Islamic religion, should be embraced as sharing and participating in the great American project of defending liberty and justice for all.”

Although it is inevitable that other attacks will be attempted, Kurth says it is not a given they will work. “They may be aborted by the government security agencies, such as the FBI or the CIA,” he says. “After all, in the 1990s, there were more than a half-dozen major terrorist attacks that were thwarted, including the plans to blow up tunnels in New York, a dozen airliners over the Pacific, the Seattle Space Needle during the millennium celebrations, and the Los Angeles International Airport. Attacks may also encounter logistical and technical difficulties in executing them.

“But although the attack may fail, it will be attempted, not just once, but two, three, four times, or more,” Kurth says. “Americans today should be planning how they will respond after the next attack in a way what will be thoughtful and reasonable.”

Kurth admits that will be very difficult, given the current values and priorities of most Americans. “These are the unnatural products of a long era of domestic peace and security,” he says. “That era is finished, however, and its priorities are now obsolete.”

Robin Wagner-Pacifici - SOCIOLOGY

“Reporters have asked me, ‘when do we get back to normal?’ It’s a revealing question. What was normal? Would we want to go back to it?”

Professor of Sociology Robin Wagner-Pacifici analyzes society’s response to terrorist events. She spoke at the teach-in held on campus on Sept. 20:

I was asked to address how to make the event intelligible and how to make it cohere,” she says. “While I understand the need for that, I also feel we need to live with the incoherence of it for a while. This obviously goes against people’s need to be oriented, and I share that. But we’re still living in a state of disorientation.

“This got me thinking about what it means to be a witness. In Latin, ‘witness’ has two meanings. One is a third party who observes and gives testimony. The second refers to someone who survives an event, who lived to bear witness and to bear the event in themselves. Each positions you differently, but both suggest that you’re inside and outside at the same time. How do you navigate that?

“Part of the decision to be a witness and to occupy this strange territory is to have a voice or presence. That’s really hard because on one level, you feel this deep humility in the face of tragic death. No matter how much you study these things, you are always ignorant of some respect. On the other hand, to decide—in the face of ignorance—that ‘I have something to say’ is also hard. That requires a certain arrogance. I hope that the humility and arrogance mesh into some sense of responsibility—and thus the willingness and ability to be a witness.

“So, of course—the historical context, the global politics involved, what a war would mean for civil liberties—all are ab-solutely important. But for me, what I could see and contribute is more oblique.

“For example, I felt like, here’s a moment where our cultural repertoire of altruism and egotism is revealed in really clear ways. This moment—when we’re in a market system, pursuing the profit motive and our own interests—is literally put in abeyance. In the aftermath, these motives seemed not just irrelevant but profane. There was an outpouring of altruism and of social services from all over the country as people tried to have human-to-human contact.

“Where do our ‘normal’ ways of treating people re-emerge? One is the airlines. Their immediate response was to lay off thousands of workers. It’s a contrast between absolute, unsullied altruism and the ‘back-to-business-as-usual’ view. This was a moment where you could see that.

“Reporters have asked me, ‘when do we get back to normal?’ It’s a revealing question. What was normal? Would we want to go back to it? If normal was a state of distraction, with virtual representations of conflicts as in movies, maybe it’s better that we pay attention to the world around us.

“There’s an interesting tension between attention and distraction. What determines attention? There is this acute emergency situation, but there are also many chronic problems, both on the global and national level. We have a hard time sustaining our attention to those rather than to the acute. It’s an age-old question.

“So I’m also watching to see where normal gets repositioned. Normal drags along certain assumptions—is it safe or dangerous? Who’s a friend, or who’s a foe? Who’s inside, or who’s outside? It’s important to watch where ‘normal’ is repositioned. Before we rush into the future, and before we recoup the past, we should observe the present and learn as much as we can from it.”

Hugh Lacey - PHILOSOPHY

“Before we have peace, we have to be intolerant of the fact that significant numbers of people are living in misery.”

Professor of Philosophy Hugh Lacey warns against a U.S. response that enters what he calls the “logic of the terrorists.” “The centerpiece of this logic is that any human life can be dispensed with if it’s convenient to do so,” he says. “In war, it would be the targeting of civilians or a high proportion of civilian deaths. It is tantamount to hitting rock bottom—the most dehumanizing conception there is.”

Long interested in the ethics of war, Lacey gave a keynote address in October at an international symposium on ethics and politics in Brazil. He is not categorically against military action, which he thinks is legitimate in appropriate conditions, but Lacey says it is always subject to moral constraints.

“I want people to ask, is the response proportionate within moral limits? It is not a narrowly ethical question,” he says. “If military action goes beyond the moral limits, it is possible that the war will expand and go on.”

But although Lacey supports a military response that does not primarily target civilians, he does not believe it can bring peace. “The best that can be achieved from military action,” he says, “is the absence or elimination of past impediments to peace.”

He also acknowledges that human perfection in military targeting is impossible. “Any time there are acts of war, there are bound to be innocent lives lost,” he says. “The problem is when it’s a tactic of war or is disproportionate to overall casualties.”

Lacey got a close look at the effects of such tactics when he studied and taught in Central America in the late 1980s. He took a special interest in the struggles in El Salvador and co-edited with Professor of Spanish John Hassett a posthumous collection of essays by Jesuit priests who had been murdered by the Salvadoran army. His vision of peace was deeply affected by his experiences there and now extends far beyond the present conflict.

“I don’t think we can expect a lasting peace while we have enormous disparities of wealth in the world,” Lacey says. “I don’t think democracy can flourish when vast bodies are impoverished, and small bodies are in control. My image of peace is very much connected to the classic virtues of sharing, compassion, and mercy and implementing them at the personal, community, and perhaps even at the national and international levels. Before we have peace, we have to be intolerant of the fact that significant numbers of people are living in misery.”

Lacey is quick to add that he does not consider Osama bin Laden as part of this vision. “I don’t think for one minute he gives a damn about the poor of the world,” he says. “He’s not in some perverted way on the side of peace and justice. His actions show a complete disregard for human life.”

Still, Lacey says that only by founding our decisions on the virtues of compassion and mercy can inequalities start to be addressed. “I would certainly prefer that American policy build itself around developing democracy in a deep, rich way rather than developing it in a way that is dependent on the economic interests of North America itself,” he says. “Alternative policies could make a difference, although not by the next election or even by the next decade. These transformations would take decades to implement.”

For an example, Lacey points to the considerable U.S. support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “In many countries, the IMF puts conditions on governments in order for them to get loans and debt relief,” he says. “Those conditions usually require less government spending, which means less spending on health care and education. These are policies that are directly detrimental to the needs of people in these countries and to prospects for democracy, yet they make sense for a financial organization interested in balancing its books. It’s more important to develop the needs of the people than it is to balance the books.”

Discouraged by recent events, Lacey says we cannot have illusions: “It’s important to struggle for possibilities that may seem dim because those are the possibilities that are worthwhile.”

Raymond Hopkins - POLITICAL SCIENCE

“Changing the way the world works is the only sure way to expose and stop terrorism.”

Making the destruction of Osama bin Laden and his network the symbol of victory trivializes and misunderstands the duration and depth of the terrorist threat, says Richter Professor of Political Science Raymond Hopkins. “At best, that’s a minor, first part of what must be done,” he says. “It’s easy to simplify the enemy as a few people who need to be crushed. But defining victory as militarily ‘getting’ one group will leave an institutional vacuum that breeds terrorism.”

Hopkins also faults President Bush for characterizing the terrorists as practitioners of “a fringe form of Islamic extremism” and ignoring how terrorism is tied to many religious traditions. “Terrorist tactics have become so dangerous because of the vulnerability of our modern, cooperative world,” he says. “For America to see our sole danger as arising from Middle East extremism would be a horrific mistake. Unless we create institutions to strengthen international justice, people worldwide will remain vulnerable to it long after military retaliation.”

An authority on world food security, Hopkins has written on global policy issues since the 1970s. By focusing on military action in Afghanistan, he says, U.S. policy decisions are wrongly founded on military, not legal doctrine. “I would instead assign the task of finding and defeating ‘every terrorist group of global reach,’ as Bush has proclaimed it, to the attorneys general of the world, not the U.S. joint chiefs,” he says. “I would tell the CIA and Defense Department to cooperate fully in stopping criminals, but the initiative to end international terrorism has to be shaped by the doctrines of law.

Hopkins also notes that societal changes have outpaced institutions of security. “Globalization is to blame,” he says. “Modern technology and global interdependence enable a few to destroy many. Changing the way the world works is the only sure way to expose and stop terrorism, especially if we want to preserve the freedoms we espouse and prevent further backlash against America and its military. State building is the central task for fighting terrorism.”

According to Hopkins, this process is already under way, as evidenced by the changing definition of nation-state. “We talk about Afghanistan as if it were a real state; this conventional reference disguises underlying complexity,” he says. “Little, if any, legitimate government exists in that area, so referring to ‘Afghanistan’ as some national unit in the world invites a picture that there is a coherent entity with whom we are at war. That perspective is misleading. Although it is easy to think in such terms, we have to make a more sophisticated distinction between states we respect, states we suspect, and states we think don’t exist. President Bush correctly distinguishes the Taliban regime as a nonstate, which allows us to feel generous toward the Afghan people as a group, while making war on some residents in that geographic area.”

This change in perspective, Hopkins says, can lead to a more “behavioral definition” of the long-established concept. “A ‘state’ is a term that captures the essence of a people’s capacity to govern themselves and deal with others as a legal entity,” he says. “Where the entity is more fictitious than real, and where ‘rulers’ are tribal and predatory, we shouldn’t dignify organizations by treating them like a state.”

Consequently, populations in these areas should live under the transitional protection of U.N.-organized supervision, “as in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Congo, and once the military action has ended, in Afghanistan,” Hopkins says. “The aim is not to reinvent colonialism but to establish an alternative to letting internal struggles and hatreds seep into global terrorism.”

Mark Kuperberg - ECONOMICS

“Even pacifists have to pick their fights.... This is not your Daddy’s Vietnam War.”

I believe that to blame globalization for these attacks—that they are somehow payback—is totally ridiculous,” says professor of economics Mark Kuperberg. “The workings of the global economy and of the global economic institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization clearly have nothing to do with the concerns of the militants who perpetrated the terrorist attacks.”

Although not an ardent flag waver, Kuperberg says he was also surprised, especially in light of current events, by the reactions of some students and faculty members and the lack of views favorable to the United States. “There are people who insist that unless the country is completely pure, then it is not worth supporting," he says. “This is as ridiculous as ‘my country right or wrong.'"

Kuperberg, an expert in macroeconomics who has taught at Swarthmore for more than 20 years, co-edited the anthology Law, Economics, and Philosophy (Rowman & Littlefield, 1983) with then–Associate Professor of Political Science Charles Beitz. He says people do not understand that international trade enriches more than the United States.

“At the most fundamental level, it is wrong to believe that if the United States benefits from the global economy, then other nations must necessarily be hurt,” he says. “This is the single most misunderstood idea in economics. Subsectors within a country can be hurt by trade while other sectors are helped, but this is as true for the United States as it is for any other country.”

But if globalization means an “emerging world culture,” then it probably has had some effect on the “radical Islamicists,” he says, “because they view that culture as seductive and sinful. But Hollywood, Bollywood, or anywhere movies are made is more to blame for this than are the IMF or the World Bank.”

Kuperberg sympathizes with the view that “the only way to stop the cycle of violence is for you to stop,” he says. “But the idea that we should send police and not military is nuts—a nonsolution. It would be nice if you could bring them to justice, but it’s utopian and clearly not going to work.”

Instead, Kuperberg suggests a harsh stance for the United States and its allies to take. “We may have to depose the Taliban,” he says. “They may have to disappear, especially if they’re unwilling to squash terrorists in their own country. I think you have to earn your right to sovereignty. If you harbor terrorists that interfere with others, then you lose that right.”

Although Kuperberg dismisses the metaphor of Pearl Harbor as “ridiculous,” he says the larger but imperfect comparison with World War II is still useful. In the handling of Germany and Japan after that war, Kuperberg finds a successful model for occupying a country, rewriting its constitution, and rebuilding it. But it comes with a price.

“It’s hard to know how much to interfere with another country,” he says. “In the past, we’ve treated these extremists like children having a tantrum—ignore them, and they will stop. But they should be treated like mature, responsible people: If you do something bad, there are consequences.”

Ultimately, Kuperberg believes the only long-term solution is to stop terrorism at its source. “I think terrorists are generated internally, which is why the only solution is for societies to stop generating them,” he says. “This can happen by a combination of alleviating legitimate grievances and suppressing radical elements who cannot be reasoned with.”

Ever the fan of the marketplace of ideas, Kuperberg notes that pacifists are always the minority, never the mainstream. “It’s one thing to be a conscientious objector,” he says. “But even pacifists have to pick their fights. Especially at Swarthmore, there’s a romanticization among some of the Vietnam protest era, and I understand that. But that’s not a way to appreciate this problem. This is not your Daddy’s Vietnam War.”

Stephen Bensch - HISTORY

“Even if we do dismantle Al-Qaeda, it’s one head on the Hydra.”

The radical wheel of Islam is very new, but it’s pressing on structures of Islamic society that go way back,” says Professor of History Stephen Bensch. “That’s what’s perplexing and hard for us to understand. This is not a medieval culture, and Osama bin Laden is not a medieval figure. His attacks are not low-tech—and neither is Al-Qaeda. Its more general definition is foundation, but it can also mean database. It’s very modern, and something we should be scared about.”

Although he began as a Western medievalist with a focus on France and Spain, Bensch branched out across the Mediterranean and now also teaches medieval Islam. He does not believe an understanding of the present conflict is possible without an understanding of Islam’s cultural emergence.

“First, Islam’s growth into a global religion has been going on since its inception,” Bensch says. “From the very beginning, Muslims had to deal with Christian and Jewish majorities and [had to] build on those populations. So ‘globalization’ is not new.”

Also important is the nature of power in Islamic societies where, according to Bensch, governmental leadership and moral leadership have historically taken very different paths. “There is tension, as there was in the 8th century, and Islam feels this pull,” he says. “Governing groups have tended to be cosmopolitan and worldly, while the religious scholars have been the moral leaders. In these societies, modern political regimes have had difficulty gaining the moral high ground.”

As a result, Bensch says calls once made for Arab socialism or nationalism are now more “Islam based” because of frustrations, not entirely unreasonable, with modern governments. “We expect our governments to have a moral quality, right? We get upset when our government officials fail to act for the general welfare,” he says.

But Bensch is quick to note that radical fundamentalism, although it developed in the 1960s and 1970s, is not due to fears of modernity alone. “The internal tensions in the region go much deeper than that,” he says. “They’re imbedded in Islamic societies. You could express it with an image of a [person with] computer mouse or wine glass in one hand and the Quran in the other.”

As for the U.S. response, Bensch cautiously endorses it, but notes trouble still looms. “The United States has a moral imperative to act,” he says. “There’s a Dylan song, ‘sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace,’ and so far, I think we’ve acted wisely. But in 10 years, are we going to have in Pakistan a fundamentalist government with an atom bomb? Long after bin Laden is tracked down and killed, there will be others like him. Even if we do dismantle Al-Qaeda, it’s one head on the Hydra.”

To help counter this threat, Bensch looks to Muslim populations in the West to take a stand, albeit a difficult one. “They should speak out strongly against these acts,” he says. “In the Constitution of Medina [a fundamental document in the Islamic tradition], Muhammad said, ‘no believer for the sake of a nonbeliever shall harm another believer.’ That’s an important restriction. But the image of a Muslim holding a Quran and denouncing Osama to the skies is not the first image that comes to mind.”

Bensch acknowledges that at Swarthmore and elsewhere, “the first reaction was that this is not true of all Muslims and that this is not Islam at all,” he says. “But many Muslims do think Osama has something profound to say, so it’s important for Muslim communities in the West to stand up and make their voices heard. It’s unclear whether this will happen.”

Even if it does, Bensch says any positive effects will not be felt for some time. “I’m thinking over several generations,” he says. “Islamic societies move between two social and cultural poles—one cosmopolitan and inclusive, the other pietistic and exclusive—and they can shift easily and dangerously. This is a deep, structural conflict that’s been going on for a long time. I’m not sure peace is anywhere near at hand.”

Farha Ghannam - ANTHROPOLOGY

“It is important to support genuine democratic changes in the region.... The purpose should be to seek justice, not revenge.”

I don’t think many non-Muslim Americans realize the dilemmas that Muslims in the United States face,” says Assistant Professor of Anthropology Farha Ghannam, a Palestinian who grew up in Jordan. “Muslims share the pain of their fellow Americans in seeing the towers collapse and seeing so many innocent people die, but they also have to struggle to make sense out of these attacks, which are being justified by their religion. You can’t measure pain, but in some way, the pain is doubled in the case of Muslims who live here.”

For Ghannam, this feeling was personally true. In the first two weeks after Sept. 11, she found it difficult to even talk about the attacks. “I was too emotionally upset,” she says, “not only because my heart bleeds for the victims and their families, but to have people use your religion and culture to justify their acts—it makes it really hard.”

Ghannam, who has been in the United States since 1989, earned a Ph.D. in Texas but did her fieldwork in Egypt. “I feel like I belong in both cultures,” she says, and these dual loyalties present challenges.

“It’s very hard for me to deal with this issue, but as social scientists, our task is to try to understand cultural practices and why people do what they do,” she says. “This in no way legitimizes certain acts. Rather, it is essential to understand the historical context that shapes people’s views, practices, and beliefs.”

To its credit, Ghannam points to how open Islam is to different interpretations. “For instance, the notion of ‘jihad’ is very much contested and has many meanings,” she says. “It comes from ‘to exert oneself,’ to struggle against the self and your desires in order to be closer to God and overcome your weaknesses. Yes, it also indicates the use of force to defend the Muslim community, but even on that, you would find that religious experts disagree.”

Until recently, Ghannam says that the United States was viewed as a relatively fair player in the Middle East. “Many there hoped it would bring positive changes to the region, but unlike their parents, who experienced colonization under the British and French, the new, younger generation believes that United States policies are unfair,” she says. “They look at situations such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the situation in Iraq and think that America is using a double standard. That is, why would the United States be so quick in bombing Iraq while allowing the Palestinians to suffer for more than 35 years?”

Ghannam also says that many in the Middle East condemn U.S. support of oppressive regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, where it has troops. “Many young people believe that these regimes continue to rule only because they are supported by the Americans, and that challenging the United States is the only way to change local realities,” she says. “Saudi Arabia is where the most places sacred to Muslims are located. This is partly why some in the Muslim world may be sympathetic to bin Laden’s views.”

Although she knows some think war is, or should be, the only option, Ghannam believes it will not work. “I’m not at all saying the United States deserves this,” she says. “And I have no sympathy whatsoever for the Taliban. They have been oppressing women, minorities, and almost everyone in Afghanistan. But I worry about the innocent civilians who may be killed and displaced because of a new war. I am afraid the situation in Iraq—where Saddam Hussein is still alive and well while hundreds of thousands have died—will be repeated. I also do not want bin Laden to become a legend or hero that some young Muslims may aspire to imitate. Let’s be careful now because we may face the outcome tomorrow.”

Ghannam says the solution ultimately lies in changing U.S. policies in the Middle East, especially because many people there support the United States overall.

“It is not a clash between the West and the East or between two different civilizations,” she says. “Judging from my own work in Egypt, people are fascinated by the United States and its technology and power. So it is important to support genuine democratic changes in the region and not certain, oppressive regimes because ‘they are our friends.’ I also believe that we should support the role of international bodies such as the United Nations in finding solutions for such conflicts. The purpose should be to seek justice, not revenge.”

In coping with these difficult issues, Ghannam’s classes this year are especially timely. “It’s been sad, but also interesting, to teach during this time,” she says. “For instance, in Cultures of the Middle East, the day before the attack we discussed orientalism and ‘is Islam violent?’ The first class after the attacks, it was very hard for me to be there and talk about it. But the students kept posing very important questions—why are people doing this? What’s motivating them? What are the economic and political contexts that produce these acts?”

Ghannam credits the students with asking those key questions, which encouraged her to look back at her own research. “I feel very fortunate to teach here at Swarthmore,” she says. “Not only are my colleagues very supportive, but the students are very sophisticated and aware that they shouldn’t homogenize all Arabs and Muslims.”

Beyond class, Ghannam says her interactions with students are helping her personally. “It’s refreshing and important for me to see their reactions to what the president and others say,” she says. “Their reactions make me hopeful that they’re a generation that understands power and inequality and that has a different understanding of resolving conflict. In the future, they will make a difference in how we’ll relate to all countries and cultures, not just those in the Middle East.”